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ABSTRACT
TACIT WEB: ENTREPRENEURIAL DISCOVERY, INSTITUTIONAL
COMPLEXITY AND INTERNET DIFFUSION
SEPTEMBER 2015
MEELIS KITSING, B.A., TARTU UNIVERSITY
M.S., LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
M.A.L.D., FLETCHER SCHOOL OF TUFTS UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Distinguished University Professor Jane E. Fountain

This dissertation investigates how institutional frameworks and entrepreneurial
discovery processes condition internet diffusion. While internet and internet-based
technologies have received considerable scholarly attention, the dissertation emphasizes tacit
elements in understanding internet diffusion. In order to do so, it incorporates perspectives on
insttitutional complexity stemming from interactions of formal and informal institutions and
different institutional logics. Empiral part consists both macro level comparisons of Estonia
and Slovenia as well as micro level analysis of internet diffusion processes within Estonia.
Estonia and Slovenia are selected for comparison because of considerable variance in
insitutional frameworks. At the same time, both countries are relatively small and members of
the European Union. This allows to focus on specific institutional configurations and pathdependencies in constraining and enabling the diffusion of internet. I find that internet is
diffused more extensively and intensively in Estonia. Different socio-economic groups use
more sophisticated online services in Estonia than in Slovenia. Once specific institutional
configurations in general and in the telecom sector in particular are considered then it emerges
that insitutional frameworks in Estonia have been more facilitative of entrepreneurial
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discovery processes over time. As a result, supply and demand for innovative online services
in Estonia is greater than in Slovenia.
After comparative perspective on two countries, the dissertation proceeds to analyze
specific cases of online initiatives in Estonia such as internet banking and internet voting.
Examination of outcomes shows how some of these initiatives have been successful and
created reasons for adoption and use of internet on the individual level leading to a greater
diffusion on macro level. My analysis demonstrates that positive outcomes have often been
unintended result of experimentation through the process of entrepreneurial discovery within
the context of institutions and path-dependencies. Evidence for this finding is bolstered by
study of heterogeneous cases of various ICT initiatives. By emphazing institutional
complexity and policy heterogeneity, the dissertation illuminates and explains the tacit nature
of internet diffusion in a specific context of Estonia. This implies that Estonia has followed a
unique developmental trajectory which cannot be generalized and transferred to other
countries.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Problem
Often the internet is perceived as a global borderless technology which is not limited
by politics, morality and geography. Some governments may try to stop its use or regulate
some aspects of its use but even these governments often face an uphill battle. In the early
days of internet, internet activist John Perry Barlow published a “Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace” where he argued that governments do not have sovereignty in
the cyberspace (Barlow 1996). He told to “Governments of the industrial world” that
“Cyberspace does not lie within your borders” (Barlow 1996). Following the true spirit of
early internet pioneers, Estonian computer programmers created Kazaa in 2001 to facilitate
peer-to-peer online file-sharing which soon became the most download computer app in the
world. However, they soon discovered that there are clear borders in the cyberspace.
According to the Hollywood-based entertainment industry they had violated some of these
borders. The United States imposed its extraterritorial sovereignty in the cyberspace and
Kazaa founders became fugitives of the US justice system. The case over different perception
of borders was finally settled for 100 million dollars in 2006. Fortunately, Kazaa founders had
just sold their other internet-border-testing venture called Skype to eBay for 2.6 billion
dollars.
The internet clearly is not a borderless technology. The nature of its use and diffusion
is clearly limited by geography, state sovereignty, economics, politics and numerous other
factors. If the world would be flat and internet would be borderless, we would expect internet
to be diffused evenly and its use to be uniform. Yet within the borders of developed countries
internet is more diffused than among developing countries. In addition, among different
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countries of industrial world internet diffuses also with different speeds. This is quite
revealing for at least two reason. First, it clearly indicates that internet is a global technology
but its diffusion is not aspatial but spatial. As it reaches different countries in different points
of time, then its diffusion is also not ahistorical but historical. It other words, history matters
for how internet diffuses in time with different extensity and intensity in different locations.
Second, if internet diffusion is dependent on historical, geographical, political, social and
other factors, then it is important to understand how these factors enable and constrain the
diffusion of the internet.
Understanding the relationship between internet diffusion and vast variety of social,
political and economic factors has increasingly become a crucial issue as more and more
societies rely on the internet for a wide range of interactions ranging from work to leisure.
While there has been an increasing number of studies on internet diffusion which have used a
variety of variables to explain diffusion, the specific contextual factors of internet diffusion is
not well understood. Some scholars have emphasized the importance of national wealth. More
income people have more likely can they afford to use internet and related technologies
(Kiiski and Pohjola 2001; Kiiski and Pohjola 2002; Norris 2001; Beilock and Dimitrova
2003; Corrales and Westhoff 2006, 912). Other scholars have emphasized the role of
institutions which are defined as rules of the game. Most scholars focus on what are called
formal rules – laws and regulations of a country (Dasgupta et al 2001; Milner 2006; Guillen
and Suarez 2005; Caselli and Coleman 2001). This is understandable because formal rules are
easier to measure than informal rules such as social norms, expectations and culture. Some
scholars have found that democracies have a greater rate of internet diffusion than
authoritarian regimes (Milner 2006). This is not surprising because authoritarian governments
often try to discourage their citizens from using internet for at least certain purposes and
particularly for activities which may in some ways undermine the legitimacy of the
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government. However, other scholars have found that much more specific rules may matter
for the diffusion of internet and related technologies. Particularly, how governments regulate
telecom sector and how much competition they allow for offering various telecom services
matters to a great deal (Dasgupta et al 2001; Guillen and Suarez 2005; Caselli and Coleman
2001).
Nevertheless, most of the studies focusing on income or formal institutions rely on a
limited set of variables to study a large number of countries. Ultimately, it means that many
factors that may matter for the diffusion of internet may be assumed away. However,
countries with similar levels of wealth and fairly similar institutional settings may still have
different levels of internet diffusion. This suggests that a country’s internet diffusion is not an
issue to be explained by a small number of country-level variables but there are important
elements outside overly simplistic formalized models which must be considered. Indeed,
studies focusing on a small number of cases usually come to the different conclusions on
factors that matter for internet diffusion than studies based on large number of cases (Howard
et al 2009). Partially, such outcome is dependent on research methods. Case studies allow
incorporating more details and to draw a richer picture. If we think how internet diffusion is
limited by borders, then it is not just easily measurable borders that matter. Mental and
epistemic factors are much more difficult to grasp than political, economic, geographical and
legal borders of countries. Hence, it is important to incorporate both literal and metaphorical
borders into analysis. This dissertation aims to do that by describing what it calls a tacit web.
The metaphor refers tacit knowledge which is important for understanding how internet
diffuses in different countries and domains as well as tacit nature of internet diffusion where
important factors behind diffusion process are not easily visible, measurable and
comprehensible.
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Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are particularly illustrative in this
perspective. They had socialist economic and political systems until 1991 albeit with some
important differences. They all went through economic, political and social transition in the
1990s towards democracy, freer markets and greater social openness. The most advanced of
these countries joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007. However, the rate of internet
diffusion varies considerably in these countries. This outcome cannot be explained by national
wealth because countries with similar level of wealth can have different outcomes in internet
diffusion. They are all democracies. The formal institutional framework of these countries is
fairly similar as they all had to adopt the EU laws and regulations. To be clear, they have
adopted also EU regulations in the telecom sector, which some scholars emphasize as
important variable in explaining the diffusion of internet and related technologies. In order to
understand differences in internet diffusion rates among these countries, I will undertake a
more nuanced and detailed study of Estonia and Slovenia as well as seven specific cases
within Estonia to characterize the processes behind internet diffusion.
This exploration contributes to our broader understanding of technology diffusion in
general and to political science and political economy research on internet diffusion in
particular. The internet is a relatively new technology making it an understudied topic in the
broader systematic context of research concerning technology diffusion.

1.2 Statement of the Problem
This dissertation focuses on specific country level cases and cases within country in
order to understand processes behind internet diffusion. I describe both country-level
characteristics of internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia as well as specific processes in
Estonia. Therefore, this dissertation has three research questions. The first question of this
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dissertation is the following: How do Estonia and Slovenia differ in the outcomes of internet
diffusion?
Internet diffusion is understood in this study as a process indicating increased adoption
and use of digital network technologies by growing numbers of people in their daily lives.
Internet diffusion is understood both as a macro and a micro process in this study. Diffusion is
usually seen how innovation spreads from its source to a wider public. Micro process of how
individuals and firms adopt internet is also seen as part of diffusion process in this study.
Essentially, macro and micro processes interact and are mutually interdependent. Macro
process means diffusion of internet to a wider public while micro process means adoption of
internet by individuals and groups of individuals such as companies.1 Furthermore, this
research offers methodologically sound conceptualization of the internet diffusion, which
utilizes more sophisticated approach to the measurement of the internet diffusion than it is
standard in the literature. This is vital for advancing our understanding of diffusion outcomes
and processes behind, which is still limited due to weak conceptualization and measurement
errors. Particularly, as the reliance by scholars on different non-correlated dependent variables
has led to different causal explanations. This dissertation will measure internet diffusion by
eleven different variables focusing on extensity and intensity of its diffusion instead of single
datasets that dominate in most studies. The study tries to capture what Kitsing and Howard
(2009) called “effective internet diffusion”, not formal internet diffusion. Chapters Three and
Four will discuss internet diffusion and its measurement in both conceptual and theoretical
terms.
The second research question of this dissertation is the following: How have the
entrepreneurial discovery processes and internet diffusion intertwined in Estonia?
Entrepreneurial discovery process is understood as a combination of Schumpeterian and smart

1

Appendix A offers definition and discussion of key terms and concepts used in this paper. Both Chapters Two
and Three also discuss key concepts in a greater detail.
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specialization scholars’ approaches (Schumpeter 1975; Foray, 2015; McCann and OrtegaArgiles 2013; 2014). An entrepreneur is a risk-taker and innovator who breaks routines by
adopting new processes and bringing new products and services to the market. However, such
entrepreneurs do not operate only in private sector but also in public and non-profit sectors.
This means also involvement of entrepreneurs in policy-design as well as use of creation of
entrepreneurs in public sector and vice-versa. Chapter Two offers theoretical discussion of
entrepreneurial discovery process. Chapters Five and Six apply the concept in empirical
analysis.
The third research question of this dissertation is the following: How has institutional
complexity constrained entrepreneurial discovery processes and internet diffusion in Estonia?
Institutional complexity is understood as interactions of formal and informal institutions as
well as interactions of formal institutions on different levels of government regulations.
Different institutions, their interactions, conflicts and institutional logics behind these
institutions creates institutional complexity (Greenwood et al. 2011; Room 2011; Smets et al.,
2012; Thornton et al. 2012). The regulations of European Union may conflict with domestic
government regulations or they may be against informal rules based on attitudes and
expectations of people. Macroeconomic framework may conflict with government regulation
on a micro level. Communities may not respect micro-level government rules because they
conflict with their social norms. Chapter Two will discuss institutional complexity
theoretically while Chapter Six will apply this concept to specific cases.

1.3 Scope of the Study
The research aims to connect a broad institutional perspectives and theories on
entrepreneurial discovery process with the literature on technology diffusion. The dissertation
argues that institutions and the entrepreneurial discovery process are crucial in understanding
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different outcomes of the internet diffusion. To add precision to the concept of institutions,
the study factors in the interactions between informal and formal institutions. It explores how
different institutions encourage greater social, economic and political use of the internet and
how it is essential for understanding the spread of internet in local environments. This
approach examines how institutions and entrepreneurial discovery processes facilitate spread
of tacit and dispersed knowledge, which, in turn, facilitate internet diffusion. The technical
aspects and transferable knowledge - which make the Internet seemingly global - represent
only the tip of the iceberg in explaining the intensity and extensity of diffusion. My goal is to
characterize complexity and heterogeneity in the internet diffusion process on the basis of
case studies. I am convinced that such approach is more meaningful in understanding internet
diffusion on the ground than overly deterministic studies based on assumptions of linearity.
Obviously, my study comes with important limitations.
This dissertation research is explicitly descriptive and particularist. By descriptive I
mean that I describe internet diffusion on basis of comparison between two countries and
cases within one country. I do not make any causal claims. That’s why research questions
start with “how”, and not “why”. The use of “why” would imply causal inference and making
if-then claims. By particularist I mean that I do not aim to generalize my findings for a larger
population. I do not claim that Estonia and Slovenia are representative of all CEE countries or
European countries. I also do not claim that seven cases within Estonia are representative of a
broader set of cases outside of Estonia. Actually, I think that some of the cases such as
narratives in Chapter Five on Skype, internet banking, internet voting and ID card are unique.
Other cases in Chapter Six may bear closer resemblance to a broader population. Essentially,
my aim is to explore some of these context-specific country differences through comparison
of two countries and comparison of cases within one country.
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I start by analyzing internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia, two countries in Central
and Eastern Europe that joined the European Union in 2004. This comparative study focuses
on particular critical junctures in their development, which is crucial in understanding the
variance in the internet diffusion between two countries. I have chosen Estonia and Slovenia
as cases from 1991 to present for country-level comparison because they offer high degree of
comparability. In addition to the factors that I pointed out above which make CEE countries
similar to each other, Estonia and Slovenia are both small countries with populations 1.3 and
2 million respectively and they are geographically, economically and culturally close to
economically more advanced Western European countries. They are also most advanced in
terms of ICT developments. In the early 2000s they were relatively similar in the diffusion of
internet. However, Estonia has leaped ahead over time. Slovenia is also wealthier than
Estonia, which rules out wealth as an explanatory variable for these differences. In other
words, there are considerable similarities on a very general level, which allows focusing on
particular institutional dimensions in understanding the differences between Estonia and
Slovenia.2
The work on Estonia and Slovenia is a continuation of my earlier study, which
emphasized the importance of economic openness for internet diffusion (Kitsing 2004).
Meanwhile, significant time has passed which has re-enforced my view that economic
openness is a crucial factor in explaining internet diffusion. At the same time, it is one factor
among many and it is clearly not sufficient factor. Incorporation of newer and more
comprehensive data allows offering a more detailed description of internet diffusion in
Estonia and Slovenia in this dissertation.
The comparisons of Estonia and Slovenia will be followed by analysis of seven cases
in Estonia. I have chosen cases within Estonia because Estonia is poorer than Slovenia and
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Appendix B offers an overview of Estonia and Slovenia.

8

has had less sophisticated institutional frameworks in the 1990s and 2000s. Yet Estonia is a
more advanced country in internet diffusion. Hence, case studies within Estonia allow to
making a step further and offering an even more detailed study on how entrepreneurial
discovery processes have been crucial for internet diffusion in some domains and how these
processes have been constrained by institutional complexity in other domains.
I recognize that there are many variables that may influence outcomes in the internet
diffusion. Essentially, internet diffusion outcomes are overdetermined. My aim is not to study
all these variables and reveal their relative importance. My research methods do not allow me
to do it because I use descriptive methods. However, I am focusing on how institutions and
entrepreneurial discovery interact with internet diffusion and I aim to describe these
processes. I realize that increased diffusion of internet has both advantages and disadvantages.
The desired or undesired effects of the internet are certainly linked to the causes of its
diffusion. However, my goal is not to make moral claims about the costs and benefits of
diffusion but rather describe diffusion and related processes.

1.4 Summary of Chapters
The next chapter reviews literature on internet diffusion as well as political science
and related literature on institutions. This synthesis of literature aims to demonstrate how
institutionalist perspectives can be linked to a number of theoretical perspectives on
innovation and diffusion of internet. It emphasizes the importance of epistemological nature
of technology and role of tacit knowledge. It points out the necessity to look beyond formal
institutions in researching internet diffusion. The chapter pays particular attention to
institutional complexity combining both formal and informal institutions in understanding the
technology diffusion processes. It highlights the interactions between entrepreneurial
discovery processes and internet diffusion and reveals how institutional complexity constrains
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entrepreneurial discovery in different economic, political, social and geographic context from
contributing to technology diffusion.
Chapter Three offers an overview of the research methodology, which incorporates
discussion of conceptualization, use of variables and the measurement issues and rationale for
case-selection and elite interviewing. It offers a critique of quantitative approaches relying on
one or two measures of internet diffusion and limited number of explanatory variables, which
cannot demonstrate the complexity of diffusion process. This chapter introduces the idea of
index of “effective internet diffusion” and shows how this concept can be operationalized on
the basis of 11 different indicators measuring network nature, sophistication of use and social
distribution of internet. It highlights the benefits of thick description, which focuses on
diffusion processes on the basis of a limited number of cases.
Chapter Four turns to comparative and descriptive analysis of Estonia and Slovenia. It
focuses on outcomes of internet diffusion as measured by 11 variables in the last available
year of data availability and change in outcomes over time. Estonia and Slovenia are
compared on the basis of internet users per 100 inhabitants, households with internet access
and broadband access at home, enterprises with broadband access, regular use of internet by
males and females, by individuals with low formal education as well as by age. It also
compares internet use by households in the areas with high and low population density as well
as by income distribution. It further compares countries on the basis of supply side indicators
such as broadband penetration rate, mobile broadband coverage and download and upload
speed. This is followed by the discussion of national wealth and income distribution in
Estonia and Slovenia. Then the chapter explores institutional framework in general and formal
rules of the telecom sector in particular with the focus on reforms undertaken by both
countries prior their membership in the EU. The chapter concludes by discussing human
capital in the form of ICT skills in Estonia and Slovenia.
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Chapter Five explores four positive cases within Estonia. It starts by discussing the
emergence of Skype in order to demonstrate how open ecosystem and competitive telecom
market facilitated new entrant, which quickly become a global player. The narrative on Skype
aims to highlight a broad institutional framework governing businesses in Estonia as well as
how entrepreneurial discovery process was unleashed in this post-socialist country. This is
followed by discussion of how start-up retail banks introduced internet banking 1996, which
essentially becomes a critical juncture in path-dependent process of encouraging internet use.
Internet banking was not just about making banking transactions online but by providing
secure online identification method it becomes a platform for offering various public and
private sector online services. The chapter discusses the option to submit tax declarations
online which was introduced by the Estonian Tax Authority in 2000.
This is followed by the case of national ID card which was introduced in 2002 to
serve as identification method in online and offline environments. The chapter emphasizes the
cooperation between two largest retail banks, two largest telecom companies and Estonian
government as a fundamental factor in the success of ID card. It also emphasizes that ID card
builds on the path-dependent process started by internet banking. Chapter Five concludes by
discussion of internet voting in internet voting in Estonia from 2005 to 2015. It highlights the
use of national ID card as mobile ID in the voting process as well as outcome of internet
voting and its distributional impact.
Chapter Six explores three heterogeneous cases within Estonia in order to balance
emphasis on agency in Chapter Five. It starts by challenging conventional wisdom on
Estonian policy-making in the area of ICT which often sees Estonian policy design as
homogeneous, centralized and smart. On basis of secondary data and interviews it
characterizes Estonia as an average innovator and not particularly innovative in its policy
design. It argues that Estonian approach to ICT policy has been relatively de-centralized and
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hands-off by focusing on general rule-making. This is followed by a case on network
neutrality legislation in the context of 2009 EU telecom package. It shows how Estonian
policy was heterogeneous by design and outcomes concerning network neutrality issues in
spite of presence of powerful vested interests and considerable experience in telecom policymaking. The last case focuses on government venture capital, which has primarily benefited
ICT companies. It shows how this government initiative has led to heterogeneous outcomes
and straightforward policy failures in capturing positive externalities of innovation. Common
theme to all cases in Chapter Six is a focus on institutional complexity as a constraint
entrepreneurial discovery and how this leads to policy heterogeneity in various Estonian ICT
policies and initiatives. Chapter Seven offers the discussion and conclusion of main findings,
discusses the limitations of the dissertation, and offers recommendations for future research
and highlights policy implications.
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CHAPTER 2
ANTECEDENTS OF INTERNET DIFFUSION: FORMAL AND INFORMAL
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how scholars have understood and explained
internet diffusion. What have been causal claims made in the literature about internet
diffusion as well as descriptive accounts on diffusion of internet? In order to accomplish this
goal this synthesis of literature draws from the scholarship in economics, economic history,
economic geography, political economy, political science and public policy for understanding
diverse set of explanations concerning the internet diffusion. This chapter uses the terms
internet diffusion, penetration, adoption, connectivity, access, use and digital divide
interchangeably to describe the same phenomena which is internet diffusion. Usually,
internet diffusion is seen as macro phenomena (Dholakia et al 2004). While adoption is
defined as a micro process where individuals make decisions about the use of internet.
However, micro and macro processes interact. Often macro outcomes are simply aggregates
of multiple micro processes. Adoption of internet by groups of individuals such as students or
businesses in manufacturing sector, for instance, increases diffusion of internet on per capita
basis on macro level.
Although the internet is now 20 years old, the research subject remains a relatively
new phenomena and the literature available on the internet diffusion has still considerable
gaps, then the chapter discusses perspectives on the diffusion of different information and
related technologies with an assumption that these insights are applicable for understanding
the internet diffusion. One of the main contributions of this literature review is to connect
different theories in different branches of social sciences in order to understand better how
internet diffuses in different countries. Scholars are often creatures of their habits in
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conducting research tend to rely on theories and methodological approaches that they feel
comfortable with. This implies that theoretical explanations and methodological approaches
applied to understanding internet diffusion have been limited in different scholarly domains.
Over the years a specific literature on internet and electronic government has emerged.
Nevertheless, this literature often lacks strong links to crucial theories in social sciences,
which allows us to understand better important features of technology diffusion.
Bearing this in mind, this literature review and synthesis starts with linear and
unidimensional accounts in offering causal inference for internet diffusion. Some scholars
have found that income is key explanatory variable of internet diffusion (Kiiski and Pohjola
2002). Wealthier people and wealthier nations can afford to connect to internet and purchase
necessary hardware and software while poorer nations and people can do it to a lesser extent.
These wealth based accounts have been challenged by scholars who emphasize the
institutions as explanatory variable for internet diffusion. Since most of these studies have
relied on quantitative methods and a large sample of countries, then the concept of institutions
have been operationalized in a reductionist fashion. Institutions are seen as formal institutions
meaning formal rules of the game such as laws and regulations of a country. The concept is
operationalized through the use of datasets showing whether a country is a democracy or not,
has certain type of telecom regulation, is economically open or some other variable.
However, such reductionist approaches ignore institutional complexity as it is argued
in the pages that follow. First, institutions are not just formal rules of the game but also
include informal rules such as culture, informal networks, habits and so on. Both informal and
formal institutions interact and impact outcomes. Second, focus on some formal institutions
because they are easily measurable implies that method drives particular social science
inquiry and determines the research question. It needs to be other way around. Third,
reductionist approaches based large samples use a limited number of variables and assume
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that the relationship between variables is linear. As it is demonstrated in this chapter,
technology diffuses in a non-linear way. Markets and government policies are characterized
by non-linerarity as well. Thus, institutional complexity (defined precisely under key terms
and in the following parts of this chapter) means interactions of formal and informal rules in a
non-linear world characterized by path-depence and imperfections in markets as well as
government policy.
In order to grasp the nature of institutional complexity and its interactions with
agency, the chapter discusses literature on geography, international trade, smart specialization
and entrepreneurial discovery to emphasize how technologies diffuse differently in different
contexts. Trade openness and environments that encourage entrepreneurial discovery
processes tend to encourage internet diffusion. At the same time, geographical location may
enable or impose serious constraints how the diffusion of technology takes place. It also
interacts with the entrepreneurial discovery process, which is important for bringing new
technologies to markets and to governments. This chapter emphasizes the role of entrepreneur
and their discovery processes as characterized by Schumpeter and more recent literature on
smart specialization. It defines entrepreneurship more broadly including entrepreneurial
discovery processes in private, public and non-governmental sector. The agency of
entrepreneurs is important but as this chapter emphasizes they do not operate in a vacuum.
The entrepreneurs face institutional complexity, an imperfect market and the network nature
of internet as well as policy environments where path-dependencies on previous decisions
may enable or constrain their ability to bring new technologies to the market. While there are
many factors which may constrain agency, the chapter also draws from the literature on social
capital and networks emphasizing the role of entrepreneurial networks and communities in
overcoming constraints imposed by uncertainty and complexity of their external environment.
This chapter’s aim is not to offer a deterministic and universal approach on how
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entrepreneurship and institutional framework interacts, but. rather, to emphasize the nuances
and details which often tend to be overlooked in the studies of technology diffusion. The
complexity and uncertainty in the diffusion process highlights a high degree of fragility.
Galvanizing changes influencing internet diffusion are often spontaneous and not a result of
some masterplan. It can be success without strategy (Kitsing 2011). The same institutional
framework may produce both successes and failures in the diffusion processes. As Paul
Pierson argues in his influential book on institutional analysis: “Every step and every
movement of the multitude, even in what are termed enlightened ages, are made with equal
blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are, indeed, the result
of human action, but not the execution of any human design.” (Pierson 2004, 102)
This points towards accidental nature of diffusion outcomes. The chapter concludes by
emphasizing the importance of decentralized and tacit knowledge in understanding the
internet diffusion. The success of internet diffusion is highly dependent on its nature as a
decentralized network, which facilitates the use and exploitation of vast variety of related
actors by diverse set of agents in different institutional environments. This chapter calls it
“tacit web”.

2.1 Income versus Institutions in Explaining Internet Diffusion
The main debate and key streams of theory and research regarding the internet and
information technology diffusion can be summarized as emphasizing either the role of income
or institutions. Institutions are rules of the game in society consisting both formal and
informal rules (North 1990; 2005). Pierson says that they are “humanly devised constraints
that shape human interaction” (Pierson 2004, 27). A more detailed definition will be offered
in the following parts of this chapter. To start with income-based explanations, economists
and other scholars have often taken a reductionist approach by looking at the relationship
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between relative prices at which Internet is supplied and demand for Internet by looking at per
capita income. A standard microeconomics approach assumes that both supply and demand
are equally crucial. The father of neoclassical microeconomics, Alfred Marshall, pointed out
that supply and demand are like blades of scissors where it is hard to argue which blade is
more important for cutting (Marshall 1920, Bk VI, Ch. II, 16). Individuals in richer countries
may have more income for paying for the Internet connectivity and, thus, supply of Internet
has to meet the demand. Whether Marshallian assumptions about supply and demand are
correct will be discussed in a detailed way in this chapter.
Some studies have revealed a strong correlation between the rate of per capita internet
diffusion and per capita gross domestic product (GDP) (Kiiski and Pohjola 2001; Kiiski and
Pohjola 2002; Norris 2001; Beilock and Dimitrova 2003; Corrales and Westhoff 2006, 912).3
Norris (2001) finds that the level of economic development is a crucial aspect in
understanding the different outcomes in the internet diffusion. Howard et al (2009) argue that
when scholars study technology diffusion in global and comparative setting, they find that
economic productivity explains diffusion patterns. Productivity is directly related to income
as countries with higher productivity levels have also higher income. Jorgensen et al (2008)
have demonstrated how the use and diffusion of information and communication technologies
(ICT) contributes to productivity growth. This may lead to circular reasoning where wealthier
countries adopt ICTs and diffusion of internet and related technologies, in turn, increases their
productivity, which increases their income and which in turn allows them to use more ICTs.
In other words, studies using per capita GDP or other measures of income as explanatory
variables for internet diffusion are able to establish correlation at best. True but the effect may
be genuinely “self-reinforcing” as is often the case with economic development. It is difficult
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The synthesis of literature was first developed by Kitsing (2008) and Kitsing and Howard (2009), which
demonstrated that such approached rely on a limited number of biased variables in explaining internet diffusion
and proposed a concept of effective internet diffusion incorporating broader set of variables.
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to entertain the possibility of causality on the basis of such models – even when their
statistical analysis are robust. It can, however, be argued that internet diffused first in
countries with high levels of productivity, and thus income, than in countries with low levels
of productivity and income. Thus certain level of productivity and income are pre-condition
for internet diffusion and it can be argued that correlation between internet diffusion and
productivity equals causation because high productivity level existed before high level of
internet diffusion. However, there is considerable scholarly literature on how the European
Union, a relatively wealthy economic bloc with a high productivity in a comparative
perspective, has not been able to utilize ICTs as well as the United States (Jorgenson 2001;
2008; Oliner 2007; Inklaar 2008). The failure of EU to turn ICTs into productivity gains
indicates a possibility that the link between productivity and internet diffusion is not as
automatic and linear as the studies discussed above suggest. Certainly, EU has also lower
productivity than the US but it is still questionable that certain degree of productivity would
translate automatically into certain degree of internet diffusion in a linear fashion. These
insights have led to an emergence of literature on smart specialization in Europe, which will
be discussed in a more detailed manner later in this chapter. Most importantly, we have to
incorporate other variables, which may be crucial in explaining internet diffusion.
The focus of empirical part of this research is on comparison of Estonia and Slovenia
and comparisons of different cases of internet use within Estonia. Since Slovenia has higher
level of productivity and national income than Estonia, but internet diffusion per capita terms
is greater in Estonia, then an interesting puzzle emerges. Most importantly, the literature
which emphasizes the importance of national wealth and productivity in explaining internet
diffusion cannot solve this puzzle. Hence, the literature review has too look beyond the
studies on income, productivity and internet diffusion. The argument developed in empirical
part cannot refute their findings entirely because it is based on case studies which are not
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generalizable for a wider population. However, theoretical part can demonstrate as a matter of
logic their shortcomings. On one hand, the difference may stem from a level of analysis. In a
highly abstract universe, where stylized analysis aims to explain internet diffusion for all or
most countries in the world, wealth and income may seem important variables. In a messier,
more detailed look on activities on the ground, different explanations emerge. As Howard et
al (2009) point out studies on regional, national and subnational level find politics and culture
to be main reasons for different internet diffusion outcomes. Certainly, the scale of analysis
matters and a research about single or some case studies is not sufficient for rejecting
hypotheses found in papers based on a large number of cases.
However, the difference in explanations is more fundamental and does not stem
simply from the different levels of analysis. Scholars who emphasize the role of institutions in
explaining the outcomes of internet diffusion have studied the diffusion by comparing a large
number of countries in the world (Dasgupta et al 2001; Milner 2006; Guillen and Suarez 2005;
Caselli and Coleman 2001). More conceptually, the institutionalist approach reveals both
shortcomings of wealth based approached as well as technological determinist explanations.
The former was discussed above. The latter claims that technology impacts society
independently of institutional framework (Fountain 2001, 84). Technological determinists
would see the spread of the Internet as the objective technology as sufficient for spreading
openness or increasing productivity (Rogers 1995; Jensen 2007). The key difference between
institutionalist approaches and income and technologically determinist views concerns
constraints and enablers of internet diffusion. Income-based approaches would assume that
main constraint for internet diffusion is income. As was explained above once higher level of
income is achieved, it will correspond to higher level of internet diffusion. Technological
determinism is idea that availability and changes in technology drives the development of
society and its culture. Though most studies on internet diffusion and income are probabilistic
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rather than deterministic, it could be argued that technological determinism is directly linked
to income and productivity as demonstrated above. More income leads to new and better
technologies, which increases productivity, which in turn translates into more income.
Most importantly, these approaches assume institutions away or see institutions as byproducts of technological economic processes. Institutionalist approaches see institutions as
rules of the game, which facilitate diffusion of technologies. Availability of income and
technology may be necessary but it is certainly not sufficient condition for diffusion of
internet. The differences in internet diffusion outcomes are result of institutions because
institutions increase or reduce transaction costs for diffusion in society. These institutions can
be formal such as laws and regulations. For instance, in a telecom market dominated by
monopoly with high prices and poor quality of internet connections, internet diffusion may be
lower than countries with competitive markets, lower prices and superior quality of
connections. As will be discussed below, many studies focusing on technology diffusion
operationalize formal institutions because of data reliability and availability.
However, institutionalist approaches can be broadened by incorporating both formal
and informal institutions. The latter is defined as social norms, culture and other
nonformalized rules of the game shaping the behavior of agents. Thus, broader understanding
of institutions-based approaches to internet diffusion, must incorporate earlier studies on
technology diffusion, which highlight the role of institutions and organizations in “social
shaping”, which impacts technology adoption (Mackay and Gillespie 1992). Economic
historian Joel Mokyr emphasizes the vitality of broader institutional environment by arguing
that the importance of openness to new information and "exposure effects" to new knowledge
as crucial elements for technology diffusion (Mokyr 1990, 186-190). Sociologist Manuel
Castells argues on the basis of the empirical example of the Soviet Union that the politics of
information control was a crucial barrier for diffusion of new technologies of information
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processing (Castells 2000, 35). The ICT threatened the power of the Soviet state, but by
blocking the inflow of the new information technologies the Soviet state undermined its
economic position in the world particularly in the times when the economies around the globe
became more information-based than ever before (Castells 2000, 35-37).
As far as internet and openness is concerned, then Beilock and Dimitrova’s (2003)
statistical study found that openness of a society was strongly correlated with outcomes in the
internet diffusion. They defined openness as a non-economic factor. Openess was important
in their study in addition to the level of infrastructure development and national income.
Guillen and Suarez (2005) how, using data about 121 countries from 1997 through 2001, that
democracies tend to have higher levels of internet use. Corrales and Westhoff (2006) have
confirmed this finding by providing evidence that authoritarian regimes tend to have lower
levels of internet diffusion than democracies. They also found that per capita income in
authoritarian countries is be more important explanatory variable than it is in democratic
countries (Corrales and Westhoff 2006, 912). In other words, open political institutions serve
to some extent as substitutes for the level of per capita GDP. An authoritarian country with
same level of wealth as a democratic country cannot expect to have same level of internet
diffusion. In order to achieve the same level of internet diffusion as democracy, the
authoritarian country either has to increase its wealth or become more democratic.
This is consistent with earlier finding by Przeworski et al (2000) that “democracies
benefit more from technical progress and use labor more effectively” than dictatorships (p.
153). Democracies with per capita income more than $2500-3000 use labor more productively
than dictatorships in the same level of development (Przeworski et al 2000, 166-176). Along
the same lines, Milner (2006) researches 184 countries and finds that on the average
democracies have higher levels of internet diffusion than autocratic countries. Milner’s
findings confirm that political institutions are important in understanding internet diffusion.
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As was highlighted in the introductory part of this chapter, institutions are rules of the game
and incorporate both informal and formal rules. However, Milner’s explanatory variables are
narrow, focusing on one set of formal institutions, and she takes a rationalistic view of
institutions by arguing that
“…political institutions in particular matter for the adoption of new technologies
because they affect the manner and degree to which winners and losers from the
technology can translate their preferences into influence. Groups that believe they will
lose from the Internet try to use political institutions to enact policies that block the
spread of the Internet. These “losers” hope to slow down or stop its diffusion, and
some institutions make this easier to do than others.” (Milner 2006)
Obviously, authoritarian governments are more eager to limit the use of internet and
related technologies. For instance, the use of Facebook is not possible in China. By doing so,
they also minimize its diffusion. Even though, Milner’s (2006) findings support that
democracies are better in adoption than authoritarian regimes, the question remains what
explains the differences among democracies. If all cases to be studied would be democracies,
then political regime type is not necessary and sufficient condition for explaining different
diffusion patterns.
The importance of institutions in comparison with income has been confirmed by
scholars studying specific institutions and policies affecting access to telecom services.
Access to telephone services is comparable to access to internet because one of the preconditions for internet use is existence of basic telecom infrastructure. In the early years most
internet users needed a telephone line to use dial-up service to internet. Even in the
technologically advanced such as the United States, 3 percent of the adult population still used
dial-up service in their homes in 2013 while 30 percent of adult Americans did so in 2004
(Pew Research Center 2013). In 2004, 21 percent of Estonian households with internet access
used dial-up connection while 53 percent of European households did the same (Eurostat
2015). Most importantly, the literature on rules governing telecom sector and telecom policies
brings in richer understanding of institutions than simple democracy-authoritarianism
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dichotomy as discussed by Milner (2006) would suggest. Dasgupta et al (2001) carried out an
econometric analysis and argue that differences in income among countries cannot be an
explanatory variable for understanding internet diffusion. They argue that internet diffusion is
linked to availability of main telephone lines and countries with lower levels of main
telephone lines also have lower levels of internet diffusion. As was pointed out above, this
may be particularly true in 2001 when the study was completed because vast majority of
internet users used dial-up connection. Dasgupta and others go in their paper to demonstrate
that state competition policies are an important explanatory variable in understanding internet
diffusion. Low-income countries with high World Bank ratings for competition policy have a
significantly higher number of internet subscriptions per main telephone lines (Dasgupta et al
2001, 15). The importance of competition for explaining the diffusion of technologies in sync
with studies on telecom regulation by Heimler (2000) and Taylor (2002). Similarly, Fink et al
(2003) researched 86 developing countries and their econometric analysis shows that
complete telecom liberalization pays off by increasing teledensity by 8 percent (Fink et al
2003, 99). By teledensity they mean the main telephone lines in per capita terms. Along the
same lines, Guillen and Suarez (2005) demonstrate that one important factor contributing to
the internet diffusion is privatization and competition in the telecom sector.
Furthermore, as personal computers used to be the main method for connecting to the
internet and still are an important devices in this respect, then internet diffusion is linked to
the adoption of computers. As John Gage, a co-founder of Sun Microsystems, once said “the
network is the computer” (Gapper 2007, 11; Weber 2004, 7). Caselli and Coleman (2001)
show that the size of government reduces the adoption of computers while smaller size of
government encourages the adoption of computers. They also found that sound propertyrights protection encourages the adoption of computers.

23

These findings emphasizing the role of competition and extent of government
intervention can be linked to an underlying theme in trade policy literature, which holds that
trade protectionism, i.e. reduction of competition and increase in government intervention,
reduces the benefits of technology transfer for small countries (Besley and Case 1993; Dollar
1993, 434). Trade protectionism decreases adoption incentives created by network, market
power and learning externalities (Besley and Case 1993, 399). The connection between rules
governing international trade and internet diffusion will be explored further in this literature
review.
This set of literature discussed above highlighted some key findings of the literature
on internet and related information technology diffusion. The first question is whether
institutions or national income matter more for explaining the outcome in internet diffusion.
The discussion above demonstrated how institutions can possible be a more powerful
explanatory variable than income, particularly when comparisons are made on the basis of
small sample of countries and various institutions are considered. The second question is what
type of institutions are more important than others in understanding how internet diffuses in
different countries. This will be explored in the next parts of this chapter.

2.2 Institutional Complexity
The common denominator of the studies discussed above is their reliance on factors
that are easily measurable. Variables such as GDP, democracy, size of government and some
other “thin” measure of tangible resources and easily identifiable “institutions”. The reality, of
course, is profoundly “thicker” than any number crunching on the basis of these datasets
would reveal. The studies may establish correlations and tell us something that happens on the
average in the world but at best the contribution to the understanding of Internet diffusion
they provide is extremely limited. Particularly, as they do not incorporate the insights of
earlier studies on technology diffusion which emphasize social shaping, specific context and
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informal factors in understanding technology diffusion. Most importantly, quantitative
approaches using a few variables may not result in improving our understanding of how
internet actually diffuses on the ground. For instance, if we learn that higher GDP or
democracy improves internet diffusion, then it cannot explain differences in internet diffusion
outcomes among democratic countries with relatively high GDP. Even the data that is
collected on the use of internet carries very different meanings, but in spite of that the thinness
of the approach implies that it may still represent one and the same data point in the
quantitative analysis. In other words, the quality of Internet connection may vary so
significantly in different countries that the use in country carries completely different meaning
from the use in other country. For instance, many wifi users may have experienced a situation
in various setting where heavy use and high traffic volume slows down access for all users.
Obviously, in that kind of situation it is difficult to carry out online bank transactions or make
a skype call. At the same time, all users have internet connection and use the internet. In
quantitative studies relying on large data sets low quality internet connection and high quality
connection would often receive the same ranking or would be represented as a same data
point. However, quality of connection would determine what is possible to achieve with the
connection and hence, would impact extensity and intensity of diffusion. Therefore, the
arguments about institutions and resources have to be much more detailed in explaining the
patterns of diffusion than quantitative studies analyzing large number of countries would
accommodate. A Ookla speedtest in 2014 found that Hong Kong at 72.49 Mbps has highest
average download speeds in the world while the US was 31st at 20.77 Mbps which is slower
than in Estonia and Slovenia (Ookla 2014). Low internet speeds mean that it is more difficult
to carry out complex transaction online and hence limits the use of internet. Obviously, the
Ookla speedtest is not a perfect measure because it is an aggregated country measure, which
takes into account rural areas. Internet adoption in some degree is dependent on geography
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and topography and cost to put in infrastructure lines. Nevertheless, these are the choices that
policy-makers have to make either by encouraging private infrastructure investment in remote
areas or intervening directly. However, most studies focusing on internet diffusion overlook
these important details. This small but important detail has direct connection to the rules of
the game, i.e. how sector is regulates and what kind of leverage belongs to service providers.
In others, words there are many different rules that influence internet diffusion. These rules
are complex.
Therefore, institutional complexity behind adoption cannot be reduced to the variables
such as whether country has had their free elections or what is its ranking in some index
measuring political freedoms. Particularly, as the collection and demonstration of data in
these indices itself is highly questionable. Such reductionism in treatment of institutions
ignores the interactions between informal and formal institutions, context specific factors such
as physical and topographic barriers, interlinkages with ideas and path dependencies on early
decisions. So what is meant by institutional complexity in this dissertation? The working
definition refers to the interactions of formal and informal institutions as well as interactions
of formal institutions on different levels of government regulations. This implies that broad
rules governing macroeconomic environment may conflict with regulations on micro level.
There is considerable literature on institutional complexity and one way to define it is
“incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics” (Greenwood et al. 2011, 317).
Different institutions, their interactions, conflicts and institutional logics (see discussion
below) create institutional complexity. Room (2011) offers a good overview of different
approaches to institutionalism and incorporates institutionalist perspectives with that of
complex adaptive systems as found in what is called “complexity science”. The complexity
science is developed to understand physical and biological processes where local interactions
may lead to complex patterns on a global level through the positive feedback loops in self-
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organizing processes (Room 2011, 15-49). These scientific perspectives have been applied to
a variety of social sciences and there has been expansion of such inquiries in the past decade
but it has not generated considerable empirical enquiry yet (Room 2011, 9).

Usually, it can be assumed that greater institutional complexity implies greater
constraints on agency. For instance, Pierson defines institutions as constraints rather than
enablers by writing that institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally,
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (Pierson 2004, 27). For
instance, the convergence of national and international standards for professionals will lead to
convergence of institutional logic of different polities (Pierson 2004, 138-139). This implies
that the result may be “institutional isomorphism” because different institutional logics are in
conflict with each other. Most importantly, institutions and institutional complexity do not
have to be constraining. First, good institutions can reduce uncertainty, which encourages
entrepreneurial activity. Second, some entrepreneurs and policy entrepreneurs may be well
equipped for navigating in institutional complexity and achieving desired outcomes. They
may benefit from complexity and it may create absolute or comparative advantages for them.
It is possible for what Crouch (2005) calls “institutional entrepreneurs” to weave the
international institutions into distinctive domestic patterns.
Institutional logic may stem from laws and regulations imposed by government in the
case of formal institutions as well as socially constructed historical patterns of behavior,
mental models of agents, habits, assumptions, expectations, values, culture and other rules,
which may constrain or enable individuals and groups of individuals in their behavior and
define social reality for them. Institutional logic may operate on community level as long as
community members share the same beliefs. On a macro level, community may be a nation.
Different nationalities may share the same beliefs about themselves and other nations. On a
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micro level, such abstract community as a nation may consist many different communities,
which may follow different institutional logic. These communities may have different
understanding of the same issue depending on their beliefs, knowledge and other factors
(Smets et al., 2012; Thornton et al. 2012). For instance, nation as a community may be proud
of IT developments in their country. They may experience the differences in quality and
availability of services when spending time abroad or read about it in the newspapers. Within
a nation IT community may also share the view about overall progress but may be more
critical of recent developments finding that the government is not investing enough in IT
development. Within the IT community an open source community may have a different view
finding that government has overinvested in proprietary software solutions and should rely on
open source solutions instead.
The notion of institutional complexity considerably broadens the possibilities how
institutions may enable or hinder internet diffusions. The institutionalist explanation discussed
earlier in this chapter has relied primarily on the approaches found in rational choice
institutionalist literature in political science and new institutional economics literature.
However, conceptualization of institutions as would benefit from recognition that there are
three different accounts of institutionalisms in political science literature and integration of
insights from rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalism (Hall and Taylor
1996). New institutionalist approaches in political science and economics have often focused
on formal institutions (Hall 1984, 19-20; Streeck and Thelen 2005, 11) Subsequently, the
institutionalism, particularly, its rational choice brand, has often been criticized that their
minimalist definition of institutions does not capture the substance of activities taken by
different actors (Wedeen 2002). Actors actual practices, their work habits, their norms of
behavior, mental models, their self-imposed constraints, expectations and many other factors
that influence their behavior are assumed away in formalistic approach to institutions.
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However, this critique of overly rationalist and instrumentalist approaches does not
imply that assumption of rational strategic interaction should be given up and institutionalist
explanations for internet diffusion have to rely solely on social and historical context as the
key determinant of outcomes. Rather, the conceptualization and operationalization of
institutional variables would benefit in recognizing that rational action of actors is embedded
in institutional structures and social context (Granovetter 1985). This is not to say that actors
cannot make choices and their action is pre-determined but their rational action is more
constrained by uncertainty, imperfect information and institutional complexity than the
calculative approach to institutions would suggest. The nature of institutions can be
significantly broadened by incorporating definitions found in historical and sociological
institutionalist literature (Hall and Taylor 1996; Granovetter 1985). These insights are not new
for political science as broad range of scholars combine rational choice, historical and
sociological institutionalism in their studies. However, these different streams of
institutionalism have not found sufficient attention on scholarship on internet diffusion. It is
also an opportunity for the author to add historical and sociological perspectives his previous
study on Estonia and Slovenia which focused primarily on rational choice and formalistic
approach to institutions (Kitsing 2004).
Furthermore, this understanding of institutions is consistent with Douglas North’s
relatively recent work (North 2005) where the role of informal institutions and mental models
are emphasized in contrast with his earlier more rationalistic interpretation of institutions.
North's earlier work on institutions also makes it clear that he is referring to both informal
(habits, norms et al) and formal (laws, constitutions et al) institutions (North 1990).
Institutions “…are in turn a function of the shared mental models and ideologies of the actors”
(Denzau and North 1994, 15). North’s views have a resonance with the discussion above on
institutional logic, where it was already pointed out that the operation of institutions may rely
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on belief systems. These beliefs may be translated into formal institutions at some point or
they may be essential for maintaining informal rules of the game. As beliefs and ideas change,
it also implies that institutional framework is dynamic over time. Certainly, the change in
beliefs takes time and hence, it can be also constraining factor for institutional change. Most
importantly, these interactions between ideas and institutions relate very well to the discussion
of openness and epistemological nature of technology as important aspects affecting
technology diffusion. However, such definitions by aiming to capture a broad range of
phenomena that goes under institutions sacrifice precision and concreteness for universality
and applicability to broad categories of social phenomena. Hence, the following synthesis of
the literature suggest a number of abstract ideas from a vast institutionalist literature on how
institutions, agents and technology interacts.

2.3 Trade, Geography and Entrepreneurial Discovery
In addition to more nuanced understanding of institutions, the dissertation seeks to
incorporate broader perspectives on technology diffusion into the analysis. This would allow
me to develop a more meaningful understanding of internet diffusion. Since the discussion of
trade and its potential impact on technology diffusion was briefly mentioned above, the
literature on technology and trade can be taken up again. Kitsing (2004) examined the effects
of economic openness (defined as openness to trade and capital flows) on internet diffusion.
However, international trade, increasingly, is not just about material goods but increasingly
about diffusion of ideas. The fact that trade leads to non-material effects - causal relationships
- that was already understood by Plato and Aristotle. These Greek philosophers made the case
for restricting trade for various non-economic reasons associated with moral and civic dangers
stemming from extensive contacts with foreigners that could make it difficult to ensure
loyalty of citizens (Irwin 1997, 14-15). Most importantly, this non-material impact of trade is
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fundamental for technology diffusion (Lall 1993, 125). Technology diffusion depends both on
importation of technical equipment and inflow of know-how, this in turn among other things
contributes to increase of human capital (Caselli and Coleman 2001). These new adopted
ideas mix with local already existing ideas by creating a new symbiosis. The relationship of
international trade to the transmission of ideas and to increases in human capital is
particularly important in the context of this study where both country cases are small open
economies heavily dependent on trade.
It is also important because increasingly global trade is intra-industry trade within
global value chains of large multinationals. Apple has made it blatantly clear letting all of its
users know that Apple products are made in China but designed in California. As scholars
have shown “makers” of Apple in China capture insignificant portion of value-added while
most of the value-added in Apple products goes to designers in California (Linden et al 2009).
This is so because they are in business of ideas and own the intellectual property. Even more
detailed study on global value chain of Nokia revealed similar result where most of valueadded is captured by intellectual property owners in Finland while final assembly of Nokia
smartphone is activity with low value-added (Ali-Yrkkö et al 2011). For instance, on the basis
of the supply chain’s geography and the assembly volume, Finnish scholars estimated that
service exports from Finland to China in 2007 resulting from the production of Nokia N95
smartphone were approximately €0.8 billion while official data showed that the total service
trade across all industries from Finland to China was €0.6 billion in the same year (Ali-Yrkkö
et al 2011).
These and other studies on global value chains and international trade have come to a
conclusion that available trade statistics reveal little about the economic consequences of the
increasing global dispersion of production processes. The globalization often means
fragmentation of production across borders within supply chains of single multinational and it
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has exaggerated the growth of trade. The trade statistics tend to overemphasize the role of
final assembly while actually the value-added of final assembly is miniscule. Furthermore,
traditional data underrepresent the role of service exports, which is a crucial part of modern
production networks. And services are intangibles and connected to epistemological nature of
technology. Reliance on „commodity“ statistics does not allow to understand the importance
of ideas and intellectual capital involved in trade.
What are the alternatives for improving our understanding of trade and thus
interactions with diffusion of technology? As a start trade figures should produced using value
added in each country, instead of including the value of intermediate imports. This would give
a better picture of trends in globalisation of trade. The joint initiative of Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and World Trade Organisation (WTO)
called Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) addresses this issue by considering the value added by
each country in the production of goods and services that are consumed worldwide. The
TiVA indicators provide new insights into the commercial relations between nations.
However, the data is relatively old, aggregated to level where it is difficult to see specific
product categories and is distorted by transfer pricing. One component of value added is profit
but because of profit shifting by multinationals and exploitation of transfer pricing schemes where profits are booked in low tax jurisdiction - the actual value-added may be different
from real value-added.
Alternative approach is taken by Hidalgo (2015) to demonstrate how different
knowledge and know-how is embedded in different products. Hidalgo and his team have
developed a database, which uses trade data to show how networks of knowledge evolve and
grow by mapping a “product space” (the database is available at atlas.media.mit.edu).
However, while the database might be useful for a broad global study involving multiple
countries (The Observatory of Economic Complexity 2015), it is not as useful for conducting
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detailed case studies on two countries and sectors within countries. First, trade data comes
with errors (for instance Russia was shown as more important trade partner for Estonia in
2012 than Sweden and Finland, which contradicts Eurostat and Statistical Office of Estonia.)
Second, the entire product category ‘electronics’ was simplified as “telephones” for Estonia
for 2012. Estonian electronics firms do not produce telephones or even mobile phones but
more sophisticated technology such as Ericsson’s RBS family mobile stations. This RBS
technology is important for creating mobile phone networks and allowing mobile phones to
communicate with each other but it is certainly not a telephone.
However, Hidalgo’s emphasis on knowledge embedded in trade of different products
as well as the literature on global value chains emphasizing the value-added of intellectual
property in products is connected to the broader understanding that adoption of ideas is
crucial for technology diffusion (Eaton and Kortum 1999, 563; Mokyr 1990; 186-190,
Castells 2000, 35-37). In essence, the nature of technology is epistemological which means
that diffusion and use of technology takes place within the social frameworks of knowledge.
Our previous knowledge and beliefs affect how we use technology. At the same time,
technological change affects how we think and our thinking about thinking. It is circular
process but technological change does not have uniform impact. We perceive technology
differently depending who we are. Braman (2012) see information policy as epistemology
policy. She argues that epistemology affects perceptual entity, i.e. how we perceive
technology, it affects how material and social world are experienced, translation of
experiences into facts and which facts are discussed in social groups and lead to consensually
understood truth (Braman 2012, 137). This means that the use of technical equipment differs
in different contexts as has been pointed out by many scholars (Mokyr 1990, 186; Fountain
2001, 88-90, 98; Keller 2002, 138; Murmann and Homburg 2001, 203; Zanfei 2000, 527). For
instance, it will be discussed in a more detailed manner later in the empirical part of the study
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greater proportion of Estonians use internet banking than Slovenians. Or we can experience it
every day that younger generation tends to be more active users of social media than older
generation. Keller argues, for instance, that language could be an important factor in
understanding the emergence of clusters in technology diffusion (Keller 2002, 138). If this is
true, then simple change of formal institutions (from authoritarian to democratic regime, for
example) or increase in GDP does not necessarily translate into increased rate of technology
diffusion. Of course, much of the internet-related technology and services are quite new and
dynamic, so we don't know which ones will expand, nor do we know if they have a “lifecycle” both as services/products or for age cohorts. For example, will people continue to use
social media as intensely as they age?
This literature on fragmentation of global production networks, embeddedness of
knowledge in products and social frameworks of knowledge emphasize the importance of
context. This context is linked to geography which matters greatly. Different geographic
regions have different perceptions, experiences and knowledge about technologies.
Technology is diffused among the clusters of countries – even if the technological knowledge
has become more global. Porter (1998) has pointed out that location has maintained a key role
and global economy essentially consists of clusters of related companies in different locations.
The world is not flat. Internet does not diffuse on a basis of some universal model but its
diffusion can vary greatly depending on specific knowledge embedded in different regions,
the previous experiences, skills and perceptions of population and obviously geographical
location of a region or country. This context specificity is often left out in the literature on
electronic government and internet technologies as more linear and technologically
determinist approaches dominate. There is often implicit or explicit assumption that particular
models can be transferred to other countries and all cases are comparable which ultimately
assumes away the importance of informal institutions and context-specificity, i.e. knowledge,
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experiences, perceptions and so on, in the diffusion process of internet and related
technologies.
Therefore, the literature on internet diffusion and electronic government would benefit
by carefully studying recent trends in the scholarship of innovation systems and management.
In the 1990s, the innovation management and innovation systems literature tended to
emphasize technocratic, universal one size fits all and top-down policy-orientated approaches
in explaining the outcomes in innovation, including diffusion of innovations such as internet.
During the past decade, a new set of studies has emerged from a wide range of disciplines,
which emphasize the importance of location, entrepreneurial discovery and local context such as embeddedness of specific knowledge, experiences and perception - in understanding
innovation and its diffusion. This perspective emphasizes the importance of small and well
educated entrepreneurial communities and local ecosystems of universities, firms and other
types of organizations within which experts and entrepreneurs operate as key agents in
bringing about changes in innovation and encouraging diffusion of technologies (Saxenian
1994; 2006; Feldman, Francis, and Bercovitz 2005). Similar notions may be conceptualized
differently as startup communities (Feld 2012) or creative classes (Florida 2005), but the key
to all of them is the process of entrepreneurial discovery in explaining diffusion of
technologies such as internet as well as broader outcomes in innovation. These approaches
emphasize the role of entrepreneurs and their agency in ecosystems and deemphasize the role
of old-fashioned top-down national or regional public policy in shaping diffusion of
technologies. This does not imply that institutional frameworks do not matter. Quite the
opposite. Top-down public policies attribute too much to the ability of government by
changing the formal rules of the game to achieve desired outcomes in technology diffusion.
More recent approaches highlighted above actually emphasize the importance of informal
institutions in the emergence of ecosystems, which facilitate diffusion of technologies. Smart
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specialization scholars are skeptical of government’s ability to pick a completely a domain in
economy and turn it into high-tech success unless these domain is already embedded in real
economy and/or it is built of different domains embedded in the current economic structures.
As smart specialization literature is essential to these debates, then next part of the chapter
will explore in a greater detail.

2.4 Smart Specialization
Shifting to a related line of research, the process of entrepreneurial discovery is central
as well to the emerging focus on “smart specialization”, which has not only shaped academic
deliberations but policy making in the European Union (Foray, 2015; McCann and OrtegaArgiles 2013; 2014; European Commission 2012). This stream of research emerged on the
basis of scholarly accounts which studied the productivity differences between European
Union (EU) and the Unites States. The key finding was that technology diffusion and use are
crucial variables in explaining the “productivity gap” between the United States and Europe.
The productivity differences exist and are growing because EU countries have been slower
than the US in adopting and using new technologies, particularly ICTs such as internet. The
ideas from smart specialization literature will be explored in the empirical part on the basis of
different domains in Estonia. However, as the empirical part is descriptive, then the predictive
power of these ideas will not be tested.
The approach of smart specialization literature differs from traditional technology and
innovation policy literature which emphasize the need to develop high-tech sectors such as
ICT and biotechnology. Foray (2015) and McCann and Ortega Argiles (2013; 2014) argue
that regions not only have different technological and industrial capabilities but also differ in
their evolutionary trajectories. This is essential for understanding internet diffusion because it
reveals that diffusion may take different routes in different environments depending on local
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context and time. There is no one-size fits all model which is ahistorical and aspatial in
explaining diffusion of the internet. It has strong links to ideas of new institutionalist in
political science such as Pierson (2004) which have been highlighted throughout this chapter.
One of the most well known smart specialization scholars, Foray (2015), emphasizes
that regions have to focus on their traditional strengths and competences and find domains
where step-by-step innovation process allows develop new skills and knowledge for greater
use of technologies, particularly ICTs. When we consider ICT sector, then Helsinki has
strengths in online gaming (Angry Birds), London has strengths in financial services
(Transferwise) and Stockholm has strengths in online music streaming (Spotify). It would
make sense to develop similar companies in these locations in Europe. Alternatively, focus
does not have to be ICT sector specific and ICTs can be as universal horizontal technologies
applied to different sectors to make them more efficient. For instance, it could be exploitation
of ICT in car manufacturing in Bavaria or production of bicycles in Northern Italy. Most
importantly, the use of new technologies relies on exploiting them in domains where different
countries and regions have already a comparative advantage. It is not a creation of new
domains for economic activity in a top down fashion and attempt to transfer some supposedly
universal model from one environment to another one without any consideration of
differences in their respective ecosystems. Furthermore, the diffusion of knowledge and
technology has to take place across different domains, activities and sectors, not only among a
few high tech sectors. In this sense, diffusion of internet in financial services, for example, is
not about focusing on ICT sector but making financial sector more efficient and customer
friendly. This allows new technologies to be diffused and adopted widely across different
sectors.
Traditional approach to innovation emphasized the role of research and development
(R&D) but disconnect between R&D and entrepreneurial activity is one of the core problems
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in the EU (European Commission 2012). Instead of high level policy-making and scientific
approaches to innovation, Foray stresses the importance of (2015) decentralized knowledge of
entrepreneurs for developing new domains which can adopt and adapt ICTs as was discussed
above. There are significant information asymmetries between policy-makers and
entrepreneurs and policy has to rely on information gained through entrepreneurial process of
discovery. According to McCann and Ortega-Argiles (2013) an entrepreneurial process of
discovery allows identification of new domains for technological development. The degree of
embeddedness and relatedness of domain increases the impact of innovation developments
across different activities and sectors. It has to be pointed out that smart specialization
literature defines entrepreneurs very broadly: public universities and research institutes can be
entrepreneurial and part of the process. It is not impossible that policy makers can be
entrepreneurial. Hence, there is some overlap with what Mazzucato (2011) calls
“entrepreneurial state” but I am not making the same normative argument about considerable
extension of state into different realms of economy. Quite the opposite, entrepreneurial
discovery process in the public sector is a fact of life. However, if left uncontrolled it may
become easily rent-seeking where the benefits are concentrated and privatized and costs are
diffused and socialized. The understanding of entrepreneurial discovery process is also
consistent what Room (2011) and Crouch call “institutional entrepreneurs”. They are
“creative political schemers, looking for chances to change and innovate” (Crouch 2005, 37).
Economic geography literature on the relationships among entrepreneurship,
innovation, ICTs and geography can be summarized on basis of six stylized facts (McCann
and Ortega 2013, 4). First, entrepreneurship and innovation tend to be more widely spread in
more densely populated areas and cities than in regions with lower population density.
Second, regions with greater sectorial diversity rather than regions where one or some sectors
dominate tend to have higher degrees of innovation and entrepreneurship. Third, innovation
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and entrepreneurship tends to be lower in regions dominated by small number of large firms.
Fourth, regions with internationally connected multinational companies tend to have higher
degrees of innovation and entrepreneurship. Fifth, regions with greater market potential tend
to have more innovation and entrepreneurship. Sixth, the diffusion of ICTs has increased
differences among what is labelled core- and non-core regions. This is because ICTs are
complements to knowledge-intensive activities which also require face-to-face interactions
but they are substitutes for activities which can be routinized (the last idea is further discussed
under social networks and capital). In other words, if greater adoption and adaption of ICTs
was one of the main arguments for developing smart specialization concept, then in reality the
diffusion of ICTs has increased differences between core and periphery (McCann and Ortega
2013, 4). Hence, public policies aimed at encouraging internet diffusion can be self-defeating
if they do not factor in local informal institutions, knowledge, skills and geographical
specificity and ensure that positive externalities of diffusion process is internalized by local
actors rather than by outsiders.
The role of entrepreneurial discovery in contributing to the diffusion of innovations
spatial and local context shares with the Schumpeterian understanding on innovation the
emphasis on entrepreneurs. Let’s recall the introduction to this chapter and emphasize that
entrepreneurs do not operate only in private sector but they can also be found in public and
non-governmental sectors. Even though, the emphasis in this research are often on cases in
private sector such as financial services, then it must be pointed out that in some countries
financial services are provided by government owned entities. For instance, the largest bank
in Slovenia is owned by government. Furthermore, financial services and other business
services have important social functions. Internet bank saves time and makes transactions
more efficient for businesses but also for NGOs, individuals and government agencies. As
was discussed in the introduction, the entrepreneurial discovery and entrepreneurs are defined
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more broadly in this dissertation than in the traditional Schumpeterian approach.
Schumpeter’s ideas and role of entrepreneurs in technology diffusion will be further discussed
in the next part on supply and demand.

2.5 The Interactions of Supply and Demand
In order to understand the role of entrepreneurs in the process of internet diffusion we
have to consider supply and demand for internet. At first this approach seems going
backwards after discussion of formal and informal institutions, trade and spatial factors.
However, the interactions of supply and demand is not just narrow and reductionist
“economic” issue. The supply and demand for internet exists in marketplace but it also exists
in government as well as in non-governmental sector. Hence, the discussion of information
technology and its role in innovation above should be seen in the context of interactions of
supply and demand. Most importantly, previously discussed broader perspectives on
conceptualization of technology diffusion, where the importance of local context and
epistemological nature of technology is revealed, is strengthened further by the asymmetrical
relations between demand and supply in the process of technology diffusion. By analyzing the
history of different cases of technology diffusion Mokyr argues that supply is more crucial
than demand (Mokyr 1990, 152, 297). "The "demand" for technology is a derived demand,
i.e., it depends ultimately on the demand for the goods and services that technology helps to
produce; there is little or no demand for technology for its own sake," writes Mokyr (Mokyr
1990, 151). Logically, it follows that the internet is not necessary demanded for its own sake,
but rather as a means for achieving whatever goals individuals may wish to pursue. In other
words, there are many substitutes for the internet. Kitsing (2004; 2008) already pointed out
asymmetry between hosts and users of internet. Hosts can be used as supply-side indicator.
The term “internet hosts” refers to organizations or firms that have computers directly linked
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to the worldwide internet network. For instance, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) serves as
host, and individuals can connect through the ISP host computer to the internet. However,
hosts can have many internet users. Internet users are usually identified by calling up
individuals and asking them whether they have used internet. This can be seen as demand side
indicator. Both concepts are discussed in greater detail in the methodology section of this
dissertation. However, as Kitsing (2004) as well as Kitsing (2008) and Kitsing and Howard
(2009) have pointed out hosts and users do not correlate. Countries which have more internet
hosts do not necessarily have more internet users and vice-versa.
The asymmetrical relations between supply (internet hosts) and demand (internet
users) are very well revealed by looking at the data that Milner (2006) provides in her study of
digital divide (although she does not explicitly point it out). Differently from many other
scholars who either use hosts or users as their measure of internet diffusion in quantitative
studies relying on a large sample, Milner uses both hosts and users. The asymmetry is
demonstrated by the fact that hosts and users do not correlate very well as it is clear from
tables that regime type has different influence on hosts and users (Milner 2006, 182). Her
study was discussed in greater detail in earlier parts of this chapter. Therefore, the role of
supply and demand for internet has to be analyzed on the basis of theories on diffusion of
innovations. Innovation is not simply a new product or service or a process, but much more
than that. It is one of the most important economic and social processes as the key to
innovation is application of new product, service, process and/or idea in practice. Without
application it would be just invention, not innovation. Well-known supply-side understanding
of innovation emphasizing the role of entrepreneurs comes from Schumpeter (1975) who
describes innovation as a process of “Industrial mutation (…) that incessantly revolutionizes
the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a
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new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism”
(Schumpeter 1975, 83).
According to Schumpeter, the process of creative destruction is the source of
innovation and the essential nature of competition. It is much more important than any other
form of competition, for example, competition of prices or quality, as usually discussed in the
economics. Schumpeter was well-known for his criticism of neoclassical microeconomics
which its emphasis on marginal analysis and equilibrium between supply and demand.
According to Schumpeter, neoclassical microeconomics was based on comparative static
models, which failed to explain the change and emergence of profit. Marginal analysis
demonstrated decreasing returns, which led to stationary state where profits disappeared.
Schumpeter, however, argued that economy is in constant disequilibrium and analysis must
not focus on equilibriums but how economy moves from one equilibrium to next one.
Innovation through the process of creative destruction was key to understanding the economic
change and emergence of profits.
The key actor in implementing the creative destruction in Schumpeter’s theory is the
entrepreneur. An entrepreneur is not an ordinary businessman. Actually, Schumpeter
emphasizes differences between entrepreneurs and businessmen. Businessmen follow
routines. Entrepreneurs break routines. They are true innovators who are always looking for
new ways of doing things and new products. An entrepreneur is not a calculative economic
man who engages in constant marginal analysis and calculates opportunity cost in every step.
Constant calculation of costs and benefits would make it difficult for entrepreneurs to get out
of the bed each morning. Rather, entrepreneur is akin to medieval knight whose motivations
cannot be understood on the basis of simplistic marginalist analysis. This is not to say that his
motives are completely irrational but rather that they are not rational in the narrow sense used
in neoclassical economics. Entrepreneurs may be motivated by honor, need to do something,
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desire to put their ideas into practice and numerous other things that simplistic analysis of
rational choice fail to account for. Ideas matter for Schumpeter. In a different essay,
Schumpeter (1949) actually argues that ideology is a necessary pre-condition for scientific
progress as ideologies generate ideas, which can be tested empirically. Schumpeter’s
emphasis on the role of entrepreneurs connects his insights on diffusion of innovation with
those scholars discussed previously, who emphasize the importance of entrepreneurial
discovery and decentralized contextual knowledge of entrepreneurs.
This dissertation relies on even broader definition of entrepreneurial discovery than
identified by Schumpeter. One the one hand, it is Schumpeterian approach where
entrepreneurs are risk-takers and innovators who find ways to break old routines and establish
new ones. Entrepreneurs engage in constant process innovation as well as improve existing
products and bring new products to the market place. On the other hand, the entrepreneurial
discovery also includes what in smart specialization literature McCann and Ortega-Argiles
(2013) call an entrepreneurial process of discovery (discussed in previous part). This process
means in addition to Schumpeterian approach involvement of entrepreneurs in policy-making
process and consideration of their insight in early stages of policy design, which allows
identification of new domains for technological development as well as re-designing public
policies through constant feedback mechanism between entrepreneurs and policy-makers. The
involvement of entrepreneurs in policy-making concerning ICTs and other technologies is
crucial because successful innovation policy has to be aware of developments in real
economy. The degree of embeddedness and relatedness of domain increases the impact of
innovation developments across different activities and sectors. It has to be pointed out that
this dissertation relies smart specialization literature, which defines entrepreneurs very
broadly: public universities and research institutes can be entrepreneurial and part of the
process. It is not impossible that policy makers can be entrepreneurial. Hence, the
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entrepreneurial discovery is not only limited to private sector, but can also take place can also
take place in public sector as well as in the non-governmental sector.
However, demand side must be considered as well. One of the key criticisms of
Schumpeter's theory of innovation is that it does not take into account the demand side and
similarly to Mokyr and the smart specialization literature emphasises supply. Schumpeter
describes demand as having little importance for the development of innovations. He points
out that innovations are not generally generated by the wants of consumers. Consumers do not
have the ability to determine what goods are produced. Producers initiate the innovation
process and bring about economic change. The consumers are then "taught" by the producers
to desire the new products that they offer. As Henry Ford once supposedly said “If I had
asked people what they wanted, they would have said faster horses” (Vlaskovits 2011). More
recently, Steve Jobs has said that “It’s really hard to design products by focus groups. A lot of
times, people don’t know what they want until you show it to them” (Ciotti 2013). Obviously,
supply is necessary precondition for the initial introduction of innovation. No consumers
asked in the 1950s for the internet. Rather it was result of work in several computer
laboratories, which later led to its adoption and commercialization. Similarly, consumers did
not demand internet banking in the 1990s. Rather, the supply of this service created demand,
which depending on country can obviously vary, as we will see later in the empirical part of
the dissertation.
However, supply is not sufficient pre-condition for the diffusion of innovation.
To gain a more comprehensive picture on the role of the demand side in the innovation
process needs to be considered. Rogers (1995) and his diffusion of innovations is most wellknown take on demand side which was first published in 1962. However, the same idea
presented more succinctly can be found in F.A. Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty published in
1960. Hayek describes the demand side as the determining force in the innovation process.
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Due to the associated high cost, innovations are initially used only by a few wealthy
consumers, as they benefit more from the innovation than other consumers. Luxuries today
are necessities of tomorrow. Their special needs are better satisfied by new products or
services, i.e. innovations. The consumption behaviour of these initial consumers serves as a
test phase for the innovation. By experimenting with the innovation, the initial group of
consumers assesses whether the innovation can in fact serve a wider range of consumers in
the society. If these initial consumers consider an innovation useful or important, they will
buy it. If the innovation fails to gain their favour, they will reject it by not buying it. Thus, the
decision to buy or not to buy an innovation is a vote for or against it. This voting
characteristic of the initial consumer's consumption behaviour steers the innovation process of
the society in the direction favoured by these initial consumers. Obviously, consumers do not
make these decisions in a vacuum but are influenced by choices of other consumers,
imperfections of their knowledge, informal and formal institutions and may other factors.
Hayekian understanding differs from neoclassical economics because he does not assume that
markets are perfect and reach equilibrium but markets are imperfect. Hence, his theory is not
necessarily in conflict with Schumpeter’s and other theories emphasizing supply side. Supply
matters for bringing new innovations to market place such as internet banking. If the
environmental factors, consumer tastes and thousands of other variables are favourable, then
the innovation spread. Again, it is important to link back to literature to formal and informal
institutions, geography and smart specialization and to emphasize that conditions governing
supply and demand differ in different countries and thus rate of internet diffusion differs as
well.
To simplify the innovation diffusion literature we can say that essentially there are
different types of consumers. The first group are early adopters who may be wealthy or at
least willing to spend a high cost on a given product. Cost here does not only refer to direct
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cost in dollar or euro terms, but also to opportunity cost of using new products. They have
special needs and desires than can only be satisfied by the innovation. They are the “test
drivers” of the innovation process. Their decision to buy or not to buy steers the innovation
process in the direction they favorite way. They willing take risks and in a way they can
entrepreneurial in their adoption of products. And there are laggards. They are not willing to
spend a premium on a given product and/or they are risk-averse. Only have average needs and
desires that are satisfied well enough by the existing products. They will only adopt an
innovation once it became a mass product. Between laggards and early adopters are different
groups some more and others less cautious in adopting new products.
Hayek (1960) overemphasized agency and income but for Rogers (1995) innovation
itself, time, communication channels and social system are main variables in the diffusion
process. Rogers’ work was based on summarizing earlier diffusion theories in sociology,
some of them dating back to the 19th Century. Hence, the fact that similar ideas were covered
by Hayek in 1960 is understandable. Key to successful diffusion was human capital and
characteristics of different adopter groups such as innovators, early adopters, early majority,
late majority and laggards. He distinguished between diffusion and adoption seeing the latter
as an individual phenomena and latter a broader societal phenomena. In order to innovation
to diffuse, a critical mass of adopters must emerge to make innovation self-sustainable. For
Rogers (1995) perceived advantage is most important factor explaining innovation adoption.
This implies studying relative advantage of innovation meaning whether consumers perceive
the use of technology to be convenient. For instance, in the case of internet banking relative
advantage can be whether internet banking gives consumers better overview of their finances
as well as quicker access than offline banking. The perceived advantage also entails
complexity and context of user. The lack of technological complexity implies that consumers
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find it easy to use internet banking, for instance, and it does not require sophisticated ICT
skills.
Eriksson et al (2008) studied the adoption of internet banking in Estonia on the basis
of Rogers’ model. Ironically, they called internet-banking adoption of “Western style”
technology forgetting that it was developed and introduced in Estonia in 1996 and is more
widely used than in most Western countries. They found that adoption of internet banking is
consistent with Rogers’ theory and also with other empirical studies carried out in the
Western markets. They found that the use of internet banking is strongly influenced by
relative advantage and lack of technological complexity in Estonia. They also found that
perceived risk (meaning trustworthiness of services and worries about security and data
leakages) is an important factor influencing decision when consumers start using the service
but its importance disappears once use becomes regular (Eriksson et al 2008, 164-165).
Rogers (1995) did not identify perceived risk but it has been found to be important factor by
scholars building on his work (Eriksson 2008). Eriksson et al (2008) also argue that their
findings in Estonia are consistent with technology acceptance model developed by Davis et al
(1989), which relied on the empirical analysis on the USA. The shortcoming of this study is
that it does not factor in supply side and broader environment concerning internet banking. It
does not answer to the questions on how and why banks started to offer this service and on
how and why government started to build its own e-government services on top of internet
banking.
Obviously, both supply and demand-side explanations of innovations can be
integrated. In some sectors innovation is more supply-driven and other sectors more demand
driven. As internet is general purpose technology it can be argued that innovation occurs
because of the interactions between the supply and the demand side in a competitive situation.
However, the interaction is not simultaneous. First, there must be supply which enables a
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select number of consumers or businesses have to experience the innovation. They simply
may not know what to demand in the first place. Suppliers achieve temporary monopolies by
bringing an innovation to the market. Because of the high monopoly price the innovation is at
first consumed only by a limited number of consumers. They can pay the monopoly prices
because they benefit more from consuming the innovation than the average consumer. For
instance, Black et al (2001) found that users of online financial services have higher income
and they are heavy users of internet (Eriksson et al 2008). Second, if the innovation proves to
be successful, it becomes more widely distributed in the market. This motivates imitators to
copy the innovation and to undercut the monopoly prices of the innovator. In effect, the price
is further reduced and large parts of the society are able to consume the innovation. This in
return motivates the innovators to come up with a new innovation, which again secures them
the consumption done by the early adopters and the resulting monopoly profits.
The individual supplier relies on the process of entrepreneurial discovery and
decentralized knowledge to experiment with new innovations in the market place. A wide
disparity between consumers in the market contributes to the importance of a decentralized
knowledge of entrepreneurs in searching and discovering new market segments for their
innovation (Foray 2015; McCann and Ortega 2013). The suppliers have to consider the nature
of market and think of potential reaction of consumers. For instance, scholars differentiate
between radical and incremental innovation. It is a stylized fact that incremental innovations
are more likely to diffuse than radical. Introduction of internet banking to consumers who
have not used banking before would be radical innovation. Introduction of internet banking to
users of banking services would be incremental innovation (Eriksson et al 2008, 157).
However, the line between incremental and radical innovation is often blurred in reality.
Furthermore, scholars differentiate between voluntary and involuntary innovation. Most
private sector innovations are voluntary because transactions in the market place occur on the
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basis of mutual consent. Hence, internet banking is an example of voluntary innovation
(Eriksson et al 2008, 157). Entrepreneurs in private sector cannot force anybody to adopt
innovation. However, policy entrepreneurs in public sector can do it. For instance, Estonian
government has made it almost impossible to file annual reports of companies by regular mail
or in person. It must take place in government’s business registry, which does not enable the
uploading pdf or word files but requires the data to be filed into pre-existing forms. This is
certainly involuntary innovation and it is possible to speak of “forced digitalization” (author’s
term), which will be explored further. Most innovation adoption models assume that
innovation is voluntary, though.
Most importantly, the stylized fact that innovation process is likely to be the more
efficient and productive if it is voluntary and incremental points towards assumption that
innovation benefits from the utilization of decentralized and tacit knowledge (Hayek 1945).
The development of an innovation by a central order, a single business or government or
incumbent monopoly internet provider, can only draw from the limited amount of available
knowledge. Even if it is highly scientific, it is not sufficient and under some conditions even
necessary for introduction of innovation. Both kinds of knowledge, the scientific knowledge
and the specific, decentralized knowledge are used to further accelerate the innovation process
in society (Foray 2015; McCann and Ortega 2013). That’s why smart specialization literature
does not only emphasize scientific innovation but also knowledge-based innovation.
Innovation does not have to be and is not always science based but it is always knowledgebased. If the innovation process also incorporates the specific, localized and tacit knowledge,
it is likely to be more efficient. The specific, localized and tacit knowledge provides an
assessment of the new innovation in practice – an assessment made under the specific
circumstances under which each individual consumer or groups of consumers exploit it.
However, to understand the interactions of supply and demand better and to spell out
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constraints on both consumers and entrepreneurs, we need to consider the network nature of
internet and path-dependencies involved in diffusion process. The next part of this chapter
will discuss these themes.

2.6 Network Good and Path-Dependency
The importance of informal and formal institutions, interaction of supply and demand
and process of entrepreneurial discovery is reinforced further once the nature of the internet is
understood. It is important to understand that the internet is not an independent good. This
implies that the value of the internet is not determined solely by the connection at a particular
speed. The internet is a network good. This means that the value of the internet depends on
the network and on different technologies which are connected to this network. This is the
case with internet as well as with many information technology goods (Harknett 2001, 242246). The network good means that a value of a good for any given person is influenced by
consumption choices made by other persons. This notion is grounded in basic
microeconomics and study of externalities. In other words, there are externalities to being
connected to certain classes of goods. The externalities are particularly important because
internet is by nature a decentralized network, i.e. applications are hosted at the edge of the
network by absolutely anyone. This means that internet is much less controllable than a smart
network. In the case of smart network applications are hosted in the network’s core amd
usually by operator of the network (Icenberg 1998, 24-31). A typical example of a smart and
centralized network is a telephone network. Even though, there are attempts to make internet
more similar to smart network by various governments and other entities, in essence it
remains a decentralized and stupid network.
Nevertheless, the simple assumptions of neoclassical microeconomics are not
sufficient for understanding the network nature of internet. The increasing returns associated
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with the technology adoption and its subsequent use has led some scholars to see technology
diffusion as a path-dependent process (Mokyr 1990, 163; Fountain 2001, 85; David 1985).
What is meant by path-dependence? The concept is often used without explicit specification
of causal mechanism involved in the process (Campbell 2010, 90). Political science literature
emphasizes that actors gain increasing returns through feedback mechanism, which is
consistent how they acted in the past. This locks in particular type of behavior. Another
approach from sociology is less rationalistic and emphasizes that practices become
institutionalized and they are taken as given by different agents involved. In other words, it
becomes difficult to change particular models of behavior or traditions. Particularly, when
they work or at least there is a perception that they work well. Comparative political economy
literature on varieties of capitalism emphasizes institutional complementarity as a result of coevolution of different institutions. This makes it difficult to change one institutions because it
is tightly interconnected with other institutions (Campbell 2010, 90-92). This dissertation will
combine these different casual mechanisms of path-dependence in the empirical part.
However, it tends to emphasize non-rationalistic chance elements behind the path-dependent
processes.
Most importantly, the outcomes for network-goods are often path-dependent and, thus,
neoclassical model based on rational expectations is not helpful for analyzing the dynamics of
the adoption process for eventual outcomes (Radner and Sundararajan 2005, 3). The pathdependent process can be understood as following:
“A path-dependent sequence of economic changes is one of which important
influences upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events,
including happenings dominated by chance elements rather than systematic forces.
Stochastic processes like that do not converge automatically to a fixed-point
distribution of outcomes, and are called non-ergodic. In such circumstances "historical
accidents" can neither be ignored, nor neatly quarantined for the purpose of economic
analysis; the dynamic process itself takes on an essentially historical character.”
(David 1985, 332)

51

Most importantly, the notion of path-dependency violates the basic assumptions of
microeconomics such as rationality because agents’ choices are severely constrained in
choosing particular technology. Idealized rational action in explaining the diffusion of new
technologies implicitly assumes that over time and through some degree of trial and error the
superior technologies will be chosen and used in increasingly better manner (Fountain 2001,
84). Milner’s (2006) discussion of digital divide is a great example of such rationalistic
understanding of technology adoption. Very narrow and overly rationalistic conceptualization
of institutions is combined with oversimplified characterization of interests where potential
losers block the Internet adoption, while winners facilitate it (Milner 2006, 178). Evidently, it
implies that we are dealing with forward-looking rational agents who can predict the future
risks and engage in cost-benefit analysis in determining whether they will be losers or winners
as a result of technology adoption.
However, perfect rational calculation as articulated by neoclassical economics and
rational choice literature in political science is not an option for agents facing constant change
and a high degree of uncertainty, which is the case in the technology adoption. Most
importantly, uncertainty and risk are fundamentally different (Keynes 1936; Knight 1921).
Uncertainty implies that the role of rational calculation and bargaining based on consideration
of risk is significantly reduced (March and Olsen 1998). If technology adoption would not be
messy and path-dependent process and would lead to fixed point of distribution of outcomes,
then “known unknowns” can play vital role and risks can be assessed and considered in the
calculations of agents.
Nevertheless, non-ergodic process of technology adoption implies that accidental
outcomes cannot be cancelled out. Particularly, as this process is rapidly changing and highly
imperfect where chance may matter more than systematic forces, which implies that
“unknown unknowns” dominate. The best we can do in light of uncertainty and constant
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change, we should see the rationality of agents in the adoption as highly “bounded” or
“adaptive” (see Simon 1955 for the discussion of “bounded rationality” and Mueller 1986 for
“adaptive rationality”). Furthermore, since the rational calculation does not provide a formula
for action for agents faced with uncertainty, the agent will follow “the logic of
appropriateness” instead of “the logic of consequences” that rationalist calculation would
require (March and Olsen 1998). The role of mental models and ideologies of agents
becomes essential in influencing the institutional change (Denzau and North 1994). And these
changes in institutions can either encourage or discourage the ways technology is diffused. It
is important to emphasize that these changes take place in specific time-frame. Pierson (2004)
emphasizes the importance of temporal nature of institutional change which is often not
captured by rationalistic approaches to path-dependency. He writes:
“There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional
arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better
metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many different
branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber
from one to the other— and essential if the chosen branch dies— the branch on which
a climber begins is the one she tends to follow.” (Pierson 2004, 20)

Pierson (2004) connects temporal nature of institutional change also to the spatial
nature of path-dependency, which is also emphasized by the smart specialization literature.
Pierson argues that “If there is one single area of economics in which path dependence is
unmistakable, it is in economic geography — the location of production in space” (Pierson
2004, 25).
Since new technology maybe represent more unknown unknowns than known
unknowns by increasing uncertainty, bad decisions can be made (Fountain, 2001, 85). In other
words, perceived losers and winners may get their cost-benefit analysis wrong. This
assumption of rationality in individual behavior or in market as a whole implies that the actors
are capable of understanding and learning of how technology adoption works and
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consequently encourage and/or discourage the process depending on their interests and how
institutions may constrain these interests. The notion of “critical juncture” for the pathdependent process where all following actions are severely limited by some decision carried
out long time ago is conceptually probably the best way how to think about the constraints on
rational action. The examples of critical juncture can range from the adoption of QWERTY
keyboard for typewriters to granting excessive privileges to telecom monopolies in countries
such as Armenia and Latvia. The former locked in a particular type of keyboard that we use
today. The latter increased the cost for spreading of internet connectivity. Path-dependence is
not the same as inevitability. As Pierson emphasizes there are real alternatives available when
choices are made. However, previous choices will affect outcomes and sequence of events
(Pierson 2004, 20). Path-dependence does not rely on causal independence through time but
it allows narrowing down the set of choices and show how decisions are linked through time
(Pierson 2004, 52).
The path-dependency and imperfect bounded rationality challenges the assumption
that actors will learn “right” lessons, which is basis for rational actor models (Fountain 2001,
85). Such assumption is not justified because actors may also learn the “wrong” lessons
(Fountain 2001, 85). As Pierson emphasizes the outcomes are result of human action but do
not result from human design (Pierson 2004, 102). Nye (1999) uses the term “path-insistence”
to capture ideological and political insistence on specific policies regardless of rational
criteria. His work concerns attitudes of Americans and Europeans towards energy issues but
its certainly fits well with the importance of path-dependence in understanding technology
diffusion. Manuel Castells (2000) gives example how Soviet Ministry of Electronics in
copying American chips rounded the space of US chip leads from 1/10 inch to 0.25
millimeters instead of proper equivalent of 0.254 millimeters. As a result the Soviet chips
looked like American but these chips did not fit into a Western socket. The Soviet
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semiconductor assembly equipment that was built as a result of this copying efforts was in
the end not able to make chips that could be exported because the inherent desire to simplify
of what seemed to the Soviet government officials as an unimportant aspect of chip design.
As this mistake was covered quite late, then one bad decision contributed to the widening of
technological gap between the West and the USSR (Castells 2000, 32). However rational the
Soviet leaders might have been in promoting adoption of Western technology, they failed to
learn what makes it work, which, in turn, had devastating consequences on the Soviet
economy. Paul Roemer, an expert in the Soviet economy, echoes this view by arguing that the
technological innovation so crucial for so-called intensive growth was insufficient in the
Soviet Union (Roemer 1994, 44). The growth of the economies became more dependent on
the adoption of new information technologies by the 1980s and, as a result, “the Soviet-type
economies failed dismally” (Roemer 1994, 44). Innovation did not occur because there were
no incentives to innovate without competition and no other mechanisms for innovation are
available (Roemer 1994, 46).
To conclude, this synthesis highlighted network nature of internet where outcomes
may be highly asymmetric and choices path-dependent rather than perfectly rational. This
discussion brought out that agents in making critical decisions in the technology diffusion
process are characterized by imperfect rationality and their decisions may be accidental but
with long term consequences. Chance elements and critical historical events remotely
connected to the outcome may matter more than rational calculation and choices. This again
neatly fits into the previous discussion of entrepreneurial discovery process where learning
through trial and error has emphasizes the asymmetry and non-linearity in the technology
diffusion process.
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2.7 Entrepreneurial Discovery and Social Networks
It is not just decentralized nature of Internet as a network which creates certain preconditions for its diffusion. Social capital and social networks of entrepreneurs, consumers
and other agents affect its diffusion as well. These networks of social relations can be
understood as institutions. Particularly, seeing networks of social relations as institutions, this
project argues that studies on digital divide and internet diffusion would benefit by
incorporating insights of social network theories into their models. That’s why the title of the
dissertation refers only to institutions and not to social capital and networks because it is
assumed that the term institutions incorporates social capital and networks.
Interactions of formal and informal institutions are fundamental for understanding the
emergence of particular type of network institutions in different localities. Ultimately, the
institutional governance structure can be seen as network (Lazer 2005; Castells 2009). Lazer
(2009) sees international system as a network. Castells argues that in the network societies
power lies within networks and distinguishes among four types of power: networking power,
network power, networked power and network-making power (Castells 2009, 42-47, 418420). The network-making power is the ultimate form of power (Castells 2009, 47). This
insight can be linked to the role of knowledge in these networks and specific social capital
that they rely on.
The connection between information technologies and knowledge is usually made in
the context of debates concerning information society and knowledge society (Servaes and
Carpentier 2006). This synthesis shares the view that technology transformative role is
dependent on knowledge embodied in people and on social, economic and political context of
society (Servaes and Carpentier 2006, 5-6). However, the following parts take a more
concrete approach by trying to highlight how knowledge, networks and social capital are vital
factors in explaining the diffusion of technology.
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The significance of ideas, epistemological nature of technology and informal
institutions that this synthesis highlighted above can be linked to the importance of social
capital and social networks. After all, networks connecting computers are ultimately social
networks as they link individuals, groups, organizations, ideas (Wellman 2001). The internet
should not be studied in isolation as merely technological network but as a social institution
that is a part of every-day life (Wellman 2001). Wellman (2001) argues that the use of internet
increases peoples social capital (Wellman 2001, 2032-2033). However, communities with
higher levels of social capital may be more eager to adopt and use the internet in the first
place. Indeed, scholars have found that establishing identity, trust, and group cohesion
through social and cultural structures is essential for creating and sustaining productive virtual
work groups (DeSanctis et al 2001; Kiesler and Cummings 2002; Neus 2001). More
specifically, researchers have demonstrated that facilitating face-to-face meetings once in a
while among the members of virtual teams is an important element in building social capital
and purely virtual communities may result in low-trust environment (Maznevski and Choduba
2000; Nardi et al 2002; Ostrom and Ahn 2001, 33). In addition, virtual communities will
increase social capital when they develop around physically based communities (Blanchard
and Horan, 1998). If face-to-face meetings would not be important, then activities are not
knowledge-intensive and information technology can be used as substitute for activities as
smart specialization experts McCann and Ortega (2013a) pointed out. Activities that require
internet as a complement require face-to-face meetings (McCann and Ortega 2013a, 4). This
in turn builds social capital. For instance, venture capitalists are still clustered primarily in
specific locations such as Silicon Valley which makes face-to-face meetings easier.
Nevertheless, the concept of social capital must be clarified in order to understand
how it might or might not impact the internet diffusion. Traditional approach in the social
sciences has seen social capital as an important aspect in understanding the well-being and

57

vibrancy of a community (Putnam 1993, 2007; Costa .and Kahn 2004; Jacobs 1993; Schweik
et al 2012). The concept of social capital is defined as trust among community members and
is measured by mapping out the strength of ties among community members in considering
their attendance in public meetings, participation in elections and group activities. Putnam
writes that social capital “…refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and
networks that can improve efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam
1993, 167). Trust is based on expectation that agents will act in a particular way in a given
situation. If this is not the case, then social sanctions will follow. Particularly, in voluntary
and cooperative arrangements with low levels of formal institutionalization social capital can
be seen as a substitute for formal institutions and their enforcements. In other words, social
capital reduces transaction costs in situations where formal institutions cannot achieve this
goal (Putnam 1993, 172; Pretty 2003, 1913; Schweik et al 2012, 69).
The literature on trust has identified that in commons settings, trust between
participants is often created when participants engage in “reciprocal cooperation” situations
(Axelrod, 1984; Putnam 1993, 172-173; Schweik et al 2012, 70). Reciprocity of transactions
creates social capital. However, these reciprocal transactions does not have to be understood
as market transactions because they are about social intangibles, not about money and
material goods (Portes and Sensebrenner 1998, 130; Schweik et al 2012, 70). The key
implication of the reciprocity in the context of social capital is that reciprocity does not have
to be “balanced” or “specific” (Putnam 1993, 172). Reciprocity can be generalized or
diffused (Putnam 1993, 172). And the generalized reicprocity can become embedded in the
entire social network, which allows solving dilemmas of collective action (Putnam 1993,
172).
We should not understand the social norms that govern behavior in terms of narrow
self-interest but their motivations can be nonconsequantialist (Knight and Ensminger 1998,
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105). Individuals may follow social norms because it is appropriate thing to do in a given
context. If participants in any undertaking have expectation that their trust won’t be
exploited, then cooperation is more likely to endure. Networks of interpersonal
communication and exchange can be horizontal (agents are equivalent) or vertical (unequal
agents and asymmetric relations) (Putnam 1993, 173). More horizontal networks should
contribute to more successful outcomes – in this case technology diffusion. More hierarchical
networks should be less successful (Putnam 1993). Saxenian (1994) found that horizontal
social networks explain the success of Silicon Valley.
Usually social scientists have operationalized social capital by exploring at civic
participation in Italy, phenomena of rotating credit agencies, voting turnout, attendance at
public meetings membership in voluntary organization, tendency to get involved in group
activities such as bowling and by various other measures that usually relate to physical
attributes and geographic attributes of communities (Putnam 1993; 2007; Costa and Kahn
2003; Schweik et al 2012, 69). However, scholars studying high-tech clusters emphasize the
trust does not have to come necessarily from having personal and family connection, living in
the same neighborhood and/or having particular physical characteristics but it emerges as a
result of reputation for performance in professional peer groups (Patton and Kenney 2003,
13). This approach is based on Coleman (1988) for whom social capital was defined by its
function. Social capital consists a certain social structure and it accommodates actions of
agents within the structure. Social capital is productive as are other forms of capital but it
resides in the structure of relations, not within entities and human beings (Coleman, 1988).
For example, on the basis of traditional understanding that emphasizes community life and
civic engagement Silicon Valley seems to have very low levels of social capital as it is a
world of strangers who primarily focus on their work. However, scholars have pointed out
that the region has very high levels of social capital and its important factor in understanding
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its success (Patton and Kenney 2003, 4, 12; Fountain 1997; Saxenian 1994). This is so
because “community is defined by the professional peer groups and not by physical
neighborhood where one sleeps” (Patton and Kenney 2003, 4).
All of this literature highlighted above with emphasis on trust and reciprocal
interactions, which obviously take time, implies that social capital leading to a more extensive
and intensive use of internet is more likely than the use of internet leading to a creation of
higher levels of social capital. One way how social capital can matter in the diffusion of
technology is that scholars have found social capital to be an important factor in knowledge
creation which facilitates technology diffusion. Ghosal and Nahapiet (1998) have found that
social capital makes possible knowledge creation. They argue that more dense social capital
creates “organizational advantage”. There have been a numerous studies showing importance
of social capital for technology firms and military (Honig et al, 2006), in understanding
business interactions in Silicon Valley(Castilla 2003), in call centers (Castilla 2005) as well
as more general studies showing how social networks interact with markets and organizations
(White 2002; Wasserman et al 1994; Eccles and Nohria 1992).
The literature on social capital and networks has a straightforward link to the
international relations’ concept of “epistemic communities” (Haas 1992). Haas defines
epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and
competence in a particular domain and authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge
within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992, 3). Members of an epistemic community may
have different backgrounds and represent different disciplines but they share normative and
principled beliefs, which helps to establish trust among the members of community. The
density of social capital and affiliated social networks is thus affiliated with the emergence of
epistemic communities, which may more or less connected to the international networks of
experts. Even though the research question here is not an issue of international policy
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coordination, such communities may have direct links to IT groups and experts in different
locations of the world and by including both experts from private and public sector form a
network that transcends traditional relations of market and hierarchical organization. The
explicit knowledge can be shared in these communities globally. However, the actual
implementation on the ground depends on local and national institutions and tacit knowledge
of local epistemic community. The existence of such epistemic community may be important
for understanding why the internet has diffused in a particular location and not in other
locations. Their authoritative claims to knowledge may have lead governments to follow their
advice in reforming formal institutions – if the conditions are right. Essentially, as this
implies, that study of the role of social networks of experts has to take into account mental
models and ideologies of agents and whether they are shared widely or not this knowledge
within their epistemic community. In the context of this project social capital, social
networks and epistemic communities are seen broadly as institutions because they structure
action of agents (more specifically it will be discussed under methodology section below). As
these networks of knowledge-based experts with authoritative knowledge transcend
traditional hierarchy of organizations and challenge the assumption of frictionless transactions
in the market. If market would be frictionless and non-market hierarchies would set the
course, then the role of social capital, networks and epistemic communities would be marginal
at best.
In sum, the value of this literature allows exploring the importance of social capital
and social networks in understanding the technology diffusion. Social capital creates trust and
disseminates knowledge which have positive impact on the increased internet use. The
existence of social networks among experts can accommodate the process of entrepreneurial
discovery and affect diffusion process as well. This can happen through formal process as the
involvement in policy-making or through more informal mechanisms.
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2.8 From Tacit Knowledge to Tacit Web
The discussion of diffusion on innovations and epistemic communities and social
capital already introduced distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge (see Hayek 1945
for discussion of tacit and dispersed knowledge). Following Hayek (1945), it is argued that
most useful knowledge in society is dispersed and localized. Ultimate outcomes depend on
local implementation and understanding of issues (Room 2011, 58). Particularly considering
the institutional complexity that is potentially linked to the outcomes in the internet diffusion,
it is easy to see how international and regional policy measures can lead to a diverse set of
domestic outcomes. This is especially so because the internet is decentralized and
unintelligent network, which leads to a proposition that its diffusion can be explained by the
extent of tacit and dispersed knowledge found within the local entrepreneurial networks. By
nature tacit knowledge is difficult to code which means that it cannot be shared and managed
as explicit knowledge (Haldin-Herrgard 2000). Perception, language, time and distance create
barriers for sharing tacit knowledge (Haldin-Herrgard 2000). Hence, such tacit and
decentralized knowledge is best utilized through process of entrepreneurial discovery with
emphasis on experiments and trial and error. For instance, in Estonian language and policy
debates e-government is understood much more narrowly than in English – primarily meaning
only the use of information technologies by the executive branch or in some cases even the
cabinet. Obviously, this is not merely a linguistic difference but leads to a different emphasis
on implementation, and thus, to the diffusion of technology within government.
Most importantly, the vital role of tacit and decentralized knowledge and
entrepreneurial discovery implies that the existence of similar formal institutions may lead to
different outcomes. If tacit knowledge matters for the spread of information technology, than
any attempt at offering explanation and/or policy lessons must consider this possibility.
Indeed, Castells and Himanen (2002) argue that there is no single model that countries can
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adopt and each country should follow its own path to “informational economy”. This fits well
with the smart specialization literature highlighted above which emphasizes different
evolutionary trajectories (McCann and Ortega 2013; Foray 2015) Even in the European
Union where the degree of harmonization of regulation related to information technologies is
greater than in any other region in the world and all kind of EU-wide initiatives to encourage
the use of information technologies have been launched, research on the European
information society has pointed out that there is “no single road to the Information Society”
because “different national authorities in Europe react differently to the plans of Brussels”
(Servaes 2003, 27).
Even more radical interpretation is given by Drahos and Braithwaite (2003) suggest
that we have entered into the area of “information feudalism”. Of course, their approach is
limited as they discuss intellectual property rights of information economy. In addition their
understanding of medieval feudalism is narrow primarily focusing on relations between lords
and serfs. They suggest that “the majority, the peasant serfs who had to work the land, had to
live with the arbitrariness that absolute power brings” (Drahis with Braithwaite 2003, 3).
“The redistribution of property rights in the case of information feudalism involves a transfer
of knowledge assets from the intellectual commons into private hands” (Drahis with
Braithwaite (2003, 3). Indeed, information economy is governed by medieval system but it is
much more complex than the simple dichotomy between serfs and lords. In fact, medieval
systems as the current information economy is really a non-system as there are multiple
sources of authority with overlapping powers. This is not necessarily negative development.
Zielonka (2006) has argued that new member states from Central Eastern Europe have faced
much fuzzier constraints on implementing supposedly harmonized EU imposed regulations
than the traditional uni-dimensional literature suggests.
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More specifically, Tenbuecken (2006) demonstrates that the EU harmonized telecom
regulation has produced quite different regulatory policies in different EU member states in
Central and Eastern Europe which had much less flexibility in adopting the EU Telecom
Acquis than their Western European counterparts. The general terms “liberalization”,
“regulation”, “de-regulation”, “re-regulation”, and “independent regulator” imply distinct
policies in different contexts (Tenbuecken 2006, 156-167, 200-239). These findings
correspond well to the argument by Vogel (1996) that globalization of telecom markets does
not lead to the convergence of international regulatory regimes but to different reactions in
domestic regulatory regimes. Since one of the key findings in “formal” institutionalist
literature was that telecom regulation is an important causal factor in explaining outcomes in
the internet diffusion, then in order to avoid conceptual stretching regulation has to be studied
carefully in different domestic contexts. Furthermore, it has to be understood in the context of
institutional complexity and conflicting institutional logics which was highlighted earlier in
this chapter. Policy heterogeneity highlighted by Vogel (1996) and Tenbuecken (2006) is
closely linked with institutional complexity because institutional complexity reduces certainty
and increases ambiguity. Room (2011) shows how policy diversity and heterogeneity emerges
by connecting complexity science and institutionalist analysis. Knoepfel et al (2011) argue
that if implementation of public policy falls under several ministries, or several departments
within one ministry, then policy context is heterogeneous. If policy is implemented by one
unit at the same ministry, then it is homogeneous. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine
completely homogeneous policy context, particularly when we discuss interactions of EU and
national institutions. Hence, it is a question of degree of heterogeneity and homogeneity.
Relatively homogeneous policy by design may still result heterogeneous results. This may
stem from unintended consequences, interactions of government regulations with informal
rules as discussed under institutional complexity. It is similar to competitive heterogeneity
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affiliated by scholars such as Harold Demzets (1973) and Michael Porter (1980) in strategic
management and industrial economics, which examines why industries do not converge on
one single model of operations. In international economics policy heterogeneity is used to
highlight regulatory differences between countries (Kox and Lejour 2005). However, there
might be also regulatory differences within countries or among the group of countries such as
EU as discussed Vogel (1996) and Tenbuecken (2006). It is a fact of life that regulations may
conflict with each other and may be implemented differently by policymakers because of
different institutional logics and path-dependencies.
To reiterate, the technical aspects and easily transferable knowledge play only small
part in explaining the intensity and extensity of Internet diffusion because the epistemological
nature of technology. Most importantly, the existence of tacit and dispersed knowledge
interconnected with the density of social networks and entrepreneurial discovery.
Entrepreneurial discovery in the broadest sense involving both public and private sector
agents contribute to a broader zeitgeist concerning internet in given society. In this sense, the
internet is really tacit as its diffusion and its use depends more tacit elements such as highly
localized and dispersed knowledge, social capital and networks and informal rules of the
game rather than on explicit knowledge and tangible factors. Thus, tacit web refers both to the
nature of Internet as well as characteristics of entrepreneurial, social and institutional
networks which impact its diffusion.

2.9 Summary
This discussion of technology diffusion and related literature, makes two suggestions.
First, the research on digital divide and Internet diffusion would benefit by recognizing
epistemological and network nature of the technology. Scholars can develop more nuanced
arguments by incorporating insights from the broader accounts on diffusion of number of
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different technologies instead of relying solely on the literature on Internet diffusion. This is
particularly valuable approach as the literature of Internet diffusion is new in the broader
context of technology diffusion literature.
Second, scholarly explanations of Internet diffusion outcomes would benefit by
moving beyond formal categories such as GDP and formal institutions. A more detailed
approach to explanatory variables would give richer and more nuanced view of Internet
diffusion. The discussion above focused on many different approaches found in social science
literature to technology diffusion by highlighting how broadened concept of institutions,
process of entrepreneurial discovery, social networks as well as path-dependence and tacit
knowledge should be incorporated into the analysis. It particularly brought out the importance
of intangible elements such as social capital and networks and tacit knowledge as important
elements advancing understanding of the diffusion processes.
On the basis of this synthesis of literature, the chapter suggests to consider
institutional complexity and entrepreneurial discovery in order to understand the different
outcomes in internet diffusion rates. The interactions between formal institutions and informal
institutions as well as path-dependence must be considered in understanding different
outcomes in the internet diffusion. Differences in formal institutions may not explain the
outcomes in the Internet diffusion. Informal institutions which include habits, norms of
behavior, social capital, networks and many other factors which have been discussed in length
above have may offer better explanatory variables. Internet diffusion has to be studied as a
path-dependent process where the development of particular diffusion process can be traced
back to a critical juncture. In the internet diffusion process both supply and demand matter
even though their interaction may be asymmetric in different periods of diffusion process, i.e.
in the beginning it may be more supply driven and in the mature phase more demand driven.
Social capital and networks facilitate the process of entrepreneurial discovery which utilizes
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of localized and dispersed specific tacit knowledge. This process can be more fundamental for
extensity and intensity of Internet diffusion than relying on top-down social engineering and
explicit scientific knowledge. In the end, both scientific and tacit knowledge may matter but
under certain conditions tacit knowledge is both necessary and sufficient for technology
diffusion in a given country because the diffusion of technology does not require a domestic
science base. Nevertheless, the domestic science can contribute further to the diffusion under
certain circumstances. The next part aims to take the core ideas into more concrete level by
outlining research methods. It starts by the overview of the conceptualization and the
measurement. This is followed by discussion of the rationale for case selection.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND RESEARCH METHODS

This chapter will offer an overview of key methodological issues concerning the
conceptualization and measurement of internet diffusion and will conclude by discussing the
research methods applied in the dissertation. The research strategy is based on descriptive and
comparative approaches comparing cases. Essentially, it combines explanatory, descriptive
and multiple-case study methods. First, comparison of cases focuses on variance between
internet diffusion processes in two countries with an aim to offer a “thick description”.
Second, it will describe different initiatives and processes within one country. Essentially, it
uses different units of analysis in different chapters. Chapter Four will be a macro-level
comparative study of two nation-states. Chapters Five and Six undertake a deeper, analysis of
the initiatives and processes taking place within one country, Estonia, and explore how these
processes are linked with macro level processes in Chapter Four.
This approach will provide more detailed and nuanced insights into the internet
diffusion process that cannot be captured by survey research and quanitative approaches.
Quantitative approaches often claim to establish a causality between different variables in
explaining the diffusion. This dissertation will not make any causal claims but limits itself to
the explanation and description of rules and processes that have facilitated internet diffusion.
It also insists that previous studies have not been able to establish actual causality because of
the lack of sufficient counterfactuals and overdetermination as well as weak conceptualization
and operationalization of concepts such as internet diffusion. Hence, the explanatory and
descriptive nature of the dissertation is purposefully self-imposed by suggesting that scholars
studying internet diffusion pretend to claim causality on the basis of reductionist approaches,
which ignore non-linearity and complexity of diffusion process. This disserstation aims to
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celebrate complexity and particularities of internet diffusion processes. It emphasizes details
that are often overlooked by reductionist approaches. In order to understand the
shorthcomings of more quantitative studies, and the benefits of this “thick description,” I will
start by discussing the concept formation and measurement of variables often used in the
internet diffusion research.

3.1 A New Index Measure of Internet Diffusion and its Limitations
As it was already pointed out in the Chapter Two of this dissertation, the internet
diffusion cannot be defined differently by differents scholars. No uniform definition of
internet diffusion can be found the literature. In this dissertation, the terms internet diffusion,
penetration, adoption, connecitivity, access, use and digital divide are used interexchangably
to describe the same phenomena. One way to define diffusion is the following “diffusion of
an innovation is a macro process concerned with the spread of the innovation from its source
to the public” (Dholakia et al 2004). The internet adoption can be defined as “… a micro
process that focuses on the stages through which an individual passes when deciding to accept
or reject the innovation” (Dholakia et al 2004). In practice, it is not possible to distinguish
between adoption and diffusion. These processes are mutually interdependent. Micro and
macro processes interact. Often macro outcomes are simply aggregates of multiple micro
processes. Adoption of internet by groups of individuals such as students or businesses in
manufacturing sector, for instance, increases diffusion of internet on per capita basis on macro
level. Indeed, the same authors after offering definitions write about “adoption and diffusion
patterns of internet” without clearly drawing the line between the two (Dholakia et al 2004).
Thus adoption, use, penetration and diffusion of internet describe the same phenomena in
many scholarly accounts (Kitsing 2008; Kitsing and Howard 2009).
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Internet diffusion is usually understood as referring to how widely the internet is used
in society. The concept is operationalized by measuring in in relative terms, not in absolute
terms. Different indicators are standardized and scholars consider per capita internet diffusion
rates or use per 100 inhabitants or some other measure in relation to population. Such
approach is important because it establishes equivalance. This means that specific context is
taken into account (Adcock and Collier 2001, 536). As it was emphasized in Chapter Two of
this dissertation local context is crucial for understanding diffusion. Standardizing by
population is important because it avoids effects that are the results of population size
(Adcock and Collier 2001, 536; Jacob 1984, 30). As it has been also highlighted in the
literature review, usually scholars have employed two standard ways of measuring internet
diffusion. First, scholars measure the number of internet hosts per 100 inhabitants (Kiiski and
Pohjola 2001; Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 279-280). Second, other scholars prefer measuring
the number of Internet users per 100 inhabitants (Beilock and Dimitrova 2003).
As Kitsing (2008) and Kitsing and Howard (2009) have pointed out, “internet hosts”
are organizations or firms that have computers directly linked to the worldwide internet
network. An Internet Service Provider (ISP) is a host. This means that individuals can
connect through the ISP host computer to the internet. The International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) measures internet hosts by two-digit country code, e.g.; France: .fr, United
Kingdom: .uk., et al. or three digit-code referring to a specific classification of organization,
e.g., .org, .com, .edu et al (ITU 2006). This way of measuring internet diffusion can be a
reliable method of measurement. Errors in collecting the data are minimal as well as from a
technical standpoint, data is easily assesible (Jacob 1984, 34). Most importantly, it is not
necessary to conduct surveys in order to identify hosts. However, problems do arise with
content validity (Adcock and Collier 2001, 538-539, Kitsing 2008; Kitsing and Howard
2009). This method of measurement of internet hosts does not necessarily inform use if a
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counted host is physically located in a certain country. As ITU points out, the indicators are
based on “approximation” (ITU 2006). This limitation is particularly relevant of hosts
providing services under internet names ending with .com or .org. Therefore, using the
number of internet hosts per 100 inhabitants is not a meaningful operationalization of the
concept of Internet diffusion (Kitsing 2008; Kitsing and Howard 2009). The indicator is not
valid because the link between per capita internet hosts as operationalized variable and the
concept of internet diffusion defined as a percentage of internet users in society may not exist.
Convergent validity is missing because internet users and internet hosts do not correlate.
discriminant validity is also not present. This is so because he measurement does not
differentiate between different types of hosts, e.g., internet hosts based in domestic economy
and those based outside (Kitsing 2008; Kitsing and Howard 2009).
The second method of operationalization of internet diffusion focuses on users. Again,
it was highlighted in the Chapter Two that some scholars rely on these measures. But how do
we identify users? Usually, it is done on the basis of survey research. Number of users per 100
inhabitants is usually recorded by contacting people by telephone. Surveys ask whether they
used the internet during a specific period which can be one year or six months or some other
time frame. It depends on survey as some surveys tend to identify heavy users in addition to
regular users. As the operationalization of internet diffusion, surveys offer an better
alternative to measuring hosts. Discriminant validity is present. The surveys differentiate
between internet users and non-users in given country. It is a more direct measure of use
while the internet hosts-based approach measured users indirectly. Measuring hosts is based
on assumption that supply equals demand. However, as it was higlighted in the Chapter Two
relations between supply and demand are asymmetrical and nonlinear. However, the
measurement of internet users is inferior in terms of reliability. Internet users are not
trustatable in terms of validity either. Convergent validity which refers to correlations with
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host is missing. As Kitsing (2004; 2008) as well as Kitsing and Howard (2009) have
demonstrated by comparing indicators it is obvious that there is no correlation between users
and hosts as well as between subscribers and users and formfo subscribers and hosts.
ITU also has pointed out that surveys are differently conducted in different countries
(International Telecommunications Union 2006). For instance, different age groups are
included in various countries. These survey design issues create systematic errors or biases
for any cross-country analysis on the basis of ITU data. This again undermines measurement
validity. Most importantly, both approaches to measuring the internet diffusion have serious
limitations in term of validity and reliability. Furthermore, these two approaches do not
reflect well the nature of the internet as a network good as it was discussed in the Chapter
Two.

3.1.1 Index-based Approaches
Again, one solution is to rely on more comprehensive datasets and not just on hosts or
users. This means the creation of an index which has been used to measure complex social
phenomena such as institutional performance, for instance (Putnam 1993, 75). Some scholars
promoted index-type of approach for the analytical framework of the Global Diffusion of the
Internet Project already in 1998 (Press et al. 1998). Barzilai-Nahon (2006 ) has proposed
index-based approach, where she treats internet as an independent good. Her approach is
integrated index similar to approach by Press and others (1998) and the World Economic
Forum (Kitsing and Howard 2009).
Based on these previous insights, Kitsing (2008) and Kitsing and Howard (2009) have
proposed “the index of effective internet diffusion” which captures intangible elements of
technology. The effective internet diffusion does not capture only the quantity of Internet use
but also quality of its use while approaches using hosts and users as indicators capture only
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“formal internet diffusion”. This index relies on conceptualizing internet as a network good
and highlighting network nature of its diffusion. The index categorizes variables into three
dimensions of Internet diffusion: network nature, sophistication of use and social distribution.
The table 3.1 offers idealized vision of the index and summarizes the key elements of the
index. It is emphasized by the authors that the concrete application of the index depends on
data availaibility in the countries to be studied (Kitsing and Howard 2009).

Table 3.1: The Three Dimensions of the Index of Effective Internet Diffusion.
Dimension
Network nature
(Geographical dispersion,
Sectoral absorption,
Connectivity infrastructure,
Organizational
infrastructure).

Techniques for
measurement
Quantitative, qualitative,
network analysis

Some potential indicators

Asymmetrical or
symmetrical distribution
between cities and rural
areas, quality and quantity
of connections to hubs,
intensity (what for) and
extensity of use
(percentage) in different
sectors: commerce,
education, percentage of
internet users, broadband
users, wireless diffusion,
number of internet hosts,
number of internet
providers, degree of
independence of telecom
regulator and market
openness et al.
Sophistication of use
Quantitative and qualitative The purposes of internet
use, availability of services
and content, nature of
discourses about the
internet et al.
Social distribution
Quantitative and qualitative, Percentage of males,
network analysis
females, young, old,
different ethnic groups in
using the internet,
differences in use of these
groups, connections
between the different
groups, Gini coefficients for
technology distribution
Source: Kitsing and Howard (2009).
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As it was discussed in the literature section of this dissertation, there are many
substitutes and complements to the internet. The index of effective internet use aims to
demonstrate the actual use and diffusion of the internet in society more closely than would be
achievable by looking at hosts or users. This dissertation will use insights from the index of
effective internet diffusion in the Chapter Four. However, it must be pointed out that the
index-based approaches have also serious shortcomings. First, they are still reductionist.
Obviously, it is not as reductionist as using one or two variables. Nevertheless, index uses a
limited number of variables, then significant portion of complexity is assumed away. Second,
indexes are arbitrary. Authors decide which variables to use and which concrete values to
assign to these variables. Several variables may correlate, which again may increase the
arbitrariness. Third, construction of new index would offer a static snapshot in time and not
dynamic evolution of variables over time. Of course, index could be constructed
retrospectively covering many years but considering the scope and length of this dissertation,
such exercise on its own would not leave time for anything else.
Third, indexes may use unreliable data. It is not just data is collected differently in
different countries and may be manipulated. Even the concepts may not have unified
meaning. For instance, data on broadband use is often not comparable because there is no
universal definition of broadband. The ITU Standardization Sector’s Recommendation I.113
defined broadband as a transmission capacity that was faster than primary rate ISDN, which is
1.5 megabits per second (Mbit/s) or 2 Mbit/s depending on country. In 2001, members of
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries adopted a
definition of broadband which is less than 256 kilobits per second (kbit/s). The ITU also
began collecting data using this baseline definition. However, the European Commission’s
Communication Committee established a different definition in 2002 at 144 kbit/s. Most
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importantly, such definitions have become irrelevant as advertised broadband offers below 2
Mbit/s are rare.
An even more complex issue is the cost of internet access because of complexity of
tariffs and bundles offered by different operators depending on the device, time of use and
many other factors. Even comparisons within country are difficult, not to mention between
countries. The OECD commissioned a working group on broadband metrics in 2010, which
after several years and meetings in Paris, London and Washington DC still struggled with
finding a new common simple definition of broadband because of quickly evolving
technology, particularly in wireless form. In the end, the OECD working party recommended
to continue using the old definition of broadband. The working group also went through
complex topics such as broadband speed tiers, next generation access, availability metrics,
investment metrics, performance metrics, competition metrics, prices and many other factors
(OECD 2012) The sheer complexity of these issues highlights the challenges of generating
comparable conceptualizations and data that can be used comparatively. The OECD efforts
involved the best experts from member countries and the secretariat.
The empirical discussion in Chapter Three mimics the index-based approach and
internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia is measured across 11 variables which link back to
the ideas developed in the index. Obviously, there are trade-offs involved. Including more
than 11 variables would increase complexity to research design and would make
interpretation of data extremely challenging. At the same time, it is certainly improvement in
comparison with studies where only one or two variables are used in operationalization of
internet diffusion.
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3.2 Research methods
Following the insights from the discussion on methodological issues, 11 different
variables are selected for measuring and comparing internet diffusion in Chapter Four in
comparison of Estonia and Slovenia.
Table 3.2: The Three Dimensions of the Index of Effective Internet Diffusion and Measures
Used for Comparing Estonia and Slovenia.
Dimension
Network nature
(Geographical dispersion,
Sectoral absorption,
Connectivity infrastructure,
Organizational
infrastructure).
Sophistication of use

Measures
Data source
a) internet use per 100
Eurostat, United Nations
inhabitants, b) households
with access to internet at
home, h) broadband
penetration rate, i) mobile
broadband coverage
c) households with access to Eurostat, Ookla.
broadband, d) enterprises
with access fixed
broadband, and j) download
and upload speeds.
Social distribution
e) regular internet use by
Eurostat
females and males, f)
households with access to
internet in rural and urban
areas, g) households with
access to internet on the
basis of income quartiles,
k) individuals with low
formal education and senior
citizens regularly using
internet.
Source: Author on the basis of concept from Kitsing and Howard (2009).
As the table 3.2 shows the internet diffusion is measured and compared on the basis of
following ten indicators: a) internet use per 100 inhabitants, b) households with access to
internet at home, c) households with access to broadband, d) enterprises with access fixed
broadband, e) regular internet use by females and males, f) households with access to internet
in rural and urban areas, g) households with access to internet on the basis of income
quartiles, h) broadband penetration rate, i) mobile broadband coverage, j) download and
upload speeds and k) individuals with low formal education and senior citizens regularly
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using internet. Measures a), b), i) and h) correspond to network nature of internet. Measures
c), d) and j) correspond to sophistication of use in the index. Measures e) f) and g) and k)
correspond to ideas of social distribution in the index.Furthemore, these 11 indicators offer a
good mix of both demand side and supply side indicators and three variables out of ten
capture diffusion among different demographic and socio-economic groups. As was
emphasized in the discussion above, there is always a degree of arbitrariness involved in the
selection variables. However, it is clear that this approach is more comprehensive than relying
on one and two variables and captures well the intensity and extensity of internet diffusion.
To understand factors that may create preconditions for the internet diffusion, the research
uses variables such as per capita gross domestic product at purchasing power parity
(per capita GDP at PPP) to demonstrate the variance in national wealth as well as the gini
coefficient as a measure of income inequality.
The literature review suggested that institutions may be crucial in understanding
different technology diffusion patterns. Hence, a background concept of institutions is used
according to the definition offered by North: "Institutions are the rules of the game in society
or, more fundamentally, are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction"
(North 1990, 3). North is explicit in stating that institutions are not the same as organizations.
Institutions are more fundamental – rules of the game –- that interact with organizations. The
Northian emphasis on incentives points out that institutions are enablers, not only
constrainers. In other words, institutions may both create and remove incentives to engage in
any type of undertaking. Obviously, the operationalization of institutions relies also on the
discussion on institutions developed in the literature review and insights from political science
scholars such as Pierson (2004).
I will operationalize the background concept of institutions in the context of insights
considered in the literature review. First, institutions will be divided into formal and informal
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categories, with my focus centering on the formal rules, but the informal rules and social
networks will be considered as well whenever the data allow me to do so. Second, the
dynamics of institutional change will be considered in the analysis. This analysis will not be
static– it attempts to incorporate a description of how the change in institutions from 1991 to
present may have affected the spread of technology. It does not make any deterministic and
probable linkages between institutions and technology diffusion. Rather on the basis of
careful case study analysis it tries to demonstrate how institutions have contributed in the
form of critical junctures for the spread of internet.
On the basis of the literature review, the following analyses will examine changes in
general formal institutions governing economy, international trade, foreign direct investment,
privatization, competition policy, regulation of telecom companies and various government
initiatives encouraging the use of the internet and targeted at the ICT sector. Furthermore, I
will consider in my analysis specific institutional changes affecting the internet and
information technology and informal rules of the game and how these rules interacted with
formal rules. In general, formal institutions can be measured by examination of legislation,
reports by government and international organizations and through semi-structured
interviews. Formal institutions can be analyzed further by in-depth analysis of EU Regular
Reports, which provide detailed overviews of overall and telecom institutional frameworks
for different years.
The impact of formal rules on the incentives of key actors cannot be explored without
incorporation of informal rules. Credible commitment and rule enforcement depend on the
interactions of the two – particularly in rapidly changing economies. But the interactions of
formal and informal institutions is challenging to measure. It heavily relies on semi-structured
interviews, surveys and indirect secondary data which may or may not support particular
interpretation. Hence, the discussion of informal insitutions is significantly more subjective

78

and subject to biases than the changes in formal institutions. However, informal instutions
have to be factored in because the impact of informal institutions can be either added or
substracted from the perceived effect of formal institutions. Depending on the particular
country and situation informal institutions may increase the credibility of commitments and
contract enforcability or may reduce it. In this analysis, I am particularly interested to see
whether there are any fundamental discrepancies between formal and informal institutions,
which undermine the projected effect of some or many formal institutions. It is important to
see whether formal rules of the game created a credible commitment or not. Or opposite may
be true that informal institutions may contribute to the internet diffusion despite the weakness
of formal institutions and a lack of credible commitment mechanism in the formal institutions.
I have highlighted the perspectives on formal and informal institutions in the Chapter
Two. The following is my own synthesis on how I will try to operationalize these
perspectives in the empirical part. To further research on informal institutions, the empirical
discussion will bring in percpectives on the roles of entrepreneurial discovery processes,
social networks and social capital by combining them with more formal institutionalist
perspectives whenever data allows me to do that. This analytical approach is based on the
premise that the entrepreneurial discovery process is based either explicity or implicitly on
the rules of the game. The dominance of particular type of rule of the game is influenced by
the network effect of internet and network effect embedded in the entrepreneurial discovery
process. In some countries institutions that emerge encourage the diffusion of Internet through
the entrepreneurial process of discovery. In other countries they do not. In other words,
formal institutions may facilitate the emergence and operation of localized networks which
are fundamental for the diffusion of internet. Hence, the thesis aims to map out the role of
tacit and often overlooked insitutional aspects which may encourage the spread of internet.
Nevertheless, informal institutions and the interactions between formal and informal
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institutions and mental models of key actors are difficult to measure. Opinion surveys such as
the data from the Eurobarometer are clearly not sufficient as the thesis is interested in specific
professional networks in specific contexts. On the basis of primary and secondary sources and
in-depth elite interviewing in, the research aims to explore the role of specific entrepreneurial
discovery processes.

3.2.1 Case Selection
The study is disciplined configurative as it will use established theories to explain
cases (George and Bennett 2005, 75). Concerning the trade-offs involved between
particularist and generalist approaches, it leans towards the particularist approach and rejects
the generalist definition where the case study is “an intensive study of a single unit for the
purposes of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring 2004, 343). Population of
the study is equal to the sample. The research is not generalist and does not aim to
demonstrate that a particular set of independent variables creates necessary and sufficient
conditions for higher outcomes in internet diffusion rates in particular population ( see for
instance, George and Bennett, 2005, 26; Gerring 2001, 132 for the discussion of research
methods). The research does not aim to establish causality and answer to “if …then”
questions. Even the best designed quantitative studies never establish deterministic causality.
At best, they show statistically significant correlations, which allows authors to entertain the
possibility of causal relationship between different variables. Often authors may overinterpret
their result and speak in deterministic language about causality. This does not certainly mean
that correlations will equal causality. In this context, it is not possible to see how case study,
comparative or not, can ever show causal relationships. Self-selection biases,
overdetermination, measurement validity and other factors make it impossible. The research
cannot aim to establish a probalistic causality or deterministic causality between the
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independent variables and the dependent variables (Gerring 2004, 342). By outlining the
necessary conditions for internet diffusion in a particular institutional context, the lack of
counterfactuals and overdetermination does not allow to establish causality.
My strategy is closest to congruence tests, but I argue that lack of counterfactuals and
overdetermination is still making it difficult to use the congruence tests for establishing
strong casual relationship. The use of these tests moves the research strategy away from a
ceteris paribus approach because of over-determination effects. In other words, the overdetermination implies that are too many variables that can explain the outcome in the
dependent variable. More specifically, small number of cases and presence of many variables
limit the ability to focus on the effects of changes in particular variables while keeping
everything else constant. Nevertheless, George and Bennett (2005) argue that it is possible to
conduct congruence tests, which emphasize “similarity in the relative strength and duration of
hypothesized causes and observed effects” (George and Bennett, 2005, 183). The congruence
method “does not mean that causes must resemble their effects or be on the same scale…”
(George and Bennett, 2005, 183). They argue that scholars can take into account theoretical
reasons why our hypothesized causes affect variables in a particular way and on these grounds
we can analyze whether independent and dependent variables are congruent (George and
Bennett, 2005, 183). Hence, by starting with theories and on the basis of these theories one
can make predictions regarding what kind of relationships we expect to see between
dependent and independent variables. If one finds out on the basis of the interviews, for
example, that the predicted relationship exists, then one can entertain the possibility that there
is a causal relationship. According to George and Bennett (2005) the congruence method is
the second best option in the situations where we cannot carry out natural experiments or
where it would be unrealistic to assume ceteris paribus because there are more variables that
change than one. Nevertheless, my approach takes more minimalist interpretation of
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congruence tests and social science research methods in general concerning causality. It
stems from the understanding that even in the well designed causal research these challenges
are almost never properly tackled because models are abstraction of reality and assumed
sigficant portion of reality away. Hence, I will limit myself to description and explanation.
The study aims to explain and describe conditions which allow understanding the
diffusion of internet in a particular context. Thus, the findings cannot be generalized for a
larger population than sample. It cannot be generalized for instance even for the transition
economies of Central and Eastern Europe even if I study one of the countries, not to mention
for all transition countries or the entire world. However, the studies should be illuminative for
researchers with the aim to help in theory building and if possible in comparing a large
sample of countries. Nevertheless, this study chooses a particularist approach in full
understanding of trade-offs involved between particularist and generalist approaches to the
research design. It combines different case study methods as was pointed out in the beginning.
Units of analysis vary from chapter to chapter. In Chapter Four, the sample consists of units
that are defined as diffusion processes in countries; the level of analysis is on aggregate,
macro- or country level.
The research strategy emphasizes the extensiveness and intensiveness of the casestudy method based on case comparibility (Gerring 2004, 347-348; Collier 1993, 111). This
description allows to improve our understanding of internet diffusion and processes which
may constrain and enable the diffusion. The dissertation combines both macro and micro level
processes. First, I start with macro level approach by combining two countries. Chapter Four
examines diffusion proecesses in Estonia and Slovenia as a primary case and uses sometimes
other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries as a secondary cases to highlight the
importance of variance between two cases and with other CEE countries and understand
factors affecting internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia. For illustrative purposes, it also
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makes comparison with a larger set of countries in the Central and Eastern European as well
as with other countries in the world. The purpose of comparison differs throughout different
sections. If the purpose is to compare a country with aspirational examples, then it should be
done so. If the purpose is to compare a country with most similar ones in terms of GDP,
institutions, membership in the EU and some other factors, then it should be done so.
After macro level approach, I will move to more micro level and describe diffusion
process, institutional and policy variables within one country on the basis of several cases.
Chapters Five and Six compare different initiatives and processes within Estonia. This allows
me to examine better the social, economic and political context in one country and offer even
thicker description than in Chapter Four. Chapter Five can be described as focusing on
positive cases. Since study of positive cases may lead to false positives – meaning that wrong
lessons can be learned on online studying success stories – the Chapter Six offers negative
cases. This allows understanding heteregeneous nature of outcomes and through the method
of elimination avoid fallacies associated with false positives. Combination of different case
study designs and mix of different levels of analysis makes the research quite complex.
However, it makes it more realistic by allowing to capture more complex phenomena. The
aim of clean research design often excludes important research questions because reality is
fuzzy. Hence, often methods determine the questions that scholars ask. However, the purpose
of the research drives the methodology in this dissertation, not other way around as it often
happens in social science research.
The diffusion processes in Estonia and Slovenia make good comparisons. They have a
variation in the per capita internet penetration rate by both users and other measures. At the
same time, there is also variance in national wealth and institutions but external environment
is rougly similar because both countries became independent in the early 1990s and joined
the European Union in 2004 (Overview of both countries is available in Appendix B). Hence
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the EU membership implies fairly similar institutional setting as EU member countries have
unified their legislation in broad economic, regulatory and sector-specific governance in
telecom sector. Hence, degree of comparability is very high, many ambiguities can be avoided
and a variance between different variables can be established by nature of the units. It allows
not to focus too much breadth and representability but on the depth and comparability
(Gerring 2004, 347-348). If I were to consider the breadth and representation extremely
important, it would make sense to have a large sample size and to apply statistical methods
but as I have indicated above I doubt that it would be able to establish causality. Furthermore,
institutional complexity implies that many variables are involved. At the same time, the
number of units is very small. Therefore, it would make sense to increase the number of units
and look at the units where are also many explanatory variables are similar or the same, in
order to diminish the number of variables involved (Collier 1993, 111-113). However,
institutional complexity implies that variance across Estonia and Slovenia is already
significant despite the factors I have mentioned above.
Incorporation of larger countries, such as Poland and Russia, may add relevance and
offer an opportunity to compare “least-likely” cases and introduce a “crucial” case (George
and Bennett 2005, 80). However, these units will reduce comparability with smaller countries.
For instance, there are differences regarding the external environment. In this sense, such
large countries would introduce new variables (Collier 1993, 112-113) without necessarily
contributing to the comparability.

3.2.2 Semi-structured Interviews
The main benefit of interviewing for my study stems from the possibility to collect
information that is not available in other sources such as Eurostat surveys and secondary
literature. The in-depth interviews will allow capturing the impact of internet diffusion and
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institutional developments better than more formalized quantitative methods. Artificial
intelligence researcher Parsaye (1988) has pointed out that elite interviewing is one of the
three methods that allows capturing tacit knowledge from experts (other two being learning
by being told and learning by observation which cannot be used in the context of this
research). In comparison of quantitative and qualititative research methods in information
collection Gerardo Munck pointed out benefits of in-depth interviews where “… informants
not only answer but often offer own more nuanced responses and unprompted insights"
(Munck 2004, 116). In this sense, survey interviewing would not reveal these insights and I
am not interested in the views of general population why the Internet is as diffused in their
country. I am interested in much more specific information and therefore the elite
interviewing is appropriate approach (Dexter 1970).
The use of semi-structured interviews varies in this dissertation. In the case of
Slovenia I use interviews in order to gain background information because I am less familiar
with Slovenia than Estonia. I do not speak the language and I do not follow local news in
Slovenia. In Estonia I used interviews to gain information which was not otherwise available.
Hence, I rely heavily on interviews in Chapter Six but I combine interview insights with
secondary data in Chapter Five. My three different research questions determine the way I use
semi-structured interviews in three different chapters. In Chapter Four I compare internet
diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia where huge amount of data is available. Hence, it did not
make sense to rely heavily on semi-structured interviews but use it in combination with
secondary data.
In the years of 2003 to 2013 I interviewed 34 people in Estonia and Slovenia. They
included top level officials of government agencies (telecom regulators, telecommunication
ministry et al), top executives of ICT companies who provide internet and internet- related
services, investors in telecom and ICT companies, content providers, bankers, politicians who
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have been responsible for telecom regulations and oversight and experts who have a deep
knowledge of telecommunications and internet related regulatory issues in given country
(university professors, analysts at leading banks et al). As my analysis is not static but
dynamic an important criteria for selecting experts was their experience and knowledge of
dynamic changes that took place between 1990 and 2013. I compiled a database of population
by publicly available information (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 673) and by informal
conversation with people with a deep knowledge of the issues. Because of tight conditionality
outlined above and the small size of countries, my assumption was that the size of group of
people I can interview would be quite small. Hence, I did not try to establish a representative
sample of population and will not use probability sampling. In other words, population and
sample would be identical. Certainly, this process introduces self-selection bias to the
research as the individuals to be interviewed will be self-selected (not everybody will grant
me the interview). In Slovenia I interviewed seven experts in January 2003 and six experts in
June 2012 which gave me a dynamic overview of changes, especially as some experts
overlapped in both years. In Estonia I interviewed 21 experts in the time period 2008-2013
(the full list is given in Appendix C). Since I have deeper knowledge of Estonia, I was able to
pre-select most candidates for interviews but to some extent I relied on snowballing, i.e.
recommendations by other experts. I also used to some extent snowballing in Slovenia.
General questions were prepared for interviews, but actual questions varied depending
on the context. In Slovenia the questions were more general because I tried to understand the
context. In Estonia I used interviews to gain information about specific situations and issues
and therefore questions were often very detailed and targeted at specific person to be
interviews. For instance, I would inquire about a specific meeting that took place. Specific
location selected by a company for business activities. Information of use of ID card for
specific online service and so on.
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All interviews were made in person. Interviews were recorded and all interviewees
agreed to talk on the record which is used for research purposes but not made publicly
available. Interviews were coded because small sample size makes it relevant as the coding
provides at least some degree of anonymity. This may help to reduce significant biases as
experts may give less constrained responses because they do not want to jeopardize ongoing
official and/or social relationships. Methodologically, I did not create specific section that
discusses only the results of interviews because the point of interviews was to gain specific
insights rather than to offer some generalization on how many experts thinks this or that.
Hence, insights from interviews are incorporated into the narrative in the following section
and not discussed separately.
3.2.3 Working Groups
In addition to semi-structured interviews the research has benefited tremendously from
a numerous working groups organized by international and domestic organizations. Since
January 2011 the author has worked as head of economic analysis at the Estonian Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Communications and represented Estonian government at the OECD
working parties as well as OECD high level ministerial meetings on internet economy. The
author participated on regular basis on the OECD Working Parties on Internet Economy and
Information Society Indicators in Paris, France. Direct benefit from the OECD was
participation on OECD workshops on broadband metrics held in Washington, DC, London
and Paris in 2010-2012. This allowed gaining expert knowledge on the broadband
measurement issues and hearing a variety of perspectives on causal factors. In addition, the
author has benefited tremendously by participating in the workshops and seminars organized
by the State Information Systems Department of the Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs
and Communications which allowed to gain new insights into the factors affecting the use and
diffusion of information technologies in Estonia.
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3.3 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the research methodology by highlighting conceptualization,
use of variables and the measurement issues and rationale for case-selection and rationale for
elite interviewing. It offered a critique of quantitative approaches relying on one or two
measures of internet diffusion and limited number of variables of internet diffusion. It argued
that the use of small number of variables cannot demonstrate the complexity of diffusion
process. Hence, it discussed the idea of index of “effective internet diffusion” and showed
how this concept can be operationalized on the basis of 11 different indicators measuring
network nature, sophistication of use and social distribution of internet. It pointed out research
strategy which in Chapter Four compares internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia and in
Chapters Five and Six discusses seven cases within Estonia. The empirical part of the study is
based on both secondary and primary data. Chapter Six relies more heavily on primary data
while Chapters Four and Five combine secondary data with insights from semi-structured
interviews. The rationale for interviews varied. In Chapter Four interviews were used as a
exploratory tool to gain more background information. In Chapters Five and Six they were
used to gain additional information because data in other forms were not available.
Ultimately, research questions drive methodological choices in this research design and not
other way around.
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CHAPTER 4
INTERNET DIFFUSION IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

4.1 Introduction
This chapter offers descriptive analysis of internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia
during the last 20 years. It starts by comparing Estonia and Slovenia on a number of indicators
on internet diffusion outlined in the research methods part of this paper. To give more context,
it also compares Estonia and Slovenia on these indicators with other countries, particularly
those in the Central and Eastern Europe, which joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007.
After an introduction to the case countries, the CEE and more general comparisons, the
chapter proceeds by offering a more detailed comparison of take-up of internet diffusion in
Estonia and Slovenia based on descriptive statistics and semi-structured interviews.

4.2 Internet Diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia
I start by considering the traditional measure of internet diffusion by counting the
number of internet users per 100 inhabitants. In order to place Estonia and Slovenia in the
broad international context, I will demonstrate how internet use in these countries compares
with the averages of internet users in the world, European Union (EU), Europe and Central
Asia. The comparison with the world average in showing the position of these two countries
in the world. Since both countries are members of the EU, then the comparison with the EU
average helps to see how number of internet users in Estonia and Slovenia fare in the EU
context. Comparison with Europe and Central Asia helps to compare with the average in the
region that does include only developed countries but also less developed countries.
Figure 4.1 compares the percentage of users with the world, the EU and Europe and
Central Asia’s (all income levels) averages. It is clear the growth of internet users has been
constantly highest in Estonia reaching almost 80 percent in 2012. At the same time, Slovenia
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lags behind both Estonia and EU average reaching 70 percent in 2012. If the spread of internet
is often taken for granted, the data in Figure 4.1 is telling that only around one third of world
population were counted as internet users in 2012 and in Europe and Central Asian average
was slightly less than two thirds.

Figure 4.1: Internet users per 100 people in Estonia, Slovenia, the European Union, Europe
and Central Asia and the World in 1990-2012 on the basis of data from United Nations
(2014).4

The comparison with the world is merely illustrative. However, the internet diffusion
has to been seen in the specific institutional context. Hence, it is more fruitful to compare
Estonia and Slovenia with other countries in the Central and Eastern Europe as shown in

4

Here and below I am using datamarket.com, data aggregator and software tool, to generate figures from a
multiple sources. Datamarket.com is available only for registered users and it has collected a variety of data from
multiple sources. In this figure the data comes from United Nations (2014) which, in turn, is provided by the
World Bank. Sources are available in biography. More detailed data of the figure 1 is available in the Appendix
D.
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Figure 4.2. The membership of the EU indicates that their institutional context is more similar
than with those countries outside of the EU.

4.2.1 Demand-Side Indicators
Figure 4.2 indicates that the growth of internet use has been constantly greatest over
the years in Estonia. Only the Slovak Republic has caught up with Estonia over the years and
both countries have about 80 percent of population using the internet in 2012. Slovenia is
broadly placed with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland where the
percentage of internet users varied between 65-75 percent in 2012 and where the growth of
users has been slower than in Estonia over the years. Bulgaria and Romania are clearly
lagging behind as the growth of users has been slower reaching 50-55 percent in 2012.

Figure 4.2: Internet users per 100 people in selected Central and Eastern European
countries in 1990-2012 on the basis of data from United Nations (2014).5

5

More detailed data is given in Appendix D.
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However, when we look at data on households with internet access at home (in Figure
4.3, below), then the difference between Estonia and Slovenia is significantly smaller as 80
percent of Estonian households had internet access at home in 2013 while the percentage was
76 in Slovenia. Certainly, the data indicates that Slovenia has been quickest in adopting
internet at home in the early years as already in 2004 about half of households had internet
access (Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3: Households with internet access at home in the European Union and the selected
CEE countries 2002-2013 on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014) .6

At the same year, less than a third of Estonian households had internet access. Estonia
by this measure was more similar to the average of the CEE countries and below the EU

6

More detailed data is available in Appendix D.
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average in 2004. In 2013 Estonia is on the same level with the EU average and above the CEE
average (Figure 4.3). Only in the Slovak Republic has the growth of internet access at home
been more remarkable than in Estonia over these years. The households with internet access
have been growing four-fold between 2004 and 2013 in the Slovak Republic. Similarly to the
data on internet users, the data in Figure 4.3 shows that Bulgaria and Romania lag behind with
the percentage of households with internet access varying between 55 and 58 percent.
However, it is not important to measure only connectivity at home but it is also crucial
to measure its quality as I emphasized in the Chapter Three. One way to do so is to look at
the households with broadband connection, which would indicate whether households can
access the internet at certain minimum speeds. This is also important variable in
demonstrating sophistication of use. Users of more sophisticated internet services require
certain minimum speeds to secure quality of connections. Figure 4.4 shows clearly it is
obvious that most countries have reached close to 100 percent broadband access in their
households. This certainly stems from the fact that the EU uses very minimalist definition of
broadband, which in fast-changing technological landscape has lost substantive meaning.
Eurostat defines the broadband connection at home in the following way: “The availability of
broadband is measured by the percentage of households that are connectable to an exchange
that has been converted to support xDSL7-technology, to a cable network upgraded for
internet traffic, or to other broadband technologies. It includes fixed and mobile connections
(Eurostat 2014a).” The Eurostat definition of broadband means minimum download speed at
144 kilobits per second (kbps) while the OECD’s and ITU definition is 256 kbps. In essence,
almost all internet connections meet the standard of broadband in the European Union.

7

xDSL refers to all types of digital subscriber lines. It includes ADSL, HDSL, SDSL and VDSL. DSL
technologies are known as last-mile technologies because they are used to provide a connection between
telephone switching station and a home or office. However, they are not used between different telephone
switching stations.
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Nevertheless, the data in Figure 4.4 shows dynamics of this minimalist broadband
access over the ten years, which is even more crucial to consider. In 2004, two-thirds of
Estonian households had already broadband access while only one third of the EU households
and of most CEE households had broadband access then. In Slovenia only one-fifth of
households had broadband access in 2004. In other words, Estonian households have had
significantly longer experience with faster and better quality internet than Slovenian
households.

Figure 4.4: Households with broadband access in the European Union and selected CEE
countries in 2003-2013 as a percentage of households with internet access at home on the
basis of data from Eurostat (2014).8

What about enterprises with broadband access? This is not just for understanding the
quality of internet among enterprises but also the quality of internet people can access in

8

More detailed data is available in Appendix D.
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general because many people use internet at work. Entreprises with broadband assess also
signals sophistication of internet use as low quality inernet connection would make difficult to
use some services. Figure 4.5 indicates that in the most Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries around 90 percent of enterprises have access to fixed broadband with is consistent
with the EU average. Exceptions are usual suspects Bulgaria and Romania but also Poland
where the access is significantly lower. There is no significant difference between Estonia and
Slovenia as both have one of the highest outcome in 2012 and the highest in 2004, where
already two-thirds of enterprises in Estonia and Slovenia had access to fixed broadband while
in other countries less than half did. It is also important to keep in mind that this data is
collected by Eurostat only about companie which employ at least 10 persons.

Figure 4.5: Enterprises with broadband access in the European Union and selected CEE
countries in 2003-2013 on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014). 9
9

More detailed data is available in Appendix D.
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It is also crucial to look at internet diffusion among different population segments.
First I will look at regular internet use among men and women in Slovenia and Estonia. The
regular internet use is a measure which tells us how often people actually use internet even if
they may have a good access at work and home and they may report to the statistical office
that they use internet. The Eurostat defines regular use in the following way: “Regular use: at
least once a week (i.e. every day or almost every day or at least once a week but not every
day) on average within the last 3 months before the survey. Use includes all locations and
methods of access and any purpose (private or work/business related).”(Eurostat 2015).

Figure 4.6: Regular use of internet in Estonia and Slovenia by males and females in 20042014 on the basis of data from Eurostat (2015)10

10

More detailed data is in Appendix D.
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The Figure 4.6 demonstrates clearly that regular use in Estonia is exceeds 80 percent
among females and males in 2014. At the same time in Slovenia, the use is below 70 percent
and on similar level among males and females. Regular internet use among Estonian females
and males has been always higher from 2004 to 2014 than among Slovenian females and
males. Quite interestingly, use among males used to be higher in Slovenia from 2004 to 2013
than among females. However, it reached the same level in 2014 but not because of increase
in the internet use among Slovenian females but because decline among Slovenian males.
This may represent some kind of statistical discrepancy stemming from particular
characteristics from one year. If the long term trend is considered, then it is clear that regular
internet use among both females and males has been equal in Estonia and it is higher than in
Slovenia. Slovenians use internet less regularly and the males are more regular users than
females.
Well educated and young people are regular internet users in almost every country.
There are no significant differences between well educated and young regular users in Estonia
and Slovenia. However, the diffusion process also depends whether laggards start using
internet on a regular basis, which implies that suppliers of internet services also offer services
that are accessible for differnet population segments. Figure 4.7 looks first at individuals
between 25 to 54 years old but with low formal education. It also compares regular internet
use among 55-74 years old with low formal education as well as internet use among 65 to 74
years old It turns out that people with low formal education and senior citizens are more avid
internet users in Estonia than in Slovenia. This also explains the difference between regular
use among Estonian females and males in comparison with Slovenian males and females. In
Estonia, people in the bottom of education pyramid and in the top of education pyramid are
more regular uses of internet than in Slovenia. In 2006, 30 percent of Estonians aged 25 to 54
years with low formal education used internet while only 11 percent of same population
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segment did so. By 2014, the internet use among the same group in Estonia had grown to 81
percent while reached 39 percent in Slovenia. The use among individuals aged 55 to 74 was in
Estonia 21 percent while in Slovenia it was 10 percent. Here, the same pattern has persisted
since 2009 (when the data is available for comparison). In Estonia, 41 percent of 65-74 years
old used internet regularly in 2014 while in Slovenia only 21 percent did so in the same year.
In 2007 the internet use was 11 percent among the same group in Estonia and 6 percent in
Slovenia.

Figure 4.7: Regular use of internet in Estonia and Slovenia among users with low formal
education and 65 to 74 years old in 2004-2014 on the basis of data from Eurostat (2015).11

11

More detailed data is in Appendix D.
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One additional way to measure distributional factors in the diffusion is is to consider
urban and rural populations in the access to internet. The figure 4.8 indicates urban and rural
households with internet access at home. It is obvious that there are not differences between
Estonia and Slovenia as well as the EU average in 2012.

Figure 4.8: Households with internet access at home in rural and urban areas in Estonia,
Slovenia and the European Union 2004-2013 on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014).12

Roughly 80 percent of urban populations have internet access at home while 70
percent of rural households have access. At the same time the dynamic picture is more telling.
In Estonia, the growth of internet access in rural areas has been greater because the starting
point was much lower - only 25 percent of Estonian rural households had internet access at

12

More detailed data is available in Appendix 9.

99

home in 2004 while over 40 percent of households had internet access in the cities. There was
no divide among city-rural lines in Slovenia at the same year. In other words, the gap between
rural and urban households has been getting smaller in Estonia while it has been growing
bigger in Slovenia between 2004 and 2013.
This is again remarkable in the context of population density. Estonia is significantly
sparsely populated than Slovenia. In 2012 Estonia had 30.5 inhabitants per square kilometer
while Slovenia had 102.2 inhabitants per square kilometer. It must be also noted that Slovenia
is mountaineous while Estonia is flat. The former makes it more difficult to provide internet
connectivity in remote areas, while the latter makes it easier. However, there are other factors
that balance the topographical factors. As was pointed out Slovenia’s population density is
three times bigger than Estonia’s population density. Also, Slovenian government owns a
majority stake in the incumbent telecom company which makes it possible to direct
investments to the areas which are underserved by telecom service providers.
The distribution of households with internet access by income allows to understand
how the internet is diffused among different social and economic groups within country and
between countries (Figure 4.9). This data is quite telling both on static and dynamic
comparison. First, Estonia has much greater share of households with income in the first
quartile than Slovenia, respectively 56 percent and 41 percent in 2012. At the same time both
countries had same level of internet use with 24-25 percent in this income group in 2008. In
other words, Estonia has more than doubled the internet use among poorest households in 6
years while the progress has been much more modest in Slovenia. The richest households in
the fourth quartile have higher access at home in Slovenia (99 percent) than in Estonia (89
percent). There has not been much dynamic change in this income group in the last six years
(Figure 4.9).
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Estonia had higher share of households with internet access in both second and third
quartile than Slovenia in 2013 as well as 2008. In the third quartile differences ranges
between 5-10 percent depending on the year and Slovenia has narrowed the gap. However, in
the second quartile Estonia had already 61 percent of households vs Slovenia’s 39 percent in
2008 and respective shares have increased to 84 and 74 percent in 2013. Slovenia has
narrowed the gap, but Estonia still has 10 percent more households with internet access in
2013.

Figure 4.9: The distribution of households with internet access at home by income levels in
Estonia and Slovenia on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014).13

13

More detailed data is available in the Appendix D.
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The bottom line is that internet access is and has been more evenly distributed among
Estonian households with different income levels than Slovenia’s households. Estonia has
also managed to increase the share of households with internet access among the poorest
households while in Slovenia the growth has been much more modest.

4.2.2 Supply-Side Indicators
The previous indicators have been primarily demand driven. Obviously, they are also
affected by supply, i.e. if there is no supply of internet in rural areas, then it cannot be
demanded. However, final decision is ultimately with those who demand internet. Now it is
crucial to include two indicators of supply, which also highlight not just quantity but also
quality of internet connectivity.

Figure 4.10: Broadband penetration rate in the European Union and selected CEE countries in
2005-2011 on the basis of Eurostat (2014). 14
14

The data is available for years 2005 to 2011 and not after that. More detailed information is provided in
Appendix D.
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First one is broadband penetration rate, which is expressed in percentages and it is
calculated as the number of broadband access lines divided to population, multiplied by 100
(Figure 4.10). Obviously, more broadband access lines improve the quality of internet
connection. By this measure, Estonia has been ahead of the EU average as well as any other
country in the years from 2004 to 2011 (Figure 4.10). Even though, Estonia’s penetration rate
27 percent is only slightly higher than Slovenia’s 24 percent in 2011. However, Estonia’s
broadband penetration rate was 8 percent in 2004 while Slovenia’s was four percent which
was the second highest in the CEE countries. This indicates that Estonia was able to supply
better quality internet connectivity earlier and people were able to use it for a longer time
period than in Slovenia.
As users have started increasingly to exploit internet on their mobile devices, it is
crucial to look at mobile broadband coverage as a supply-side factor (Figure 4.11). Even
though 74 percent of Slovenia’s population had access to mobile broadband and 62 percent
did in Estonia in 2008, Estonia passed Slovenia already in 2009 and in 2010 mobile
broadband was available for 90 percent of Estonian population which is same as the EU
average but more than Slovenia’s 80 percent.
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Figure 4.11: Mobile broadband coverage in Estonia, EU and Slovenia in 2008-2010 on the
basis of data from Eurostat (2014).15

Since the Eurostat did not collect data after 2010 on 3G mobile broadband coverage as
a percentage of population and started to collect data only on advanced 3G mobile broadband
coverage as a percentage of households, then the Figure 4.12 complements Figure 4.11 with
years from 2011 to 2013. Figure 4.12 shows the comparison between Estonia and Slovenia
and benchmarks it against the EU average. The data shows that Estonia was relative laggard
in 2011 with 87 percent of households covered against Slovenia’s 97 but by 2013 both

15

More detailed data is available in Appendix D.
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countries had reached almost 100 percent coverage in households.

Figure 4.12: Advanced (3G) mobile broadband coverage in Estonia, EU and Slovenia in
2011-2013 on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014).16
This Estonia’s superiority in delivering higher quality internet connectivity is further
bolstered by comparing download and upload speeds in Estonia and Slovenia. As Figure 13
indicates, the Estonian download speeds have been higher on most years between 2008 and
2014. The upload speeds have been roughly the same in the same time period but in 2013 the
Estonian upload speed is about two times faster than Slovenia’s upload speed. To sum up. the
internet diffusion was measured and compared in Estonia and Slovenia on the basis of eleven
indicators which are summarized in the Table 3 below. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 are
presented as one indicator as they both measure internet users per 100 inhabitant. Figure 4.1

16

More detailed data is available in Appendix D.
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was used to provide more context to understand where Estonia and Slovenia are based in a
global comparison. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 are also presented as one indicator in the Table 4.1.
They both measure mobile broadband coverage and as this technology is changing rapidly,
the Eurostat has started to collect different data differently for more recent years

Figure 4.13: Download and upload speeds in Estonia and Slovenia 2008-2014 on the basis of
data from Ookla (2014). 17

Table 4.1 presents results in the form of all years when data is available and a snapshot
of last year with available data. In the ‘Over All Years’ column of Table 3, Estonia performs
better in 7 out of the 11 variables listed. In the ‘Last Available Year’ column, I list the
country who scored better for that year for each indicator. In this column, Estonia
outperforms Solvenia in 10 out of 11 variables. Slovenia only outperforms Estonia in the
‘enterprises with broadband access’ category. However, since Estonia was able to catch up

17

More detailed data is provided in Appendix D.
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with Slovenia over time and has better outcome in 10 variables out of 11 in the end, then it
can be concluded that dynamic performance measure in terms of growth rate of Estonia has
also been considerably better than Slovenia’s. Only in category enterprises with fixed
broadband access Slovenia is better in dynamic (over all years) and static (last available year)
performance.
Table 4.1: Comparison of internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia on the basis of static and
dynamic variables.
Indicator
Over all years
Last available year
Figure 1 and 2: Internet
Estonia
Estonia
users per 100 inhabitants
Figure 3: Households with
Slovenia
Estonia
internet access at home
Figure 4: Households with
Estonia
Estonia
broadband access
Figure 5: Enterprises with
Slovenia
Slovenia
fixed broadband access
Figure 6: Females and males Estonia
Estonia
regularly using internet
Figure 7: Individuals with
Estonia
Estonia
low formal education and
senior citizens regularly
using internet
Figure 8: Households with
Slovenia
Estonia
internet access in areas with
low and high population
density
Figure 9: Households with
Estonia
Estonia
internet access by income
Figure 10: Broadband
Estonia
Estonia
penetration rate
Figure 11 and 12: Mobile
Slovenia
Estonia
broadband coverage
Figure 13: Download and
Estonia
Estonia
upload speeds
Source: Author

However, it must be noted that variance between Estonia and Slovenia on following
indicators; households with access to internet at home, households with access to broadband,
enterprises with access fixed broadband and households with access to internet in rural and
urban areas is relatively small. Neverthelesss, these eleven indicators suggest that Estonia has
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been able to diffuse better quality internet than Slovenia by giving its users more time to
experience with it. In addition, Estonia has been able to diffuse internet more among different
demographic and socio-economic groups and has a less constraints on the supply side than
Slovenia. Particularly remarkable is higher regular use of internet among older people, people
with low levels of education and income in comparison with Slovenia. In other words, there
are significant differences between Estonia and Slovenia by measuring both extensity and
intensity of internet diffusion. The next part of this section offers a description of some crucial
factors in understanding these differences.

4.3 Internet Diffusion and National Wealth
The literature review in Chapter Two outlined a hypothesis which several studies have
failed to reject that internet diffusion is correlated with nation’s wealth. This correlation
seems to suggest a certain causality that wealthier countries have higher degree of internet
diffusion than less wealthier countries. This may be so dependening on the sample and
specific conceptualization of internet diffusion. However, this is not clearly the case with
Estonia and Slovenia. Both countries have similar or higher levels of internet diffusion
depending on the variable used than the average of countries of the European Union and the
OECD, but they have and have had considerably lower per capita gross domestic product
(GDP) at purchasing power parity (PPP) than the OECD and EU average, as indicated in
Figure 4.14. Furthermore, Estonia used to be two times poorer in 1993 than Slovenia and was
still about one fifth poorer than Slovenia in 2012. Figure 4.14 shows that GDP at PPP in the
2005 constant international dollars for Estonia, Slovenia, OECD members and EU average.
Furthermore, if the comparison is made with all the CEE countries that joined the EU
in 2004 and 2007, then it is obvious that Estonia had one of the lowest per capita GDP at PPP
in this group in 1993. It has one of the highest in 2012 but its is still significantly lower than
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that of Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Countries with relatively similar levels of per capita
GDP such as Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Hungary have quite different outcomes in
internet diffusion.

Figure 4.14: Gross Domestic Product per capita at Purchasing Power Parity in Estonia,
Slovenia, EU and OECD 1993-2012 on the basis of data from World Bank (2013).18

Most importantly, despite of being significantly poorer Estonia actually has either
achieved the better outcome on the basis of eight internet diffusion indicators than Slovenia.
Estonia’s outcome in internet diffusion is particularly remarkable in comparison with
Slovenia across different socio-economic groups despite of differences in the per capita GDP.
In other words, an average Estonian is considerably poorer than an average Slovenian but the
average Estonian is more avid internet user than the average Slovenian. One plausible
18

More detailed data is in Appendix D.
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explanation could be that Estonia has greater degree of income equality than Slovenia and the
distribution of internet access among different households just reflects it. Quite puzzlingly,
the opposite is true. Estonia is significantly more unequal than Slovenia and than the average
of European Union as well as members states that joined in the EU in 2004 and 2007.

Figure 4.15: Gross Domestic Product per capita at Purchasing Power Parity in Estonia,
Slovenia and selected CEE countries in 1993-2012 on the basis of World Bank (2013).19
Estonia’s gini coefficient has been decreasing from the peak of 0.37 in 2004 to 0.33 in
2013 but Slovenia’s gini has stayed at stable 0.24 percent during the same time period (Figure
4.16). In other words, the use of internet has increased among poorest socio-economic groups
in Estonia despite of the fact that their income is smaller in both absolute and relative terms

19

More detailed data is in Appendix D.
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than similar groups in Slovenia.

Figure 4.16: Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income in Estonia, Slovenia, European
Union and new member states of the European Union in 2000-2012 on the basis of data from
Eurostat (2013). 20
Thus per capita GDP cannot be a variable that would explain why Estonian internet
users have enjoyed better quality internet connectivity for a longer time period and why
internet use is more evenly spread among Estonian internet users with different income levels
than Slovenian users. Most importantly, the the national wealth hypothesis would suggest that
Slovenians should not only have higher and better quality internet connectivity than Estonia
but also the diffusion of internet should be more equal among users with different income
levels. Particularly so as Slovenia’s gini coefficient suggest that income equality is much
greater than in Estonia. As we saw above, the opposite is true. Internet diffusion in Estonia is
much more egataliarian than in Slovenia. Most importantly, socio-economic groups with
lower income in Estonia use internet more than in Slovenia.

20

More detailed data is in Appendix D.
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4.4 Institutional changes in Estonia and Slovenia
One factor that emerged in the literature review (Chapter Two) as an explanation for
understanding differences in the internet diffusion were institutions defined as formal and
informal rules of the game. Hence, institutional factors have to be considered in understanding
the differences between Estonia and Slovenia. This section offers an overview of formal
institutions and their changes. Obviously, some insights from the literature review do not offer
much explanatory power. It is evident without much deliberation that political regime type
whether democracy or dictatorhip cannot explain differences between Estonia and Slovenia,
since both countries have been democracies since the early 1990s. Both countries joined the
European Union in 2004 and have adopted same detailed EU rulebook which covers
significant part of their domestic formal institutions. Therefore the consideration of formal
institutions has to be unpacked further.. Even though the EU is considered the most legalized
international organization in the world, and its role in shaping the domestic rules goes beyond
of what the international relations scholars usually expect of international organizations, the
implementation of its formal rules in different member countries still varies significantly.
The literature review discussed the work by Dasgupta et al (2001), Fink et al (2003)
and Guillen and Suarez (2005), and reveals that the institutions that may matter most for the
availability of high quality internet connectivity are the rules governing the telecom sector.
The OECD has been collecting data on the restrictiveness of telecom sector regulation, i.e
how open the sector has been to competition. One of the key findings by Dasgupta et al
(2001), Fink et al (2003) and Guillen and Suarez (2005) was that telecom sector liberalization
and increased competition benefits the availability of telecom services. The data in Table 4.2
shows clearly that Estonia has one of the least restrictive regulatory regimes among the
OECD countries while Slovenia has the most restrictive regulatory regime right after the
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Luxembourg. Estonia scored 1 out of 6 point scale in 2008 and had almost reduced by half its
ranking on restrictivness index in 2013 (Lower the number less restrictive, i.e. more
competitive, is the telecom sector). At the same time, Slovenia scored 2 out of 6 in 2013 and
the reduction in the ranking had been minimal in comparison with 2008. The OECD and EU
average score has been 1 out of 6 in both years. In other words, not only had Estonia low
degree of restriveness in 2008 it also managed to reduce it significantly while Slovenia’s
ranking stay constantly high indicating high degree of restrictiveness.

Table 4.2: Restrictivness of telecom sector regulations and regulatory protection of
incumbents in Estonia and Slovenia in comparison with the OECD average 2008 and 2013.
Indicator/Unit
Restrictiveness of
telecom sector
regulations in 2008
(From 0 to 6)
Restrictiveness of
telecom sector
regulations in 2013
(From 0 to 6)
Regulatory
protection of
incumbents in 2008
(From 0 to 3)
Regulatory
protection of
incumbents in 2008
(From 0 to 3)

Estonia

Slovenia

OECD average

121

2.2

1

0.5

2

1

1

1.4

1.25

0.75

1.4

1.25

Source: Author on the basis of data from the OECD (2014)
Similarly, Slovenia has higher protection of incumbent companies in the marketplace,
including telecom companies (Table 4.2). The level of protection was 1 out of 3 in Estonia in
2008 and it was decreased to 0.75 in 2013. The lower number means that government
regulations protect less incumbents and encourage competition. At the same time the
Slovenia’s protection of incumbent companies has stayed over 1 in both years and is slightly
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higher than the EU average but slightly lower than the OECD average which is heavily
inlfuenced by extreme outliers such as Mexico and Israel.
The telecom sector regulations and protections influence internet diffusion because in
restrictive markets where incumbents are protected entry of new services and new competitors
is difficult, if not impossible. Lack of competition allows incumbents to charge higher prices
for internet diffusion which reduces demand. It makes it also difficult to offer new services
because incumbent may discriminate against new entrants. At the same time, the incumbent
companies may lack incentives to provide new services because they do not face competitive
pressures. In other words, restrictive regulatory regime and protection of incumbent
companies in the marketplace does not allow the process of entrepreneurial discovery to take
place. The importance of entrpereneurial discovery and reduction of institutional barriers on
supply-side was emphasized in sections 2.4 and 2.5 in Chapter Two.
Obviously, such comparisons on the basis of OECD data are just a snapshot in 2008
and 2013 and do not offer sufficient levels of detail to understand the differences. Hence, the
next part of this chapter describes formal institutions and their changes in Estonia and
Slovenia in a greater detail. It starts with the discussion on Estonia which is followed by
overview on Slovenia. The ideas concerning formal institutions and their impact on internet
diffusion were first developed in my Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy thesis at the
Fletcher School at Tufts University (Kitsing 2004). The following sections build on the thesis.

4.4.1 General Background of Institutional Changes in Estonia
Before we take a detailed look at the telecom sector regulation it is important to
consider broader institutional context and its evolution in Estonia. It may seem obvious to
informed reader but it is crucial to keep in mind that Estonia was once one of the republics in
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the years 1940-1991. If we place the use of
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internet per 100 inhabitants in the context of all former USSR member states, then the number
of internet users in Estonia is highly remarkable as Figure 19 demonstrates. Certainly, it must
be kept in mind that in many ways Estonia was one of the most developed members of the
USSR but nevertheless, the progress is quite stunning in comparison. With some former
members of USSR there is eight time difference in internet users per 100 people. Even more
wealthy parts of former USSR such as Russian Federation have only half of its population
online in 2012. The dynamic picture also shows clearly that Estonia was quick to adopt
internet use in the second half of the 1990 while even its close neighbors Latvia and Lithuania
with similar level of economic development lagged behind.

Figure 4.17: Internet users per 100 people in the former republics of the USSR on the basis of
United Nations (2014).22
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Detailed data is available in Appendix D.
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In order to understand Estonia’s quick adoption of internet, it is crucial to understand
the general institutional changes as well as specific changes concerning telecom and ICT
sectors that took place in the country. Formal institutional changes in Estonia were rapid and
radical in the 1990s (Laar 1996; Freytag 2003; Sorg and Vensel 1999). Significant highlights
include corporate and personal income tax reform, which introduced a flat tax rate of 26
percent in the early 1990s (Feldmann and Sally 2001, 7; Freytag 2003, 11). As of 1999,
reinvested corporate profits are not subject to income tax. The currency board system was
boldly introduced in 1992 – against the advice of the IMF (Iwaskiw 1996, 41; Sally and
Feldmann 2001, 6). Government spending as a percentage of GDP was reduced to less than
40 percent, and has remained at that level (Freytag 2003, 11). State subsidies were eliminated
(Feldmann and Sally 2001, 7). Large-scale privatization started in 1992, and most enterprises
were sold by 1995. Since 1993, it has been constitutionally stipulated that the general central
government budget must be balanced (Freytag 2003, 9). Import quotas (a main form of trade
protection until 1993) and significant tariffs were completely abolished in 1993. By 1997
Estonia had switched to completely unilateral free trade with zero percent tariffs on all
imports (Feldmann and Sally 2001). Previous restricitions put on foreigners wanting to buy
domestic firms and real estate were also lifted. These institutional changes combined to create
one of the most favorable foreign investment climates in Central and Eastern Europe.
The basic ingredients for the implementation of the rule of law were set out in the
early 1990s. The bankruptcy law took effect in 1992 and the system of courts was improved
to exercise and enforce contractual rights (Laar 1996, 98). Certainly, the institutional changes
implemented by Estonia in the 1990s could not immediately introduce institutions as complex
and sophisticated as those in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the Competition Act of 1998 was
already in line with EU legislation, except in the area of merger control. The Estonian
Competition Law became fully compatible with the EU legislation in 2001 (Freytag 2003,
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13). Nonetheless, the quite simple economic system in Estonia and a lack of sophisticated
institutions managed to create sufficient conditions for outstanding economic performance in
the 1990s.
Once the economic recovery took off, it was also able to bear the high costs of
institutional convergence with the laws of the European Union; Estonia joined the EU in
2004. Prior to the obligation of complying with the EU’s conditionality, the radical changes
in the rules of the game were actually effective and sustained despite political fragility. The
most important reforms were the result of bottom-up policy initiatives – not imposed in a topdown fashion by international organizations (Feldmann and Sally 2001). There was little
disagreement about the substantial nature of the reforms among the major political parties
(Tallo 1995). The party views differed mainly in their assessment of the recent past and
regarding issues of nationality (Tallo 1995). These converging attitudes and beliefs of
politicians made it easier to carry out the changes in the formal institutions.

4.4.2 Institutional Changes in the Estonian Telecom Sector
Having looked at general changes in the institutional framework, it is now fitting to
give attention to the changes in the rules of the game governing telecommunications and
information technology. In 1992, the Estonian government signed a concession agreement
with Telia and Sonera of Sweden and Finland, respectively (now TeliaSonera). Both
companies acquired half of 49 percent of shares in the incumbent telephone company. A
monopoly on fixed-line telephone calls was bestowed on the incumbent, Eesti Telekom, until
the end of 2000 (WTO 1999, 11-12). In 1997 the company, which had by then been
restructured into Eesti Telekom, offered 24 percent of the government’s 51-percent stake
through initial public offering (IPO) to domestic and international investors. The government
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remained a holder of a 27-percent stake in the telecom company until 2010 when the Estonian
government exited from the company.
An independent regulator of the telecom sector was set up in 1998. Nevertheless, the
EU still raised concerns in 2002 over potential conflicts of interests stemming from the fact
that the telecom regulator is under the administrative authority of the Ministry of Economy
and Communications (Commission of the European Communities 2002, 90). The Ministry of
Economy and Communications did not represent state interests as a shareholder in Eesti
Telekom (the incumbent company regulated by the independent telecom regulator) and the
ownership rights were transferred to the Ministry of Finance in 2000. This created an
additional layer for avoiding the potential conflict of interests. Nonetheless, both ministries
represent the same government in the end. Obviously, the conflict of interest or potential
conflict of interest was finally resolved with the government exit from the incumbent in 2010.
However, the regulator of the market – the Competition Authority – still remains as an agency
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and its independence has not
increased over time.
The provision of leased lines and alternative infrastructure use was partially liberalized
before the end of 2000. Estonia had a free market for data transmissions, Internet service
providers (ISPs) and backbone service providers before the end of the monopoly on voice
services (ESIS 1999). The key commitment concerning the EU was to lift all limitations on
market access and national treatment by January 1, 2003, thereby ending the monopoly on
fixed-line telephony services. However, Estonia adopted its new Telecommunications Act in
February 2000, which lifted the limits on market access and national treatment in the
telecommunications market by January 1, 2001 (Commission of the European Communities
2002, 89-90).
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Obviously, the development of telecom sector also depends on the general
development of information and communication techologies sector. This is not just about
infrastructure but variety of products and services that are necessary for infrastructure as well
as the use of infrastructure. It can be clearly said that a key institution in development of ICT
sector in Estonia has been market since the early 1990s and in the telecom sector, the market
has driven developments since early 2000. The Estonian ICT market and telecom market
appears to work relatively well with several competitors in all sectors and decreasing prices
for end customers. There is effective competition in more segments of the industry than in
almost all other EU member states. As the section on internet diffusion highlighted, high
quality internet services are widely available for all segments of society. Mobile phone
penetration is significant with approximately 135%. Mobile payments are widespread in
Estonia, primarily due to effective co-operation between stakeholders. For instance, mobile
parking (paying for parking with your mobile phone) was introduced in Estonia already in
2003 and, by 2012, 85 percent of those parking in capital city of Tallinn used this method. In
addition, m-payments are a popular method of payment for covering the costs for certain
types of services, e.g. for playing and paying for lotto, buying electronic bus tickets.
There have not been any significant competition concerns in ICT and/or telecom
markets since Estonia joined the EU in 2004. As competition in the ICT market and telecom
market has been effective, no special measures have been taken to encourage innovation
through means of competition policy. Interviews reveal that vigorous competition, market
forces and competitive pressure necessitate companies to stay innovative in order to stay
competitive (Interviews 16 and 19). Supervision on competition in the market is exercised by
the Estonian Competition Authority under the Competition Act and the Electronic
Communications Act. The World Economic Forum has given Estonia a relatively high rank of
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25 in its network readiness index in 2009, where important component indirectly and directly
is competition (World Economic Forum 2010).
All of this is not to suggest that there are no improvements to be made. If Estonia is
compared with its wealthier Nordic neighbors (Figure 4.18), where over 90 percent of
population use internet, then obviously there is still potential progress to be made in
increasing the use of internet among its population.

Figure 4.18: Internet users in Estonia, Nordic countries, high income OECD members, high
income countries, high income non-OECD and upper middle income countries on the basis of
data from United Nations (2014).23

Of course, the Nordic countries are exceptional in comparison with OECD and high
income OECD countries, which on average have same level of internet use as Estonia.
Estonia has 2-3 times lower per capita GDP (depending how it is measured) than the poorest

23

Detailed data is available in Appendix D.
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Nordic country and significantly different instutional development. However, Estonian
policy-makers often compare the performance of Estonia with its Nordic neighbours,
particularly with Finland. This comparison is more aspirational rather than analytical but it
does give a different perspective and aspirational comparisons matter because they feed back
into policy-makers mind-set and their framing of policy-issues
Even though Estonia has a higher percentage of internet users than the average of EU
27 member countries, the question of digital divide is still relevant particularly in the
aspirational context of Nordic neighbors and the Estonian government rhetoric that access to
internet is a basic human right. Despite the human right status of internet access, the extensity
and intensity of internet use differs among different social groups and regions. The
competition in offering broadband services in bigger cities is tough and the communications
operators have replaced the connections using the out-dated technologies with the fibreoptic
networks. The basic networks of almost all the major communications operators in cities are
based on the fibre-optic connections. The fibre-optic networks in cities are expanded
gradually and in the coming years all the residential houses and office buildings will be
equipped with next-generation broadband. Although the investments made by the
communications operators in next-generation broadband are significant, the high
concentration of customers makes it profitable (Interviews 16 and 19).
There is virtually no competition in rural areas because the market is small and
unconcentrated. Due to this, broadband is much less available and its quality remarkably
lower than in cities and at the same time the fees are much higher. The construction of nextgeneration broadband networks in rural areas is, for the communications operators,
economically not profitable and therefore the investments for business purposes in these areas
are not very likely to be made. Hence, Estonia has reached a phase where internet connections
in rural areas are less available and their quality much lower than in cities but in spite of that
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the communications operators develop next-generation broadband only in bigger cities. The
Internet services is offered in rural areas, however, only through the out-dated technologies,
and due to the lack of investments, these connections will become useless in some years time
as they do not enable the new information society services to be used. If this trend continues,
the digital divide between cities and rural areas will widen even further and ever more people
and businesses will be living and operating in cities with proper ICT infrastructure (Interviews
16 and 19).
The government and telecom companies aim to tackle the gap between rural and urban
areas with the broadband project EstWin, which aims at ensuring internet connection with
speed up to 100Mbps for all by 2015, also contributes to the improvement of information
technology diffusion throughout the country (Interviews 16 and 19). EstWin was launched by
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and some member companies of
Estonian Information Technology and Communications association (EMT, Elion, Elisa,
Ericsson, Eltel, Levira, Tele 2, Televõrgu AS), which set up the Estonian Broadband
Development Foundation for this purpose in 2009. The EU Commission approved state aid
status for the project in 2010. EstWin aims to build a network of fibre optical cables in
Estonia by 2015 where 98 % of households, organizations and companies have to be within
1.5 km radius of the backbone network connection (Interviews 16 and 19). National
Government is involved in investing in backbone network while providing connection for socalled last mile is the responsibility of telecom operators. Estwin will build a network with a
length of 6000 km and with 1400 network connection points. The government finished 1200
km of the backbone network by the end of 2011. The cost of the project is 100 million euros –
most of which is financed through EU structural funds. However, according to the industry
estimates, Estonia needs to invest at about 300 million euros to cover the country fully with
broadband connections (Estonian Association of Information Technology and
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Communications 2009). Nevertheless, this is more recent initiative which has further
encouraged internet diffusion with inflow of the EU funds. Most importantly, Estonian
internet users and household access to broadband was already greater than most other
countries in the CEE in 2004 when they joined the EU. Hence, institutional changes in the
1990s and early 2000s were crucial for the take-off of internet diffusion.
The key benefit of institutional changes in the Estonian telecom sector was relatively
low internet access costs in the early years of internet diffusion and this trend has continued.
In order to understand the importance of institutional changes in this sector, a brief
comparison with Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia can be made. Latvia is especially relevant for
Estonia as the general institutional changes in Latvia were not so different from Estonia but
the variance in institutional changes governing telecom sector was significant. It is obvious
that rent-seeking by the incumbent undermined the effectiveness of generally liberal formal
rules in Latvia. Latvia had the highest internet access costs in Europe in 2001. Slovakia’s
costs were high at peak times in comparison with Estonia and Slovenia. Estonia’s dial-up
internet costs were lower in absolute terms than in Slovenia but higher when adjusted for
purchasing power parity because as I have pointed out Estonia was then and still is
significantly poorer country than Slovenia.
Table 4.3 Dial-up internet access cost per hour in 2001 (approximation in euros)

Peak
Peak at PPS24
Off peak at PPS

Estonia
1,3
2,9
2,2

Latvia
4,2
8,8
3,5

Slovakia
1.8
5,0
1,9

Slovenia
1,5
2,1
1,9

Source: Author on the basis of data from EU (2002).

PPS refers to Purchasing Power Standard. According to eEurope+2003 Report (2002), “Purchasing Power
Parities are obtained as a weighted average of relative price ratios regarding a homogeneous basket of goods and
services expressed as a unit that is independent of national currencies”.
24
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Liberalization of their telecom sectors in Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia was a result of
EU pressure rather than domestic interests. Even though Latvia and Slovakia both established
a market liberal formal rule-set governing their economies, the timing of the institutional
changes and interactions between informal and formal institutions channeled the actions of
agents in different directions than in Estonia. The Latvian government signed a concession
agreement with the incumbent telecom company in 1994, which made changes in the rules
extremely difficult before the agreement expired in 2013. Also, in Latvia the monopoly over
services was more excessive than in Estonia. In addition to fixed lines, leased lines and
alternative infrastructure were also under the monopoly provisions in Latvia. Once Latvia
liberalized the telecom sector in the beginning of 2003, per capita Internet diffusion increased
significantly. In Slovakia the monopoly power of the incumbent was strengthened by
informal rules that encouraged corruption as well as protection of domestic industries in the
early years of internet diffusion. The informal rules of the game kept potential challenges to
the incumbent’s monopoly power at bay - even though the formal institutions governing the
economy were fairly liberal. In other words, prohibitive costs resulting from excessive
monopoly did not create incentives for the creation of innovative services that would have
attracted users. As there were not many users, the potential positive network externalities and
increasing returns were limited. The users preferred substitutes to the internet. Consequently,
strong interest groups backing the liberalization did not emerge (Kitsing 2008; E-User 2005;
Interviews 16 and 19).
The comparison of internet access prices is easier in the early years of internet
diffusion. However, it is much more difficult once extensity and intensity of internet use has
spread all across the society because of high variety of bundled and unbundled services that
different companies in different markets offer. The OECD working group on broadband
metrics spent years in discussing how to compare the broadband access prices and what data
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to use. The difference in data and data collection method make this extremely difficult task
and the results may be very different from reality. Most importantly, the comparison of
nominal prices and/or adjusted for purchasing power parity is based on the assumption that
users of internet have constant objectively measured preferences. But they do not. The users
assign different relatively values to the internet use in different context. In some countries
and/or some settings users are willing to pay more for a similar service than in other settings
and other countries. Thus the preferences of the users and constantly changing and value of
internet use depends on the context. Hence, what really matters is not the actual absolute cost
of internet access but perceived relative cost of internet access, which is heavily contextdependent. Instead of trying to measure actual costs in different countries and offer some
comparison, it is more fruitful to rely on survey data which indicates how important the costs
are for the users. In order to understand the internet diffusion, it is crucial not only to focus on
users but also non-users.
Figure 4.19 compares different households with internet connectivity in Estonia and
different households without broadband connecivity because the internet access costs are too
high. In 2005, 36 percent of household without internet connectivity at home reported that
they cannot access internet because access costs are too high. In 2013, the percentage of such
households had fallen to 11. Among the households with dependent children only 4 percent
reported in 2011 that access costs are too high and that’s why they are without internet
connectivity at home. In 2005 32 percent of such households thought so. Among the
households without children the respective percentages were 21 in 2011 and 38 in 2005.
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Figure 4.19: Different households with broadband connectivity and without broadband
connectivity because high access costs in Estonia in 2004-2013 on the basis of data from
Eurostat (2014).25
As I have pointed out, the internet is network good and access costs are only one
aspect of decision to get internet connectivity at home. The equipment costs have to be
factored in as well. The similar trends persists also among households without internet
connectivity because equipment costs are too high. The following figure 4.20 indicates that
In 2005, 39 percent of households without internet connectivity said that equipment costs are
too high. By 2013, the percentage had been reduced to 14. Among households with children

25

Detailed data is available in Appendix D.
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the percentage was 33 in 2005 and 3 in 2012 while among households without children the
respective percentages were 41 in 2005 and 21 in 2012.

Figure 4.20: Different households with internet connectivity and households without internet
connectivity because equipment costs are too high on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014).26

Households with children show faster adoption rates of internet and for them both
access and equipment costs are less of the concern than for households without children.
Obviously, households without children tend to be older and hence the age may be objective
reason for not having internet access at home. However, previously I showed that even older
people and people with low formal education in Estonia are eager to use internet in regular
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Detailed data is available in Appendix D.
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basis in Estonia – particularly in comparison with Slovenia. Most importantly, Figures 4.19
and 4.20 present indicators, which points out the subjectivity of preferences among
households concerning internet access. Households with children value internet access more
and they are willing to pay for it even when households without children consider internet
access at home too expensive because of access and equipment costs. Increasingly, most
households in Estonia do not see the access and equipment costs an issue. This trend
continued throughout economic recession which led to cumulative drop 20 percent to GDP in
2008-2009 and there has not been significant growth in real wages.

4.4.3 Overview of Institutional Changes in Slovenia
As the section on Estonia emphasized that the liberalization and regulation of the telecom
sector, then this section discusses the role of these factors in Slovenia. It starts by outlining
the general institutional changes in Slovenia, which is followed by the discussion on telecom
sector and developments in the Slovenian ICT sector.
In the 1990s Slovenia experienced the smoothest political, social and economic
transitions seen in Central and Eastern Europe. The country took a step-by-step approach to
economic restructuring by starting with stabilization instead of facing stabilization,
liberalization, complete re-orientation of international trade and other reforms all at the same
time. This approach was made possible in Slovenia thanks to an important difference between
Yugoslavia and other socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe; the difference was
found in its industrial and economic policy (Gray 1999, 104). The Yugoslav system
emphasized the importance of “self-management” of industries; the state did not own
manufacturing industries, nor did it dictate what factories produced. Workers played a
considerable role in the decision-making process of each company. Even if Yugoslavia
remained a one-party state, its economic system was decentralized. All of this was especially
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beneficial for Slovenia, where factories exported products to Western Europe and were often
in direct contact with their customers in the West (Gray 1999, 104). Technology transfer was
facilitated in socialist Slovenia by rules governing trade relations (Gray 1999, 104, 106).
In the 1990s, trade barriers were liberalized incrementally, but further reductions were
required for entering the EU. Slovenia’s simple average applied MFN tariff rate was almost
11 percent in 2001 (WTO 2002). Some significant trade restrictions were in place. Slovenia
imposed taxes on exports, but had them removed by the late 1990s. In addition to the strict
trade policy measures, the government used financial means, such as subsidies and capital
controls in the 1990s, in order to offset the negative impact of import competition in the
sectors that suffered most in the process of reforming trade policy (WTO 2002).
In general terms, Slovenia pursued relatively protectionist and targeted policies
regarding FDI, which is also visible from the data on protection of incumbents provided in the
OECD figures in the beginning of section 4.4 of this paper. Instead of opening entry for all
investors on an equal basis, the government discriminated against foreign investors in the
privatization process and attempted to meddle with direct financial incentives instead of
following rules of fair play (WTO 2002, ix, x, 13, and 26). Protectionism in the 1990s was
expressed in a discriminatory privatization process that preferred domestic investors to
foreigners, pervasive capital account restrictions, and a hesitant process of liberalization in the
service sector (WTO 2002, ix, x, 13, and 26). Moderate protectionism has not disappeared
from the Slovenian economy as this has been brought out by research by various international
organizations (OECD 2014; European Commission 2015).

4.4.4. Institutional Changes in the Slovenian Telecom Sector
In the 1990s protectionist rules against foreign investment were used to minimize the
negative distributional effects of economic change, and influenced the restructuring of the
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telecom sector (OECD 2002, 11). The share of inward FDI in the category of postal and
telecom services increased from 0 percent in 1994 to 0.4 percent in 2000. (OECD 2002, 11).
Seventy-four percent of shares of the incumbent telecom company, Telekom Slovenije, are
owned by the state; 13 percent of shares are owned by workers, the rest are state-owned,
domestic investment funds. In addition, two employee representatives are also members of the
board, as is typical of Slovenian companies. Ironically, the privatization of the incumbent
telecom was agenda already in 2003, when I carried out first set of interviews in Slovenia.
Interviews with supervisory board members and regulators in 2012 confirmed that it was still
in the agenda but privatization plans are primarily driven by the EU pressure and resisted by
the local politicians. By the beginning of 2014, Slovenia set concrete plans to privatize the
telecom company because of constant EU pressure and economic difficulties which led
government to look for additional sources of revenue. However, the European Commission
still expressed its concern over the slow path of privatization in Spring 2015 (European
Commission 2015).
As far as the sector regulation is concerned, then the Act of Telecommunications was
adopted in May 1997, and it provided legal framework for establishing key principles of EU
legislation. However, Slovenia was extremely slow in implementing the legislation. More
specifically, insufficient resources in providing regulatory functions were apparent. The state
preferred to spend money on infrastructure development rather than providing fair rules in the
market. In the 1990s Slovenia had formally liberalized the market in data transmissions, but in
reality, the market was still held by a monopoly (WTO 1995, 16, ESIS 1999). ISP services
were partially liberalized but licenses were required, thereby increasing the cost of entry.
Leased lines and alternative infrastructure use were partially liberalized (ESIS 1999). The
Competition Protection Office (CPO) initiated two investigations into Telekom Slovenije’s
alleged abuses of dominant market position, which concerned non-transparent pricing
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practices of leased lines in 1999 (Commission of the European Communities 2001). Most
importantly, the opening of the telecom market in the fixed line telephony services has been
constantly postponed both formally and informally. The market opening has been subject to
constant pressure by the EU, which demanded the candidate countries to open their telecom
markets by the end of 2002. The government had planned to open the market by the end of
2000. Slovenia formally ended the monopoly in fixed lines over voice telephony by the
Telecommunications Act, which was not adopted until April 2001. The act legislated a
transition period in the market opening in areas of leased lines, the local loop, number
portability, and cost-based accounting mechanism for operators with significant market power
until 2002 (Commission of the European Communities 2001, 67-69). Hence, the market was
not opened until mid-2002, and the new competitive environment did not ensue informally
even in 2002.
By the end of 2000 Slovenia had not established a separate regulatory authority in the
telecom sector. Tariff rebalancing, liberalization of voice telephony and alternative networks
for the provision of telecom services did not reflect the EU Telecom Acquis requirements.
The regulator, the Telecommications and Broadcasting Authority, was set up in 2001. Several
provisions of the 2001 Telecommunications Act concerning the work of the regulator did not
allow this agency to function with full independence. The role of the executive in nominating
the director and approving statutes and the involvement of operators in the
Telecommunication Council, which oversees the work of the regulator, can lead to substantial
conflicts of interests. This observation was supported by the European Commission’s
assessment in 2003, which stated that Slovenia still had to strengthen the regulator in order to
make the agency truly independent (Commission of the European Communities 2003, 35-36).
Furthermore, the Slovenia’s ineffective implementation of anti-trust aspects of its competition
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law in meeting the EU standards was highlighted by the report of European Commission on
the progress of EU applicant countries in November 2003 .
The need to solve the issues with the governance of the telecom sector was a part of
the rationale that led to the creation of the Ministry of Information Society in 2001 was
emphasized by the minister in the interview in 2003. The decision to create a special ministry
grew out of the recognition that a more concentrated effort was needed to coordinate the
government’s ICT priorities. The existing relationships between the Ministry of
Communication and the incumbent telecom company did not encourage reform of the telecom
sector. However, as the former minister and now computer science professor explained in
2012, the ministry did not have sufficient power to tackle the vested interests involved in the
telecom sector. The Ministry of Information Society lasted only for three years as it was shut
down in November 2004, and its functions were distributed among other ministries (E-User
2005; Interviews 10-11). In the early 2000s, the development of ICT was one of key priorities
of Slovenian government and Slovenia was seen as a model for other countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. This was the main purpose why I was in initially interested in Slovenia and
conducted first set of interviews in 2003. However, the impression from interviews conducted
in 2012 is that ICT development has not been a priority in the second half of 2000. ICT
experts were clearly unsatisfied with government’s lack of interest (Interviews 10-11). Even
though Slovenian telecom regulations and regulator meets the criteria of EU laws and
regulations, then the state ownership of incumbent has distortive impact on the telecom
market and discourage innovation (European Commission 2015; Interviews 10-11).
Overall, this story demonstrates that Slovenia has been very reluctant reformer of the
telecom sector and there has been consistent refusal to accept more liberal rule-set imposed by
the EU. The anger at EU pressure was also a main theme at one of the interviews with a
former high level government official responsible for the EU integration when I first
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interviewed him in 2003 official and now the supervisory board member of incumbent
telecom company. This has not been only the case in the telecom but also in the banking
sector where the key player is owned by the government. As will be discussed in Chapter Five
this is an important factor in discouraging entrepreneurial discovery in exploiting the benefits
of internet in banking.
Nevertheless, the internet diffusion in Slovenia has been significantly greater than in
other former member countries of Yugoslavia. Certainly, such comparison is not very telling
because most ex-Yugoslav countries were in war with each other throught the 1990s when
Slovenia developed and prospered. Furthermore, Slovenia’s own aspirational reference point
is not the former Yugoslavia but countries in the north and west such as Austria, Switzerland
and Germany.

Figure 4.21: Internet users per 100 people in Slovenia and selected European countries,
OECD, high-income OECD, high-income nonOECD, high income countries and uppermiddle income countries in 1990-2012 on the basis of data from United Nations (2014).27
27

Detailed data is in Appendix D.
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The data in Figure 4.21 shows that percentage of internet users in Slovenia has caught
up with the OECD average over the years. Slovenia has higher percentage of users than Italy
and Croatia and upper-middle income countries. However, high-income countries tend to
have about 10 percent more users as do Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The one way how
the nature of telecom sector affects people is through internet access costs. In 2005, 19
percent of Slovenian households reported that they cannot have interent access because access
costs are too high (Figure 4.22). In 2013, 12 percent of Slovenian households told so in the
survey. For households with children access costs were not an important issue while for the
households without children it was more significant.

Figure 4.22: Slovenian households with internet access and without internet access because
access costs are too high on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014) .28

28

More detailed data is in Appendix D.
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The households without internet connectivity because of high equipment costs show a
similar pattern in Slovenia. In 2005, 21 percent of households without access gave the
equipment cost as a reason. By 2013, it had fallen to 13 percent. Among the households with
children the equipment costs have been smaller issue while among households without
children it is somewhat bigger concern than on average (Figure 4.23).

Figure 4.23: Slovenian households with internet access and without internet access because
equipment costs are too high on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014).29

Overall, the decrease in people who say that access or equipment costs are too high is
quite small considering that both costs have been falling. However, the percentage of people

29

More detailed data is appendix D.
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was small to begin with. Hence, it cannot be concluded that the perception among the people
concerning internet costs is significant reason for not getting online. There is dynamic
variance with Estonia where decreases among households have been more significant in
Estonia. There is not nominal variance but there is real variance considering the both Estonian
average income and that of poorest households significantly lower than in Slovenia.

Figure 4.24: Slovenian households with internet access and without internet access because
access is not needed on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014).30
More significant factor in Slovenia is the fact that 20 percent of households without
internet connectivity told in 2013 that they don’t need the access because content may not be
useful or other reasons (Figure 4.24). This percentage stood at 30 percent in 2005 but it is still
significant. It is even more important reason given by households without children while
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More detailed data is in Appendix D.
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households with children do not consider it important. This would suggest that many
households have internet access because of children’s needs.

4.4.5 Conclusion on Institutional Changes in Estonia and Slovenia
The formal institutions governing Slovenia’s telecom sector are more restrictive than
in Estonia despite of the fact that both countries have adopted same EU legislation. Yet the
difference with Estonia in term of Internet access costs is very small - Slovenia, like Estonia,
had relatively low Internet access costs in the early years. The largest difference between
conditions in Estonia and Slovenia regards broader formal institutions and its approach to
liberalization of telecom market. The overall institutional rule-set suggests that Slovenia is
closest to the model of social democratic corporatism (see Olson 1982 and Garrett 1998 for
discussion of social democratic corporatism). This observation suggests that the negative
externalities of the incumbent telecom company’s monopoly as well as costs of protectionist
rules governing telecom sector are widely socialized. Slovenia is run like a partnership with
highly-centralized bargaining between interests groups. Indeed, the ownership structure and
control of the telecom company indicate a high degree of socialization. At the same time,
Estonia relied more on liberalization of telecom markets which implied greater competition
and lower barriers for entry. As was discussed through sections 2.4 and 2.5 supply-side
constraints are important factor in internet diffusion and lower supply side constraints have
facilitated process of entrepreneurial discovery and utilization of decentralized knowledge of
entrepreneurs.
As the telecom sector regulation and related institutional changes looked primarily on
supply side factors, then the comparison of Estonia and Slovenia must also consider demand.
Obviously demand is affected by income but as Slovenia is considerably wealthier and
egalitarian than Estonia, then this factor cannot claim much importance. As the literature
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review has emphasized the role of knowledge as one factor affecting the diffusion of
innovations such as internet, then the next part of this chapter looks at the skills of internet
users in Estonia and Slovenia. It starts by discussing Estonia, which is followed by
elaboration on ICT skills in Slovenia.

4.5 ICT Skills in Estonia and Slovenia
As some perspectives in the literature review emphasized the importance of human
capital, particularly skills, then this part will highlight human capital in Estonia and Slovenia.
As both countries are highly developed and with literacy rates, then it focuses specifically on
ICT skills.

4.5.1 ICT Skills in Estonia
In general, the Estonian government purused relatively noninterventionist and not
sector specific policies in 1990s but development of ICT skills did receive specific attention
from policy-makers. Estonia’s public sector did support the launch of the Tiigrihüppe
(Tiger’s Leap) program in 1997, which provided information technology to many schools
(Tiigrihüppe Sihtasutus 1999). The idea was generated and actively supported by Toomas
Hendrik Ilves, the Estonian ambassador to the United States and Foreign Minister in the
1990s and Estonian President in 2006-2016. As many interviews pointed out, the most
important element of promotion of ICT skills has not been funds but the emphasis of many
politicians and experts on the importance of ICT. This has received a considerable attention in
the public. In this sense, such government programs have served more as a propaganda tool
and rhetoric. This is pointed out not to undermine the importance but to emphasize the
importance of rhetoric as it has been crucial in changing public perception. Here again is
important to recall the discussion of variety of perspectives in section 2.3 and 2.4 of Chapter
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Two that nature of internet is epistemological and its use in specific context depends also on
skills of users.
Most importantly, the private sector came along with such initiatives by providing
both technology and emphasizing the importance of skills. Compared to earlier years of
internet diffusion, when the main emphasis was on ensuring internet connections and take-up
in general, projects and programmes aimed at increasing technology diffusion became
gradually more targeted. Even self-interested behavior by banks in encouraging the use of
internet banking is educational as customer service people had to guide and advice very
different population segments how to use sophisticated online services. But private sector
went further. In 2001, the largest banks, IT and telecom companies launched the Vaata
Maailma SA (Look @ World Foundation). The foundation has trained 10 percent of Estonian
adult population in computer skills. They have set up 442 public access internet points. They
launched an e-school portal, which is used by most schools in Estonia for submitting grades
and feedback for students. Their project “Ole kaasas!” (Come Along! in English) operated
from 2009 to 2011 by helping 100 000 people to familiarize with the use of internet based
services and was primarily aimed at people living in rural areas, people with lower education
and wage levels, and older generation(Interviews 19-20, 28 and 32).. In addition, in the
framework of “Ole kaasas” a new initiative was organized entitled “Uus algus” (New
Beginning in English) in order to fix up old computers with the help of volunteers and donate
them to those in need. All of this has run in parallel with programs of public sector. For
instance, the aim of the programme “Raising Public Awareness about the Information
Society” is to increase the skills and knowledge of the general public as well as to enhance
the competence in the field of IT and information society of public servants. The program is
funded by EU structural funds (Interviews 19-20, 28 and 32).
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As Figure 4.25 demonstrates the lack of skills has become gradually a smaller factor
given by households as a reason by not having internet access at home. In 2005, 26 percent of
households gave lack of skills as a reason for not having internet access at home. In 2013, 14
percent of households surveyd said so. Here again, the households with children are less
likely to give lack of skills as a reason for not having internet access. In 2005, 31 percent of
households without dependent children said that lack of skills is a reason for not having
internet at home while in 2013 19 percent of surveyed households did so.

Figure 4.25: Households with internet connectivity and households without internet
connectivity at home because of lack of skills and because of privacy and security concerns
on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014). 31

31

Detailed data is in Appendix D.
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Quite, tellingly privacy and security concerns have never been an issue for Estonian
households. Throughout the years from 2005 to 2013 only two percent of households have
reported that this is the reason for not having the internet access at home. Even the
cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007, which cut the entire country off the global internet
networks for several weeks, did not change this view. Nevertheless, Estonians were able to
use the internet within country. People outside of Estonia could not access Estonian sites. This
confirms further that people care primarily about the local content, not international content,
even if the internet is often seen primarily as a global phenomena.

4.5.2 ICT Skills in Slovenia
Slovenia started to focus on IT-related research and education in the mid-1970s. In the
early 1980s, secondary schools began installing mainframe computers. In the 1990s, the
government also launched specific projects to increase Internet diffusion at schools, public
libraries, and research institutions (E-User 2005). The government has also made interactive
online services available starting in 2002, but two-way transaction capabilities remain
constrained (E-User 2005). The strategies for information society and e-government were
adopted in 2003.
Development of local ICT services was facilitated by the existence of the local
technology industry, particularly companies such as IskraDelta. Siemens established a joint
venture with Iskratel in 1989. Slovenia’s early ICT orientation in education allowed fairly
sophisticated technology companies to grow and integrate with Western clusters (Biegelbauer
et al 2001). Slovenian companies hold relatively high positions in the value chains of Western
multinationals. Many multinational corporations (Siemens, Cisco, and Microsoft) have
invested in Slovenia or have partnered with Slovenian companies in the 1990s. In addition,
the country has a wide range of medium-sized hardware and software companies. However,
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as the data has shown above the internet is widely diffused in enterprises but has not reached
all population segments equally despite the egalitarian social democratic corporatist nature of
the country. There are still signifigants segments in population who do not have internet
access because of lack of skills. Figure 4. 26 shows that in 2005 21 percent of household
without internet connectity at home gave lack of skills as a reason. It was reduced to 15
percent in 2013 but among the households without dependent children the percentage has
stayed the same over 20 percent throughout the same period.

Figure 4.26: Slovenian households with internet access and without internet access because
lack of skills and because of privacy and security concerns on the basis of data from Eurostat
(2014).32
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More detailed data is in Appendix D.

142

Interestingly, Slovenians are increasingly worried about the privacy and security
concerns as higher percentage of households reports this factor as a reason for not having
internet access at home in 2013 than in 2005.
There is no significant variance in the ICT skills between Estonia and Slovenia. It was
a bigger issue in Estonia in 2005 but percentage has been reduced to the Slovenian level or
below depending on the group. There are some differences concerning the privacy and
security concerns which is increasingly seen a bigger issue among Slovenians than Estonians.
This is also reflected by the fact that Estonian internet users are more avid participants in
social networks than Slovenian users. This holds in general and across different demographic
groups on the basis of Eurostat data.

4.6 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated that there is significant variance in the internet diffusion between
Estonia and Slovenia when measured by both eleven indicators. Estonian internet users have
been able to use better quality and higher speed internet for longer time period than Slovenian
users. The more regular use, better supply of internet and demand for more sophisticated
services have interacted more favorably in the Estonian case and contributed to both better
intensity and extensity of internet diffusion. Most importantly, poorer, older and people with
low education levels in Estonia are more regular internet than in Slovenia.
The comparative analysis of previous chapter also shows clearly that the national
wealth cannot explain the variance between internet diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia.
Estonia has been and is considerable poorer than Slovenia as the data on per capita GDP
demonstrated. Furthermore, Estonia is considerably less equal than Slovenia as the data on the
gini coefficient demonstrated. In spite of lower per capita GDP and higher inequality, internet
has diffused more among Estonian population and among different population segments by
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income in Estonia than in Slovenia. Estonian households in the first quartile of income
distribution are more avid users of internet than Slovenian households in the first quartile.
This is particularly remarkable given that the Estonain households in the first quartile of
income distribution are in relative and absolute terms poorer than Slovenian households. The
data also shows, for instance, that poorer Estonian households are more avid users of online
social networks than Slovenian households in the same income distribution quartile (Eurostat
2014). Thus, the propositions based on wealth and/or distribution of wealth as an explanation
for the internet diffusion can be rejected as a crucial factor in the variance between internet
diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia.
Therefore, the attention must be turned to institutions and particularly institutional
changes have created preconditions for internet diffusion. Before outlining the key critical
junctures in the institutional environment of Estonia and Slovenia the basic theoretical
premises from synthesis of literature must be recalled: institutions matter because the
institutional framework conditions the incentive structure of agents (North 1990; Denzau and
North 1994, 15). Certainly, institutions as the rules of game do not do anything, but agents do
within institutional context. However, agents are influenced by the transaction costs. As
transaction costs for any undertaking depend on the institutions themselves, then agents’
calculations of costs and benefits of any action is dependent on the institutional context
(North 1990; Coase 1937). In this sense, agents are not perfectly rational, but their rationality
is constrained by institutions. This “bounded rationality” (Simon 1955) or “adaptive
rationality” (Mueller 1986) of agents is fundamental for understanding the role they play in
the spread of internet diffusion. As there are many substitutes for the Internet and the
adoption of internet depends also on many complements to this technology, then the limited
individual rationality of agents may or may not lead them to adoption of the Internet and/or
undertakings that encourage internet diffusion. The actions of semi-rationally individual
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agents may lead to socially suboptimal or optimal outcomes depending on the institutions that
govern the supply conditions of the internet. Most importantly, the outcomes in terms of
internet diffusion should be understood as not intended but unintended consequence of actions
by rational agents. As was emphasized by Pierson in the literature review the social reality is
full outcomes which are result of human action but not deliberate design. In other words, it is
not possible explain the internet diffusion rates by insisting that forward-looking rational
agents acted purposefully set to achieve the rate on this particular level. Rather, rational
agents acting on the basis of their self-interests and short-term time horizons unintentionally
contributed to the particular outcome. In many ways the diffusion process may be accidental
where path-dependence on particular decisions made in the past matters more than rational
calculation of costs and benefits of any planned action. This also implies that institutions and
their design, accidental or not, cannot determine a particular outcome in the internet diffusion.
The link between technology diffusion and internet is not deterministic and linear. Rather,
institutions condition agents to see spectrum of alternatives but the process of deciding, which
alternatives to pursue and to which final outcomes these alternatives can lead is
overdetermined. There are too many variables to establish causality between institutions and
technology diffusion however well it is modeled or not. Path-dependence works in curious
ways. Estonia’s decision to liberalize the telecom sector in the late 1990s created necessary
but not sufficient conditions for entrance of new players in the telecom sector (which will be
studied further in Chapter Five). However, Slovenia’s inability to increase competition is a
result of lock-in by vested interests which in turn increased the power of incumbents at the
expense of potential competitors. As section 2.6 pointed out path-dependence does not imply
inevitability. There are real alternatives available when choices are made. For instance,
Slovenia could have increased competition earlier. However, previous choices will affect
outcomes and sequence of events (Pierson 2004, 20). Path-dependence does not rely on
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causal independence through time but it allows narrowing down the set of choices and show
how decisions are linked through time (Pierson 2004, 52).
When one would have compared Estonia and Slovenia in the early 2000s, then it was
obvious that both countries had similar levels of internet users per 100 inhabitants and the
lowest Internet access costs in Europe (EU 2002). But to say both countries got the prices
right for internet connectivity is not an explanation, rather a restatement of the puzzle.
Particularly, as this dissertation has argued the prices reflect subjective individual preferences
vis-à-vis relative prices of other goods. As the chapter demonstrated by the static indicators a
smaller percentage of Estonian households see the costs of internet access and equipment as a
barrier for not connecting to internet than in Slovenia 2013. At the same time, the Estonian
households are poorer and income is more unevenly distributed than in Slovenia.
Furthermore, the dynamic indicator shows that the change in the perception of Estonian
households concerning the costs has been significantly greater as the costs were seen as
significant barrier by higher percentage of households in Estonia than in Slovenia in 2005.
The institutional changes in telecom sector have benefited supply and demand for
internet by affecting prices and relative meaning of the prices. Estonia made simple and
straightforward institutional changes to open the telecom sector for competition in the 1990s
and early 2000s. Estonia opened an alternative infrastructure and leased lines to competition
when in Slovenia and in other CEE countries, they were protected by the national
government. This move suggests that many private sector agents were able to undermine the
power of monopoly over the provision of internet services. This diversity in the early years is
captured by Kitsing (2008) and Kitsing and Howard (2009) on internet hosts which can be
seen as indicator of supply conditions. Estonia had in the time period of 2001-2004 more
internet hosts than any other CEE country and 2-3 times more than Slovenia depending on the
concrete year. As was discussed in the synthesis of literature in Chapter Two, scholars such
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as Mokyr (1990) suggested supply conditions are crucial than demand for understanding the
technology diffusion.
Estonia also abolished the monopoly on fixed-line telephone services two years before
the same was done in Slovenia. The timing of these changes of formal institutions (two years
before the deadline stipulated by the EU telecom acquis and the WTO Basic Telecom
Agreement) and the effectiveness of their implementation suggest powerful domestic interests
backed the reform: the liberalization was not imposed in the top-down fashion by some
outside agent such as the EU, as was the case with Slovenia which struggles with the EU
telecom regulation. The bottom-up liberalization of the rules governing the telecom sector is
consistent with the zeitgeist shown in Estonia’s rule-making in the economic sphere (see
Feldmann and Sally 2001).
Often scholars studying the EU regulations proceed as the EU is a federal state akin to
that of the United States. Similarly, as interviews showed lobbyists seem to think that
regulatory decisions are simply made in Brussels and there is no need to look beyond it
(Interviews). Hence, telecom regulations and particularly effective regulations on the ground
are simply imposed on Estonia and Slovenia. Thinking that that rules are written in Brussels
and simply followed in national capitals represents a line of thinking reflects a profound
failure to grasp the nature of EU. Obviously, the EU is much more than simply a regional
international organization but it is not a Westphalian state either. Even though, the EU has
been given a vast authority over the economic regulation it is far from becoming in any way
similar to the US federal government. First, the EU directives however detailed and uniform
may they seem in print have to be implement by national authorities. Second, there is ongoing resistance to increase regulatory powers of the EU over that of national authorities.
As Oxford scholar Jan Zielonka has pointed out there are competing sources of
authority in the EU with overlapping jurisdiction resulting in “maze Europe” (Zielonka 2006).
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This implies that EU is not something in between an international organization and
Westphalian state, which develops in the direction of the latter. Rather, it is something
completely different which the state-centric approaches are not capable of grasping.
According to Zielonka EU’s model is closest to that of Neomedieval Empire – not to that of
Westphalian state (Zielonka 2006). Most importantly, telecommunication regulations as
expressed in the EU Telecom Acquis seem at first sight highly uniform and detailed.
However, as the research has demonstrated these uniform rules are often implemented
differently in different the EU member states (Tenbuecken 2006). For instance, the
independence of telecom regulator has considerable variance across the EU countries despite
the perceived uniformity of telecom regulations on this issue.
Hence, the decisions made in Estonia and Slovenia matter to great extent before the
countries joined the EU in 2004 and after that. Interviews and data from the EU and OECD
suggests that the regulatory capture by narrow vested interests is greater in Slovenia than by
Estonia which has had consequences for the delivery of high quality and high speed internet.
Nevertheless, the collective action literature highlights the difficulties in promoting general
diffused interests against small groups with concentrated interests (Olson 1965, 22-52). This
framework applies neatly to the technological change where benefits are diffuse but costs are
concentrated (Mokyr 1990, 256). Obviously, the incumbent telecom company is more
effective in lobbying – whether it is privatized or publicly owned – than consumers are.
However, in the case of transition economies the timing of reforms matters and explains also
why Estonian government was able to promote diffused general interests without ending up in
the excessive regulatory capture. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to what Joseph
Schumpeter called “[a] creative destruction” (Schumpeter 1975, 81-86). It was a period of
“extraordinary politics,” in the words of former Polish finance minister and current governor
of the Central Bank of Poland, Leszek Balcerowics, as he described the utilization of the
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window of opportunity by radical reformers who enjoyed strong public support (Balcerowics
1995, 4, 145-165). Most importantly, vested interests were not present or simply ignored in
the decision-making process of government in this time-period of radical reforms. As the time
passed by and costs of reforms accumulated, political rationality changed. The vested interests
gained considerable influence.
In the demand side analysis, yhe comparison of ICT skills does not show that there are
considerable differences between Estonia and Slovenia. At the same time, intsitutional
differences were greater. Slovenia has tried to encourage telecom sector development through
top-down state directed policies and protected incumbent companies. Estonia has been
liberalizer of telecom market and facilitated the process of entrepreneurial discovery.
The nature of social democratic corporatism in Slovenia would suggest in theory that
broad set of interests are taken abroad in decision-making by government but as it has been
discussed above the interests of incumbent telecom company prevailed. Hence, it is not
surprising that despite a strong promotion of IT for decades and toying with strategies for
promoting information technology, the provision of government services in Slovenia has not
gone as smoothly as in Estonia. This implies that all the costs of negative externalities have
not really been socialized in Slovenia. Internet diffusion in Slovenia is driven by the IT
industry and other companies that are well integrated in the value-chains of Western clusters.
The data on broadband take-up by enterprises demonstrates that Slovenia was quicker to
adopt broadband than Estonia. However, the provision of government and domestic private
sector services to ordinary citizens lags behind those offered in Estonia. However, Slovenia’s
long-term emphasis on IT education and its strong IT sector suggest that informal institutions
have at least to some degree compensated any shortcomings concerning government rulemaking in telecommunications and information technology.
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CHAPTER 5
ENTREPRENEURIAL DISCOVERY: FROM INTERNET BANKING TO INTERNET
VOTING

5.1 Introduction
The main purpose of this dissertation is to explain how internet diffuses in different
contexts. The research strategy emphasizes the importance of “thick description” in achieving
this goal. This approach allows capturing interactions of informal and formal institutions as
well as agency in a more detailed manner. Chapter 4 discussed key differences between
Estonia and Slovenia higlighting that internet diffusion is greater in Estonia than Slovenia.
This is so when both static and dynamic aspects of diffusion are taken into account. It also
emerged that formal rules of the game encouraged greater openness and competition in
Estonia. Now it is time to move to the next step in research strategy and provide case studies
within Estonia which allow demonstrating how the process of entrepreneurial discovery and
institutional framework has played a role in contributing to the emergence of internet ventures
and services which have created reasons for the regular use of internet in Estonia.
The approach in this chapter can be described as relying on positive cases. Essentially,
it focuses primarily on key entrepreneurial venture (both public and private), online
identification methods, internet banking and internet voting which all can be described as
“success”. Nevertheless, their success is mutually dependent and capture well the importance
of network effects affecting internet diffusion which was described in the section 2.6 of
Chapter Two. First, the availability of internet banking has made the use of internet in Estonia
more valuable. Second, internet banking introduced online identification methods, which were
exploited by government and created a culture which made it easier to introduce online
identification methods by government and internet voting. Third, internet voting is not
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necessary for the emergence of internet banking and online identification methods but in the
Estonian context it is hard to see how internet voting could have emerged without internet
banking and online identification methods.
Ultimately this chapter offers a narrative how emergence of online identification
methods in Estonia, not just ID card, contributed to the path-dependent process where both
private sector and government organizations started to supply more services online and
availability of these services encouraged the use and diffusion of internet. I will start by
discussing internet banking and related online identification methods, which is followed by a
narrative on the Estonian ID card and I conclude by offering a detailed overview of internet
voting. The latter is the most unique development underlining the emergence of online
identification culture in Estonia.

5.2 Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Emergence of Digital Economy
Throughout the interviews I conducted in Slovenia in June 2012 I asked local experts
how they saw the differences in developments in the diffusion of internet and related
technologies in Estonia and Slovenia. Since I had also conducted interviews in Slovenia in
January 2003, it allowed me an opportunity for a comparison over time. In addition, some of
the experts I interviewed were the same in 2012 and 2003. The main difference that was
emphasized between Estonia and Slovenia is the existence of sophisticated online
identification method in the form of an identification card (ID card) in Estonia and lack of
such an ID card in Slovenia. A former Slovenian government minister and current computer
science professor at a major university pointed out explicitly that the introduction of the ID
card has made the use of internet in Estonia qualitatively different from Slovenia. Privacy
concerns and bureaucratic inertia had made launch of similar system in Slovenia of combining
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physical identity card with digital and online identification method impossible (Interviews
11).
Obviously, the ID card is not just unique innovation when Estonia is compared to Slovenia, it
is unique innovation when Estonia is compared to the most countries in the world. However,
there are countries such as Belgium, which has fairly similar ID card (Martens 2010).
Estonian ID card allows user to access both private and public sector services online such as
banking, voting, paying taxes buying bus tickets and so on. In all other countries people need
different identification methods for accessing different services. The nature of ID card will be
discussed will be discussed extensively in the following sections of this chapter. However,
interviews with Slovenian experts revealed a widely spread tendency to see the development
of online identification methods as a purely government project and overemphasize the
importance of ID card while ignoring developments which took place before the introduction
of ID card by the government (Interviews 11). This overemphasis on ID card is also found in
several reports on Estonian e-government (Maaten and Hall 2008; Ernsdorff and Berbec
2007; Dutta 2006). Ernsdorff and Berbec’s understanding of ID card is simplistic and naïve as
they write that government introduced them in 2002, made it mandatory and all citizens will
have it by 2006 (Ernsdorff and Berbec 2006, 173). Even if this is true, then it does not mean
that they will use them online and that by 2007 ID card played important role in online
transactions - actually opposite is true as shown by Martens (2010). For Maaten and Hall
writing in 2008 “the widespread use of national ID card”… is one of the factors “why I-voting
has been success in Estonia” (Maaten and Hall 2008, 32).
National ID card was widespread in 2008 but this does not automatically mean that it
was widely used in online environments in 2008 as it will be demonstrated below. If this is a
question of emphasis and interpretation, then Dutta writing in the World Economic Forum
Network Readiness Report states bluntly the following: “Thanks to the use of electronic ID
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cards as a safe way to access private data, citizens can declare their taxes online” (Dutta 2006,
84). First, Estonians were able to declare their taxes online already in 2000 – two years before
ID card was introduced in 2002. The ID card started to be used more widely in online
environments in the late 2000s. Dutta writes in 2006 when as will be reported below and has
been reported by others (see Martens (2010), for instance) ID card was not even sufficiently
diffused in Estonia to be a major contributor for online tax declaration. Second, the use of ID
card is not necessary for declaring taxes online. It was and is only one option. Even in 2015, a
brief visit to the website of Estonian Tax Authority reveals that their online services can be
accessed by the following methods: 1) ID card, 2) Mobile ID, 3) internet banks (links to six
banks are provided) and 4) user ID issued by tax authority (this information is available in
English at the website of Tax Auhtority at http://www.emta.ee/index.php?id=29761). The
option three -access by internet banks- also means actually at least three options because
banks can be accessed by the use of ID card, Mobile ID as well as older identification
methods used by banks since 1996. All of this will be discussed more in detail below but the
key point here is to emphasize that reports on Estonian ID cards often lack of context and
understanding of a specific development trajectory of online identification methods in
Estonia. Most importantly, they often talk about developments about Estonia in general terms
and are not able to distinguish between the respective roles of private and public sector agents
in launching these initiatives.
Furthermore, there is even more profound principal point that needs to be made
concerning the introduction of ID card and role of government in the development of digital
economy. The ID card and a numerous related Estonian government initiatives have received
significant attention by scholars, then it should be kept in mind that in free and democratic
societies most citizens do not interact with government online and offline very often. People
primarily use services provided by private sector such as banking. Their adoption of internet
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depends on services and content provided primarily by private and less on public sector. For
more sophisticated interactive services it is necessary to create reliable online identification
tools. The existence of such tools encourage further use of internet and increases demand for
high quality connectivity. Hence, the involvement of the Estonian public sector in
encouraging wider use of internet is not comparable with the developments that ensued in the
private sector. The following sections will point out some key developments that took place
in private sector and how these various initiatives intertwined with government policy. It
starts by mapping out emergence of new internet business in Estonia – some of them gained
global significance and then focuses on internet banking.

5.2.1 Skype: An Estonian Company
One of the most well-known ICT companies that emerged in Estonia is Skype, which
was founded by Niklas Zennström, Janus Friis, Jaan Tallinn, Priit Kasesalu, Ahti Heinla and
Toivo Annus in Tallinn in 2003. Skype was acquired by EBay for 2.6 billion dollars in 2005
(Skype Technologies 2009). In 2009 Ebay sold 65 % of Skype to venture capital firms
Andreessen Horowitz, Silver Lake and Canadian Investment Plan Pension Board for 1.9
billion dollars valuing the company at 2.75 billion dollars. Microsoft acquired Skype for 8.5
billion dollars in 2011 (Skype Technologies 2009; Skype Technologies 2014; Tiits and
Kalvet 2012). In 2015, Skype was listed by UK investment banking group GP Bullhound as
the most valuable European technology company in Europe in so-called billion dollar club
(Ahmed 2015). Skype’s valuation at 8.5 billion dollars exceeds considerably club’s average of
three billion dollars.
Estonian founders of Skype had excellent technical skills. They had developed
computer games already when they were high schools students and sold one successfully in
the early 1990s. Tallinn graduated with BSc in theoretical physics from the University of
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Tartu in 1996, while others studied computer science. Nevertheless, the technical skills are
not sufficient for developing world class software. Success of Skype can be described as
accidental. When Skype was founded, it was obviously not clear to the founders as in many
start-ups and outsiders that one day it will be worth of billions of dollars. In the early 2000s,
many Estonian IT and telecom analysts were still underestimating the role Skype might play
in changing the traditional telecom landscape. And then overnight, millions of dollars poured
into the country and Skype has become a part of eBay. All of this was a big surprise
(Interviews 14 and 16).
Two Skype founders Zennström and Friis moved to Estonia from Sweden and
Denmark respectively already in the 1990s. They placed an ad in English in an Estonian
newspaper in 1999 with catchy slogan: “Supermodels not wanted. We want your brain”
(Kitsing 2005). This ad attracted several Estonian programmers with whom Zennström and
Friis created a portal called www.everyday.com, which does not exist anymore. This was
followed by peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing company Kazaa in 2000, which made them
famous and fugitive together with Estonian programmers from the US legal system. Kazaa
was actually developed first by Tallinn and other programmers and then sold to Zennström
and Friis. In 2001, Kazaa was sold to Australian based Sharman Networks in order to avoid
law suits by US based music and movie industry (Pasick 2006). Zennstöm, Friis, Kasesalu
and Tallinn could not travel to the United States and had to avoid situations where they could
be served legal papers for years. In 2003, Kazaa was most downloaded computer program in
the world with 315 million copies residing in computers (Roth 2004). However, once Skype
founders made hundreds of millions for selling Skype to eBay they also settled lawsuits with
music industry by paying more than 100 million dollars to music industry plaintiffs (Pasick
2006).
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This background makes it obvious that the process of entrepreneurial discovery behind
both Kazaa and Skype was messy and it had nothing to do with Estonian government policy –
other than government stayed out and open economic environment enabled such activities to
take place. It is difficult if not impossible to establish causality between the success of Skype
and numerous social, legal, economic, political, individual and other variables. However, it
can be said with certainty that Skype was a result of entrepreneurial discovery process. It did
not emerge as a result of government intervention in creating innovative companies or
because of top-down social engineering. Economic openness and Estonian government efforts
in liberalizing telecom market as discussed in previous chapter probably contributed to its
birth but this cannot be claimed with certainty. The broad institutional framework might have
been necessary for its birth and perhaps attracting its founders from Scandinavia to Estonia
but it was certainly not sufficient condition.
The early years of Skype are well capture by Fortune magazine, which opened its
article titled “Catch Us If You Can” on Skype in 2004 with the following paragraph:
“Near the center of the walled medieval district of Estonia's capital, Tallinn, sits the
NoKu bar. It's almost impossible to find, on a cobblestone street behind a pair of old,
unmarked wooden doors that unlock only with a magnetic keycard, and up a set of
rickety stairs. In Estonian, "NoKu" is an acronym for "young culture"; the private club
is full of twentysomethings in jeans, drinking local Saku Original beer to rock music.
The bar's name has another meaning: Read as one word, it's slang for "penis." Both the
hidden nature and the cheeky attitude of the place fit perfectly with the company I'm
here to meet. Almost a dozen computer programmers and engineers are gathered
around a large wooden table in the back of the bar on this bitterly cold mid-December
night. They work for a startup called Skype, which produces software that allows
people to make free, incredibly clear voice calls from their PC to any other PC in the
world.“ (Roth 2004)

This description makes it difficult to believe that the venture was sold for 2.6 billion
US dollars one year later. However, in the section 2.3 of the dissertation I highlighted
perspectives on startup communities (Feld 2012) and creative classes (Florida 2005), which
all emphasize the process of entrepreneurial discovery in explaining diffusion of technologies
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such as internet as well as broader outcomes in innovation. These approaches emphasize the
role of entrepreneurs and their agency in ecosystems and deemphasize the role of oldfashioned top-down national or regional public policy in shaping diffusion of technologies.
The description of early years of Skype above fits particularly well with Florida’s concept of
creative classes where both bohemians and computer programmers are included in the
creative class. Existence of creative class helps to encourage economic development through
innovation (Florida 2005).
Technologically, Kazaa has obvious connection with Skype as both businesses relied
on peer-to-peer (P2P). It cannot be claimed that the team invented peer-to-peer technology33,
however. Entrepreneurs behind Kazaa were good at turning earlier inventions into innovation
and building entire business model around it. Skype team's previous undertaking, Kazaa, had
often been called the new Napster. Napster was a Californian peer-to-peer file sharing service
which was founded in 1999 and ended up in legal difficulties because of copyright
infringement in 2001.
However, the Napster comparison to some extent misses an important technological
difference. While Napster utilized client-server structure for some tasks, Kazaa relied entirely
on P2P technology and it was located outside of the United States . Naturally, the
technological difference as well as geographical location of service provider translates into
crucial legal and economic implications. In the case of Kazaa, it was more difficult to hold the
distributors of file-sharing program responsible for illegal downloading of files. Due to the
use of server-client structure for some tasks by Napster, documentation of its direct
involvement in illegal file-sharing was easier (Kitsing 2005; Tambur 2013).

33

Peer-to-peer is a distributed application architecture which distributes processes among peers, i.e. participants
in the network. It does not require central coordination by servers and stable hosts as peers make resources such
as bandwith and processing power available for other peers. Peers are both suppliers and consumers of the
resources. This is different from traditional client-server model where the role of suppliers and consumers is
divided.
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Unlike many other VoIP service providers, Skype (like the file-sharing program
Kazaa) relies entirely on peer-to-peer technology. P2P technology creates important
technological advantages compared to the traditional server-client model. The Skype directory
is entirely decentralized and distributed among network nodes. This in turn implies that Skype
can increase its scale rapidly without added investments for expensive and centralized
infrastructure. Essentially, Skype excels in exploiting the decentralized nature of internet
(Kitsing 2005).
This technological aspect explains why P2P VoIP is economically superior to serverclient VoIP as well as to traditional telephony. Economic superiority has a tremendous effect
on the competitive rivalry in the telecom market. Skype has a lower cost structure, thereby
enabling lower prices in comparison with non-P2P VoIP and traditional phone services. It is
also easier to scale Skype's subscribers, because Skype does not need to invest in additional
infrastructure for accommodating new users - a necessary investment for non-P2P centralized
VoIP service providers and, obviously, traditional telephony companies. Hence, Skype grew
rapidly because of its technological and thus economic superiority.
In the beginning Skype grew rapidly in Estonia and their main engineering and
development center is still bases in Tallinn, Estonia. At peak Skype employed over 400
workers in Tallinn. However, this has been slightly declining recently. It is not reflected yet in
companies financial statements but in the second half of 2014 Microsoft restructured Skype
business in Estonia, which means that employees were laid off and some of the same
employees will continue working for Skype as contractors. Table 5.1 gives overview of main
financial indicators of Skype operations in Estonia as a comparison of financial year 2008 and
2013/2014 (Skype has changed its financial year from full year in 2008 to two half years of
one full year in 2013 and 2014). As Table 5.1 shows labor costs are 64 % of revenue in 2008
and 57 % in 2013/2014. Hence, there has not been significant change in the proportion and it

158

remains most important cost of the company. Number of employees has grown from 318 to
415 but sales revenue and profitability has more than doubled. Monthly labor cost per
employee in 2008 was about 3400 euros, which means gross salary of approximately 2500
euros. Monthly labor cost per employee was about 5000 euros in 2013/2014, which translates
into average monthly gross salary of 3700 euros (after social insurance taxes but inclusive of
income tax). The average salary in Estonia was at the same time 1000 euros and in the ICT
sector close to 1600 euros (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications 2015). This
increase in salaries during the time period including economic recession in 2008 and 2009
where most salaries did not grow or stagnated, signals that Skype has difficulties in finding
qualified employees.
Table 5.1: Indicators of Skype operations in Estonia.
Indicator/Period

01.01.2008-31.12. 2008

07.01.2013-30.06.2014

Number of employees/
average monthly gross
salary34
Labor costs

318/2500

415/3700

13.1 million euros

24.8 million

Sales revenue

20.5 million euros

44.2 million euros

Source of sales revenue

EU 100 %

US 100 %

EBIT35

1.7 million euros

3.7 million euros

Return on Equity (ROE)

39 %

14,4 %

Source: Author on the basis of Skype Technologies (2009) and (2014).

34

The average monthly gross salary is calculation by the author on the basis of data provided in annual reports
(Skype Technologies 2009 and 2014). It is an approximation..
35

Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) is an indicator of company profitability. It is calculated by
subtracting expenses from revenue but not including interest and corporate tax payments on profit. It is also
known as „operating profit“, „operating income“ or „operating earnings“.
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All sales revenue comes from transactions within group. In 2008, revenue source was
European Union but in 2013/2014 it has changed to the United States. ROE as a measure of
efficiency has decreased from 39 % in 2008 to 14.4 percent in the 2013/2014 financial year.
Already in 2009 Skype’s annual report reflected natural limits for potential expansion
in Estonia by pointing out that the main barrier for growth in Estonia stems from the lack of
qualified software engineers (Skype Technologies 2009, 3). It was also emphasized in an
interview with a former Skype top manager in Estonia in 2011 who also expressed concerns
about Estonian immigration policies and overall low levels of social tolerance for inflow of
international workers (Interviews 14). In order to deal with the small pool of labor in Estonia,
Skype also established engineering centers in Prague as well as offices in Stockholm, Sweden,
London, UK, Luxembourg, Silicon Valley as well as various locations in South America and
Asia (Tiits and Kalvet 2012). The relative importance of Tallinn for Skype operations has
been declined over time as company expanded overseas and increased its staff to 1600.
However, 400 employees in Tallinn out of 1600 is still quite significant 25 percent of total
workers at Skype. It would be unrealistic to assume that company with global presence
would recruit only in Estonia because it would make it difficult to attract sufficient number of
talented people.
Partially, limited labor pool stems from the fact that Estonia is a small country of 1.3
million inhabitants and it does not have sufficient number of qualified workers. The size of
labor market is roughly 600 000 people. ICT sector employs 20 000 people (without
manufacturing of electronics). Through interviews with various IT companies in Estonia and
government officials it is also clear that supply of IT workers does not meet the demand. It is
also difficult to attract workers from overseas because of strict immigration regulations for
non-EU citizens as well as unwillingness of some potential recruits to move to Estonia
(Interviews 14, 23, 24). In section 2.4, I highlighted stylized facts on the basis of smart
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specialization literature, which emphasized that innovation and entrepreneurship tends to be
widely spread in more densely populated areas and ICT can actually increase the differences
between core and non-core regions. Tallinn, Estonia, with 400 000 inhabitants is certainly not
densely populated and is not a core region.
Hence, factoring in the locational disadvantages, it can be considered a success that
Skype has maintain substantial presence in Estonia from 2005 to 2015 when it has become a
global player. Obviously other factors can help. Other stylized facts in section 2.4 pointed out
that sectorial diversity and high number of internationally connected multinational companies
tend to benefit entrepreneurship and innovation while innovation tends to be lower when a
small number of large firms dominate the economy. Estonia scores well on all these accounts.
As chapter 4 highlighted it has had open trade and foreign direct investment regime –
particularly in comparison with Slovenia. It has diverse manufacturing base. 52 percent of
Estonian exports were produced by 100 companies in Estonia in 25 different sectors in 2013
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, 2015). There is a strong presence of
multinational companies such as Ericsson and ABB in Estonia. Successful Estonian
manufacturing companies are well integrated into global value chains of multinationals.
Obviously, Skype has joined the ranks of multinationals which operate in Estonia.
Estonians consider Skype an Estonian company and it is often used by country’s officials for
marketing purposes. At the same time, one of the main founders of Skype, Niklas Zennström,
usually does not even mention Estonia when he discusses Skype. He usually refers to Skype
as Swedish company. For instance, Zennström wrote in the Financial Times in 2015: “When
we founded Skype, our aim was never build the best peer-to-peer communication service in
Sweden” (Zennström 2015) The fact that Zennström does not mention Estonia in his public
statements refers to a locational disadvantage because Estonia is considered a periphery and is
not well known as a country. Even more importantly, GP Bullhound report on Europe’s most
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valuable technology companies considers Skype to be Swedish and Transferwise, a financial
technology company founded by two Estonians, one of them former Skype employee, to be
UK company (Ahmed 2015). Transferwise has headquarters in London but significant
presence in Tallinn, Estonia. The fact that two companies with significant presence in Estonia
and involvement of Estonian entrepreneurs are in the list of 13 most valuable technology
companies in Europe is quite remarkable and reveals that entrepreneurial discovery process
works quite smoothly in Estonia. But at the same time, the same entrepreneurs prefer to
present their companies as Swedish and British and usual coverage in financial press does not
even mention Estonia in relation to these companies, reveals that Estonia comes with
locational a disadvantage. Usually, Estonians tend to see Skype and Transferwise as Estonian
companies and may overemphasize the Estonian connection.
However, at least in these two cases the connection to Estonia and its entrepreneurial
ecosystem is strong. For instance, a scholarly piece on e-government has even suggested that
Hotmail originates from Estonia (Ernsdorff and Berbec 2007, 171). This is a clear
misrepresentation which has also been replicated in numerous publications. The first backer
of Hotmail was Steve Jurvetson from Silicon Valley venture capital firm Draper Fisher.
Jurvetson whose parents are immigrated from Estonia to the United States after the World
War II. Hence, the Estonian connection is loosely indirect at best and certainly Hotmail did
not originate from Estonia.
To sum up, the case of Skype illustrates the opportunities that emerged in the
entrepreneurial ecosystem of Estonia in the 1990s and 2000s. Certainly, Skype created more
reasons for Estonians to use internet and even more importantly, the success of Estonian
based company increased the visibility of internet and related technologies among Estonian
public. However, for the diffusion of internet among different socio-economic groups the
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developments in banking sector were even more important. The next section explores the
emergence of internet banking.

5.2.2 Internet Banking as a Critical Juncture in the Emergence of Digital Economy
The importance of entrepreneurial discovery in bringing new innovative products and
services to the market and by doing so encouraging the use of internet refers more than just
the birth of numerous of IT companies such as Kazaa and Skype. The liberal economic
regime and sound financial policies benefited the birth of the banking sector, which became
an influential IT innovator by introducing Internet banking in 1996 (Lustsik 2003, 24). The
internet banks were introduced by Estonian banks Hansapank and Ühispank, which were
owned by Estonians. However, both banks were taken over by Swedish banking groups
Swedbank and SEB in the late 1990s. However, interviews confirmed that in many ways
Estonian internet banking solutions were superior to Swedish internet banking solutions and
Swedish banking groups actually learned from the Estonian experience (Interviews 28 and
32). It other words, reverse technology transfer took place – usually it is assumed that superior
technology is transferred from economically more advanced to economically less advanced
countries.
Estonian new banks in the 1990s were effectively start-ups because there were no old
legacy banks. The Soviet banking system was undeveloped. To great extent it was cash-based
system. The use of checks was not widespread. Hence, it was possible to start from blank
sheet and avoid the same development trajectories that were experienced by more advanced
countries. This provided a critical juncture because Estonian banks did not have to deal with
legacy costs and path-dependencies of old banking systems. It was possible to move from
cash-based system to internet banking without ever introducing checks and other old
technologies. When a typical bank in the west such as Bank of America has essentially made
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its check-book based system electronic and calls it internet banking, then the Estonian internet
banking was from the beginning in term of speed and quality of service. Transfers could be
made within the same day, within few hours instead of waiting at least 24 hours. It was cheap
as most consumers using the service did not even qualify for credit-cards in 1996.
The quality, security and simplicity of internet banking service attracted the majority
of Internet users as its customers (Lustsik 2003, 27). In 2005, 35 percent of Estonian people
used Internet banking. In 2013, the use of Internet banking was almost universal among
internet users as it reached 73 percent of total population. As the Figure 29 below shows
clearly, Estonian lead in the internet banking is exceptional among the CEE countries that
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 as well as in comparison with EU average. In 2004, the use of
Internet banking in Slovenia was four times smaller than in Estonia and in 2013 it was almost
2.5 times smaller. Slovenia has not just been a laggard in comparison with Estonia but also in
comparison with the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia. Only 4-5 percent of
internet users used internet banking in Romania and Bulgaria in 2013. The huge variance of
outcomes quite remarkable in the context of Chapter Two, which emphasized the
epistemological nature of technology and role of local context in internet diffusion. Even
various internet banking solutions have been available for 20 years, these solutions have not
diffused evenly to countries characterized by relatively similar socio-economic development
(as countries which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 are).
For those unfamiliar with the Estonian context, the emphasis on internet banking may
seem unusual. However, the quick uptake of internet banking provides another critical
juncture for the spread of internet and particularly high speed and high quality internet
because the service would not be useable without it. The internet banking was introduced
when the internet diffusion was still making baby steps in Estonia. Thus, it provided crucial
reason for getting online – particularly as banks encouraged their customers to use this option
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in order to cut costs and provide more efficient service. Already in 2002, internet banking
classified as the third most important reason for Internet use among Estonian population,
behind communicating via email (76 percent) and using search engines (62 percent) (Lustsik
2003, 27).

Figure 5.1: Individuals using Internet for Internet banking in selected CEE countries and EU
on the basis of data from Eurostat (2014). 36

It is also important to keep in mind that most people do not need to interact and make
transactions with government often. At the same time, the use of banking services can be a
daily or weekly necessity. According to Alexa.com data on top sites in Estonia in 2015, the
government portal eesti.ee, a gateway to different government online services, is ranked 113
among top sites in Estonia (Figure 5.2). At the same time, the website of the largest bank by
market share in Estonia swedbank.ee was ranked 8 and second largest bank seb.ee was ranked

36

Detailed data is available in Appendix D.
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16 among top websites. The websites of smaller banks lhv.ee was ranked 62 and Nordea.com
was ranked 110. In other words, even small banks beat the government central portal in
attracting users. To be totally objective, it has to be mentioned that the website of capital city
Tallinn.ee was ranked 49 and rik.ee, which provides online access to land, property and
enterprise registers, was ranked 65 (Alexa, 2015). Figure 30 provides historical traffic trends
showing that websites of two largest banks www.swedbank.ee and www.seb.ee have
considerably higher global rank by attracting number of visitors than three most popular
public sector websites www.tallinn.ee, www.rik.ee and www.eesti.ee.

Figure 5.2: Top government and bank websites in Estonia from January 15 to June 15
in 2015 on the basis of global traffic rank with data from Alexa (2015).
This indicates two trends. First, many users go directly to subwebsites of government
services rather than access them through government portal. Second, the websites of large
banks attract considerably more users than any government service. The data collected by
Alexa is based on monthly traffic rank which is combination of average daily visitors and
page views over past month. Certainly, monthly data may not be representative of broader
trends and some websites may experience considerable volatility of visits on monthly basis.
Nevertheless, all this websites are well established in Estonia and have loyal visitors. We can
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assume that most visitors have to access their banking and government services with certain
regularity and are not likely to change their bank or government often. Hence, it can be
describe as a path-dependent process where initial decision to use particular bank and its
internet banking services will lead to the regular use of their services. For the sake of
understanding the importance of internet banking plays in Estonia Figure 5.3 compares top
government and bank websites on the basis of global traffic rank with Slovenia. Slovenia’s
result are opposite to Estonia’s. Slovenian government portal has almost as high rank as most
popular bank website in Estonia while most popular bank website in Slovenia lags
significantly behind top bank website in Estonia by global ranking – nlb.si global rank is
56.306 in comparison with largest Estonian bank swedbank.ee’s ranking of 14.324.

Figure 5.3: Top government and bank websites in Estonia compared to top bank and
government websites in Slovenia from January 15 to June 15 in 2015 on the basis of global
traffic rank with data from Alexa (2015).
It must be kept in mind that Estonian population is 1.3 million while Slovenia’s
population is 2 million and in absolute terms Slovenia has higher number of internet users as
well as regular bank customers. Hence, one would expect Slovenian websites to be more
popular by global ranking than Estonia’s websites. To illustrate this key difference further
between Estonia and Slovenia, then it must be pointed out that the Slovenian government
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portal gov.si is ranked number 11 among top websites in Slovenia on the basis on monthly
data. Slovenia’s largest bank nlb.si is ranked 56 in among top websites in Slovenia.
Furthermore, often scholars fail to grasp the Estonian context where internet banking
is not just about providing one service but providing a platform for many services. Many
state agencies started to use the identification verification offered by internet banking, thereby
enabling government services online. Estonian Tax Authority developed a new software
solution in cooperation with companies Sema Group Belgium and AboBase Systems and
started to offer an option to declare taxes online already in 2000. The availability of bankbased online identification system allowed them to do so. In fact, in online banking
environments it is possible to enter directly to Tax Authorities webpage and declare taxes
online. In 2014 95 percent of people declared their taxes online.
According to Aivar Sõerd, General Director of Estonian Tax Authority from 1999 to
2003, the implementation of online services cost to taxpayers only 85 000 euros (Sõerd 2015).
“Cooperation with banks led to considerable cost savings,”37 wrote Sõerd in the leading
Estonian daily (Sõerd 2015). Sõerd emphasized that “two largest bank at that time Hanspank
and Ühispank offered to government an opportunity to rely on their bank portals for logging
into the (tax authority online) environment” (Sõerd 2015). It is obvious from Sõerd’s
comments that the main focus was on cost saving and control. Since identification tools were
made available by the banks, then the tax authority relied on them. Questions whether the use
of private sector identification methods is acceptable or not in providing government services
were not discussed. It was implemented as a tax authority service project and it did not require
any special legislation and wider discussion in the government. Again, functional focus on
implementing a concrete project by specific government department without consideration of
broader issues and without general government strategy fits neatly into what Kitsing (2011)

37

Direct quotes from Sõerd (2015) are translated by the author from Estonian into English.
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called “success without strategy” in discussing the development of Estonian e-government. It
is also a prime example of what this dissertation in the section 2.5 discussed as an
entrepreneurial discovery process.
Let me recall the dissertation defines entrepreneurs very broadly: policy makers,
public universities and research institutes can be entrepreneurial and part of the process. In
many ways development of online services by Estonian Tax Authority is also consistent with
Mazzucato’s concept of “entrepreneurial state” or what Crouch calls “institutional
entrepreneurs” (Crouch 2005). Mazzucato emphasizes that different public sector bodies can
contribute towards innovation outcomes. It does not have to be central government and
centralized top-down policy-making (Mazzucato 2011).
Aivar Sõerd of Tax Authority and his employees acted as entrepreneurs by making tax
declarations accessible online to public and minimizing costs in doing so. According to Sõerd
(2015), the project was implemented in two phases: a pilot took place in 1999 and in 2000 full
services made available for individuals and companies. 12 000 people used the Tax Authority
online services which consisted of submitting and correcting income and value-added tax
declarations, make inquiries about tax liabilities and other transactions. Sõerd argues that in
principle the online services of Tax Authority have remained the same from 2000 to 2015 and
it should serve as a model for optimization of othe government services. Again, his focus is
on optimization and for him public sector “is by nature a large organization which offers
public services”(Sõerd 2015). Again, focus is on functionality and tax services are seen as
any other service available in the private sector.
Similarly, many private companies offered services which were accessible through
banks making basically banks verifiers of online identities. Essentially, this is a service which
is provide by five major banks to third parties (Martens 2010). The authentication methods
offered by banks are following: 1) password cards containing 24 one time passwords or 2)
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PIN calculators which are offline card readers with a keypad. Customer has to enter his bank
card into reader which generates a PIN code which has to be entered when accessing bank
online. The system introduced by Estonian banks was more sophisticated than the system
used by many American or Western banks today, for example, where only password and
username is required. This system introduced already in 1996, is still in use – even as its role
has been gradually decreasing making ways for newer identification methods such as ID card
and mobile ID. By 2009, one million bank password cards were issued, 50 000 pin calculators
were in use and about one million government ID cards were issued (Martens 2010). What is
the relative role of bank based ID in comparison with government issued ID card in online
environments cannot be verified because the data is not available publicly. However, the
leading authentication expert Tarvi Martens wrote in an article in 2010 that bank based ID
system is still more widely used accounting for 80 percent of all online transactions than
government issued IDs (Martens 2010).
The bottom line is that emergence of internet banking benefited directly provision of
e-government services. Since 2000 Estonians have been able to file their taxes online, using
the identification system offered by electronic banking services. The study on use of
government online services conducted in 2002 already indicated then that the 48 percent of
Estonian Internet users pay for e-government services through the internet banking (Krull
2003, 58). Other ways of using e-government services were less exploited by the people.
Hence, the Internet banking demonstrates that changes in the formal rules provided incentives
for self-interested agents through the process of entrepreneurial discovery to find innovative
solutions that encouraged Internet use.
The contribution of political leaders and that of the IT community in the public sector
has been primarily in the form of rule-making and provision of services based on private
sector developments. In other words, rule-making specific to the electronic government has
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answering demands in the marketplace and/or seeking to provide services in the areas where
transaction costs were lowest. As has been documented by Kitsing (2011), the provision of
online government services was not universal and even. Some agencies were truly innovative
such as Tax Authority, while other lagged behind such as Labor Market Agency. In this sense,
the provision of government services online can be also seen as a process of entrepreneurial
discovery in the broadest sense.
This is well characterized by X-Road system that forms the backbone of Estonian egovernment. The X-Road system was outlined in the Master of Science thesis of Arne Asper
in 2001, a programmer working for small Estonian IT firm Cybernetica employing about 100
people (Interviews 20 and 29). The distributed nature of X-Road makes it more secure than
centralized system and allows to exploit the benefits what was called “stupid network” by
Icenberg (1998) in the literature review. The X-Road can route queries with different
databases in the public and private sector as demonstrated in the Figure 5.4. As systems are
technologically different, then they have to use adopters to send and receive information
through X-Road. Each computer system uses its own secure server for encryption to protect
sensitive data. The following Figure 5.4 illustrates the X-Road system demonstrating how
public sector registries, telecom and energy companies, banks, government portal as well as
electronic ID infrastructure are all connected through a decentralized network.
Essentially, Cybernetica created similarly decentralized system for Estonian
government that Kazaa did for file-sharing and Skype for phone calls exploiting the benefits
of internet as a distributed network. Most importantly, it has been cost-effective. Both Taavi
Kotka, undersecretary for information technology at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Communications and Oliver Väärtnõu, CEO of Cybernetica confirm that the cost of X-Road
has been up to 67 million dollars over lifetime, including all maintenance costs, salaries,
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investments and all other costs (Bershidsky 2015). Usually, countries spend more than that
per year for their e-government information systems with significantly more modest results.

Figure 5.4: Estonian Information System based on X-Road adopted from the State
Information Agency (2015).

The bottom-line is that the emergence of government online services did not result
from a top-down centralized approach rather it was based on de-centralized approach where
some agencies were eager to launch new services while others were not. Some were more
eager to exploit online identification methods and opportunities offered by X-Road. Kitsing
(2011) has labelled it “success without strategy”. As in private sector new services were
provided by experimenting policy entrepreneurs and some of them turned out to be
successful. More online services created additional reasons for using the internet. It must be
emphasized that the X-road connected private sector agents such as banks with government
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databases which made it possible for both sectors to cooperate and offer services online. The
next part will discuss how the cooperation between private and public sector played out in the
case of ID cards and their use in a digital environment.

5.3 From Private to Public: ID Cards
One of these examples of successful policies is Estonian ID card. In 2002, the
government introduced electronic identification cards that can be used as identification
method for online transactions. One reason why the government introduced ID cards in 2002
was to provide a more secure and sophisticated substitute for online identification method
provided by the internet banking where cards with numerical codes were used. The work for
ID card project started already in 1997 but it took three years to prepare draft law called
Digital Signature Act. The decision to go ahead with the project and deliver the cards to all
citizens as one of the last decisions of Prime Minister Mart Laar’s government in October
2001 (Martens 2010).
The decision led to establishment of private company AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus by
two largest banks and telecom operators in 2001. The company was essentially the
certification center for ID card and in the center of network of apps and businesses built
around it. In the early years ID card received considerable public criticism and there was
initial outrage over investment of 20 million euros in the project (Martens 2010, 224).
Martens (2010) emphasizes that initially government agencies were not active promoters of
ID card but gradually they started to promote and procure new generation software for their
use. Since important private sector playes were behind the project by becoming shareholders
in the company responsible for certification process, then the ID card gradually took off and
public attitude became for “This unique setup of private and public cooperation with strong
players enabled to build a uniform platform,“ writes Martens (2010, 226). There were also
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attempts to challenge the monopoly of Sertifitseerimiskeskus by Cybernetica who launched
alternative tools based on different standards in 2002. However, this competition ended in
2008 when uniform standard prevailed.
Even though it was made obligatory to have the ID card, they did not become widely
used immediately in online environments (E-User, 2005; Martens 2010). As was emphasized
above the previous simple identification method provided by internet banking remained the
primary form of online identification. Even though government had issued a half million IDcards by March 2005 (Estonian population is 1.3 million) and reached 1 million by 2009, the
new identification method did not gain immediately considerable following in the online
environments (E-User, 2005; Martens 2010). People use these cards primarily offline – ID
card is a regular identification card with chip that allows it to be used also online. The bankissued online identification cards have been used in parallel and before the ID card as an
identification method for government provided online services. Overall, only 25 000 ID card
owners used their cards online in 2006 – four years after the launch. In 2009 the number of
online users of ID card had increased ten-fold to about 250 000 (Rudi 2009). Between 2012
and 2002, 500,000 people had authenticated themselves electronically with the ID card at
least once. Total number of authentications reached 131 million, which makes 260
authentication per average user in this 10 year period. Out of these 131 million transactions 78
million have been digital signatures, which implies that 156 digital signatures have been given
by average user. Obviously, this is just indicator of abstract averages. In reality, some people
are heavy users, some light users and some do not use ID card at all electronically. In 2011,
86 percent of Estonian citizens had ID card but only 40 percent of the ID card holders used
the digital options of the card – either to authenticate their identity online or to give digital
signature (State Information Agency 2015). This implies that most citizens use ID card offline
as a regular ID. Ownership of ID card is mandatory by law. However, law does not specify
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any penalties for not owning the ID card and nobody has not been penalized for not owning
the card. Ownership of ID card can make life more convenient. For example, the card can be
used as a substitute for a passport for travelling within the European Union.
In 2009, Estonian government also introduced the mobile phone based identification
method called mobile ID. The mobile ID does not imply that people can transact on any
mobile phone. Rather it is a mobile phone based identification method alternative to ID card,
which allows conduct transactions in online environments using smart phone as a substitute
for ID card. Prerequisite for activating mobile ID is existence of ID card. It also requires a
special Mobile ID compatible SIM-card in the mobile phone which is provided by all mobile
operators in Estonia. The cost of changing regular SIM-card to Mobile ID compatible SIM
card is about 12 dollars. However, the use of Mobile ID has not become as widespread as the
use of ID card. It is a newer innovation and primarily used by early adopters. As of October
2012, 30,000 people had Mobile ID and about 80 percent of them actually used it. By October
2014, the number of users had reached 50,000 and 1.8 million transactions were conducted by
Mobile ID per month. 75 percent of these transactions were banking transactions. The use of
Mobile ID as a substitute for ID card is encouraged by the spread of smart phones and tablets.
ID card cannot be used with smart phones and tablets because of lack of ID card reader.
Mobile ID can be used by both (State Information Agency 2015).
Over time, the online identification methods provided by banks and ID card have
become of prerequisite for using most Estonian government online services as well as services
provided by private companies. It is possible to speak of “forced digitalization” as many
government services are not easily available without the ID card or the use of other online
identification methods. Offline services are still there but their users face significantly higher
transaction costs than users of online services. For instance, it has basically become very
complicated to submit documents to Business Registry unless ID card and online channels are
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used (personal observation). However, some government officials responsible for the
digitalization efforts in the Estonian government still complained in interviews that a
significant share of online service users rely on bank-based old identification methods and do
not use ID card online (Interviews 20).
Nevertheless, the increasing availability of secure online services and innovations such
as ID card have created additional reasons to use internet. As the following figure 5.5
suggest, over the years less and less Estonian households are without internet access at home
because access is not needed.

Figure 5.5: Estonian households with internet connectivity at home and without internet
connectivity at home because access is not needed 2004-2013 on the basis of Eurostat
(2014).38
38

Detailed data is in Appendix D.
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In 2005, survey results show that 28 percent of households without internet
connectivity at home said that they don’t need it while in 2013 the percentage of such
households was decreased to 11 percent. 36 percent of households without children said so in
2005 and 15 percent in 2013.
It is also important to note that the spread of ID card adds to the cost of internet use.
The use of ID card requires a purchase of ID card reader or a computer with ID card reader.
But it is not sufficiently significant or at least perceived not significant as it has not been a
major barrier for its adoption. Cheaper versions of the reader can be purchased for slightly
less than $10 dollars. More expensive versions can cost $40-50 dollars. The ID-card itself
costs slightly more than $20 dollars (personal observation and calculation). While the reader
is required for online interactions, the ID-card can be used as a regular identification
document within Estonia and it serves as a substitute for passport for traveling within the 28countries of the European Union.
In recent years banks have actively supported the use of ID cards in internet banking
by lowering the amount of daily transactions that can be made by old internet bank
identification method and price discriminating in transaction fees. In addition to private
sector, ID cards have become widely used by municipalities and other organizations.
However, these are more recent developments, which build on the initial success of internet
banking. From the perspective of long-term evolution the Internet banking was more
fundamental in explaining the early take up of internet and its more recent initiatives such as
the ID-card have helped to diffuse the use of internet further.
But the cost of ID-card and its reader represent only the tip of the iceberg. Any
analysis of costs has to go beyond it and consider entire process of its use. Obviously, some
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transactions such as banking or voting are relatively simple and less complicated than
conducting transactions with government in some other online environments such as the
business register. Hence, the complexity and costs of using ID card in online environments
may vary depending on a particular service. The following is a description of simplified
process to illustrate how the ID card can be used. The user starts by inserting the ID-card into
card reader and opening the webpage for transaction such as bank, tax authority or some other
service provider. Then the voter verifies his/her identity using the first four-digit personal
identification number (PIN1) of ID-card. This number is given to user when the card is issued
together with PIN 2 and PUK code. Both PIN codes are used also for all online transactions
with the ID card that require digital signature. After entering the first PIN number the server
checks whether the user is eligible by using the data from the register.
Once the eligibility is verified, the user can fill in data for transaction and can click on
to complete the transaction. This decision has to be confirmed by inserting digital signature
in the form of second five-digit PIN code (PIN 2). Certainly, user may experience difficulties
in this otherwise straightforward process. User have different levels of sophistication in using
internet, they have different computer skill levels, their computers may be configured
differently and they may use software that is not always compatible with the ID card reader.
The practice in Estonia has shown that cheaper ID-card readers may be sometimes quite
unreliable and at least in the early years of experiment it did not work properly with some
browsers (such as Firefox and Google Chrome). When new versions of browsers and
operating systems are released, they may not be always compatible with the ID card software.
Hence, the technology may create additional barrier for using online services for some
individuals rather than to move the barriers. It creates uncertainty as this way of completing
transactions may not always be reliable. The next part discusses the use of ID card and mobile
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ID in the internet voting. Other online identification methods cannot be used in the internet
voting.

5.4 Internet Voting39
Internet voting is the most well-known government initiative to engage public in
democratic process in Estonia. It is also an example of policy entrepreneurship in Estonia.
The internet voting started as an small experiment in the 2005 municipal elections and now
one third of votes are submitted this way. As Estonia is the only country in the world where
citizens have voted online in the municipal, national and European elections, then the internet
voting in Estonia has received a considerable scholarly attention (Alvarez et al., 2009;
Bochsler, 2010). Particularly, the 2007 parliamentary elections have been scrutinized from
various angles. Similarly, this initiative was emphasized by interviews as an unique
phenomena which demonstrates how sophisticated can be the use of internet in Estonia.
Obviously, the internet voting cannot be a major driver of internet adoption. However, it
demonstrates the interaction of institutions and internet at the very core of democracy.
Increasing availability of secure, high speed and good quality internet makes voting online
possible. This leads to the institutional changes, which give an additional reason for the use of
internet. Hence, this section offers an overview of last eight elections, highlights key elements
of voting process and discusses the reasons for internet voting in Estonia.

5.4.1 Ten Years of Internet Voting Experiment
The possibility to vote online was first used in October 2005 when almost two percent
of all voters (Table 5.2), which translates into one percent of the electorate, used this
opportunity in the municipal elections as the following table demonstrates. This experiment

39

An earlier version of this section has been presented in various conferences and published by ACM in the
conference proceedings (Kitsing 2014).
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was followed the parliamentary elections in April 2007 where about 5 percent of casted votes
were submitted online. The European Parliament Elections in 2009 saw close to 15 percent of
votes were submitted online. In the municipal elections in October 2009 almost 16 percent of
the votes were casted online. The parliamentary elections of 2011 achieved a record where
over 24 percent of votes were submitted online. The municipal elections of 2013 saw
somewhat lower turnout of internet voters – slightly over 21 percent. However, the latter
should be compared with the municipal elections where obviously it is the best turnout of
internet voters as well as offline voters among the last three municipal elections. In the 2014
European Parliament and 2015 National Parliament elections one third of all votes were
submitted online. The latter is particularly remarkable as it broke all the previous records 176,491 people participated in the internet voting and overall turnout was 64 percent. This
outcome is higher than in any elections between 2005 and 2015.

Table 5.2: Turnout and Internet Voting in the Estonian Elections (2005-2015).
Type of elections

Date

E-votes Turnout
(% of all (%)
votes)

Municipal elections

October
2005
April 2007
June 2009
October
2009
March 2011
October
2013
May 2014
March 2015

1.8

47.4

E-voting
turnout (%
of all
eligible
voters)
0.9

5.4
14.7
15.7

62
43.9
60.6

3.4
6.5
9.5

24.3
21.2

63.5
58

15.4
12.3

31.3
30.5

36.5
64.2

11.4
19.6

National Parliament
European Parliament
Municipal elections
National Parliament
Municipal elections
European Parliament
National Parliament

Source: Composed by the author on the basis of data from the Estonian Electoral
Commission (2015) and Kitsing (2014).
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The core idea behind the Estonian internet voting system is that the provision of these
online channels for voting removes another barrier by making voting more “convenient”
(Alvarez et al 2009, 502). Proponents of remote electronic voting in Estonia, however, often
extend their argument beyond convenience and insist that this type of voting will increase
turnout in elections. Electronic voting will reduce transaction costs and enhance efficiency in
the voting process. Citizens find it easier to cast their vote and they face lower costs of voting
(Interviews 20).
Of course, benefits of electronic voting such as reduced transaction costs are only one
side of the coin. On the other side, the electronic voting has also potential costs – e.g. reduced
civic engagement, privacy and security concerns. Indeed, these costs are not just technical or
emerge from a particular civic republican and/or communitarian theoretical perspective.
Starting with the consideration of instrumental facts, internet voting reduces some transaction
costs for voting while it does increase some other costs. From a purely practical point of view,
voters do not simply need access to the computer but the use of the national ID card is
required as well. The use of ID card requires a purchase of ID-card reader or a computer with
an ID card reader. Since most people use banking services often, then it has created habit to
make transactions online, which in turn, has made adoption of ID card and internet voting
easier. This allows understanding the role of ID-card in the elections. Naturally, it follows that
one of the main reasons for low participation in online voting in the municipal elections of fall
2005 is simply the fact that the online use of ID card was not wide spread. Many people did
not use ID card for online transactions because they used old identification techniques
(Martens 2010). As the following table 5.3 shows, 61 percent of all internet voters were first
online ID card users in the 2005 elections. In the 2007 elections the first time online users of
ID-card users made up 39 percent. Subsequently, the percentage of first time online ID card
users in the European elections dropped to 19 and in the municipal elections to 18.5.
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Similarly, voters were able to use mobile ID instead of ID card in the last four elections. The
data shows that in 2011 election only 1.9 percent of internet voters used mobile ID while in
2013 the percentage had increased to 8.6 percent. 11 percent of voters used Mobile ID in 2014
and 12 percent did so in 2015.

Table 5.3: Characteristics of internet voting in the Estonian elections (2005-2015).
Type of elections

E-voters
outside of
Estonia (%
of all evoters/numb
er of
countries
N/A
2 / 51

Length
of
internet
voting
(days)

Internet
votes as
share of
all preelection
day votes
(%)
7.2
17.6

Mobile ID
users (% of
all e-voters)

First time
online IDcard users
(%)

Municipal 2005
3
N/A
61
National Parliament
3
N/A
39
2007
European Parliament 3/ 66
7
45.4
N/A
19
2009
Municipal 2009
2.8 / 66
7
44
N/A
18.5
National Parliament 3.9 / 105
7
56.4
1.9
N/A
2011
Municipal 2013
4.2 / 105
7
50.5
8.6
N/A
European Parliament 3.7 / 98
7
59.2
11.0
N/A
2014
National Parliament 5.71/116
7
59.6
12.2
N/A
2015
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of data from the Estonian Electoral Commission
(2015) and Kitsing (2014).
In sum, the role of ID card and mobile ID demonstrate that internet voting is a typical
adoption process as described by Rogers (1995), where early adopters proved ID card as well
as mobile ID a reliable way to submit votes and conduct transactions online. As a result
increasingly higher percentage of voters have started to rely on these methods. It cannot be
argued that internet voting caused people to use more ID cards and this led to wider use of
sophisticated online services, which all contributed to the use of internet. Rather, as
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individuals gained more experience in using internet and ID card online, then they become
more comfortable in voting online as well. But certainly the fact that in the first elections
significant percentage of citizens used their cards first time online also gave some early
adopters more experience and allowed them to experiment with the ID card in online
environments.
Coming back to costs and benefits, it is obvious that the adoption of ID card and its
reader did represent significant costs in the early voting experiments in 2005 and 2007.
However, it does not represent significant costs for the considerable proportion of voters
anymore as they have adopted this technology already as consumers in using internet banking
and other services. Even institutionally, the process has changed. Internet voting is spread
over 7 days since 2009. It used to be three days in 2005 and 2007. If the voter changes its
mind, then there is a possibility of electronic re-vote: e-voters can cast their votes again
electronically and in that case, their previous votes will be deleted. As far as privacy and
security are concerned, then at the vote count, the voter's digital signature is removed. The
members of the National Electoral Committee can together open the anonymous internet
votes and count them.
One way of tackling these challenges is to vote early and not to leave it for the last
minute. If any technical difficulties occur, there is sufficient time to solve these problems or
vote in the traditional way at the ballot box. Table 5.3 shows that in the first two elections the
share of internet votes as a percentage of all pre-election day votes ranged between 7 and 18
percent. At the same time, in the last six elections it ranged between 44 and 60 percent. The 7day internet voting period has it made easier for voters to submit their votes and half of the
voter prefer to do it early rather than on the last day. This is one way for tackling potential
uncertainty which technology may sometimes cause. It also reduces the symbolic importance
of election day and makes voting as a result more transactional.
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Table 5.3 shows also that the percentage of internet votes by Estonians abroad is
miniscule in comparison with votes submitted in Estonia. In 2015 only close to 6 percent of
internet votes were submitted abroad. Over the years only 2-6 percent of internet votes have
been submitted outside of Estonia. Even though, number of countries from where Estonians
submit their voters has increased from 51 in 2007 to 116 in 2015, internet voting is still a
domestic matter as 94 percent of votes are submitted by residents of Estonia.
This fact alone brings attention back to the importance of context for explaining the
nature of internet voting. It seems that this method of voting would serve best the Estonians
outside Estonia and would allow increasing turnout by making voting for them possible.
However, the expat community has not been eager to pick up internet voting and it really
gathers primarily for domestic audience who could without major difficulties vote also in the
traditional voting booth.

5.4.2 Internet Voting and Digital Divide
The qualities of ID card reader, computer hardware and software as well as skill-level
in using these technologies are important factors whether internet voting makes voting more
easier to citizens or not. The role of resources and knowledge, of course, raise the issue of
digital divide and its effects on internet voting in Estonia (Bochsler 2010, 4-6). The digital
divide is when certain social groups have resources, skills and knowledge for utilization of
information and communication technologies while other social groups lack these necessary
preconditions for internet use. A digital divide may exist between countries and regions as
well as within regions, countries, cities, towns and villages (Norris 2001). Thus it relates back
to the very topic of this dissertation on how internet diffuses differently in different countries,
geographic areas and among different social groups. The segments of society with a lower
income, and insufficient computer skills are less likely to cast their votes online than wealthier
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and better educated citizens. Particularly so by considering that a considerable amount of
internet voters are urban and the distance to voting booths is smaller in urban locations than in
the countryside. The votes of residents of two largest cities – Tallinn and Tartu – have
amounted to 40-50 percent of all internet votes in the elections between 2005 and 2015. By
attempting to see the impact of internet voting on educational and economic criteria the
distribution of votes between cities and rural areas can be used as a proxy. More than half of
the votes were submitted in capital city of Tallinn and its surrounding Harju county in 2013,
where the GDP per capita is highest in Estonia and people have the best education. However,
if one considers that 60 per cent of Estonian GDP is generated in this region, then the
distribution of votes does not seem distortive. If the second largest city Tartu and its
surrounding county is added to the picture, then over 60 percent of internet votes were
submitted in the two largest metropolitan areas (Estonian Electoral Commission 2015).
The same pattern has persisted in 2015 when almost 60 percent of internet votes were
submitted in the two largest metropolitan areas. At the same time, voters in quite urbanized
and industrialized but primarily Russian-speaking county of Ida-Virumaa in the north-east
Estonia counted only four percent of internet votes in 2013. The same pattern persisted in
2015. As non-citizen residents can vote in the municipal elections, then this low turnout
cannot be explained by ineligibility. Rather, the internet voting has not been adopted among
Russian speaking population to the extent it has spread among Estonian speakers (Estonian
Electoral Commission 2015).
In addition to geographical distribution, one additional way to measure the impact of
digital divide is to examine the age structure of internet voters. 18-34 year olds made up 43
percent of all internet voters in 2005 and 44 percent in 2007. After that their share has been
dropping and reached 36 percent in 2011. At the same time the share of over 55 year old
voters was 15 percent in 2005 but has increased to 21 percent in 2011. The share of internet
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voters between 35 and 54 has stayed more or less constant in all 10 elections with slightly
more than 40 percent (Estonian Electoral Commission 2015). This does not indicate a
significant divide considering that young are always eager to adopt new technologies while
older generations tend take a more conservative view. The dynamic comparison shows that
the older generation is actually following the young in the adoption process. The data on
distributional impact of internet voting on different sexes is showing the same pattern. In
2005, 54 percent of internet voters were male and 46 percent were female. Their roles had
been reversed by 2011 as 54 percent of internet voters were female and 46 percent were male
(Estonian Electoral Commission 2015).
Additionally, the distributional impact can be analyzed by considering the influence of
internet voting on political parties. Parties representing less fortunate segments of population
were skeptical about the internet voting, while center-right parties were the main champions
of the internet voting initiatives (Drechsler, 2006). However, Alvarez et al (2009) argue that
the results of Estonian internet voting have not introduced socio-economic and political bias
when controlling for other variables (Alvarez et al, 502). Nevertheless, their own data about
the 2007 elections shows that only 9.1 percent of internet voters voted for the Center Party,
which received 26.1 percent of overall votes. The Center Party is a populist, left of center
political party, which represents older, Russian-speaking and economically challenged
segments of Estonian population than other main parties. Naturally, it might be that the
supporters of this party have lower levels of computer skills and this is the reason for lower
share of internet votes. Nevertheless, seeing skills as more important explanatory variable
than socio-economic status is just a restatement of the argument.
It is clear that there is an uneven distribution of internet voting along the party lines
(Table 5.4). For instance, Reform Party received 35 percent of internet votes while its total
score was 28 percent of votes. Similarly, the Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit (IRL) received 27
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percent of internet votes in comparison with 18 percent of total votes. In other words, two
main center-right parties received a total of 63 percent of internet votes while their share of
total votes was 46 percent. Both of these parties were actively pushing for the
implementation of remote electronic voting and the results show clearly they have bigger
share of internet votes than other main parties. Similar pattern has been persistent also in all
other elections between 2005 and 2014 (Estonian Electoral Commission 2015).

Table 5.4: Distribution of internet votes among political parties in the Estonian elections percentage of all internet votes (2005-2014).
Type of
elections/Party
Municipal 2005

Reform

IRL

Center

Greens

9

Social
democrats
10

33

National Parliament
2007
European Parliament
200941
Municipal 2009
National Parliament
2011
Municipal 2013
European Parliament
201442

35

18 +
1040
27

9

13

11

20

17

11

10

3

25
37

23
25

15
10

11
18

2
4

22
32

26
19

9
6

15
15

N/A
N/A

N/A

Source: Composed by the author on the basis of data from the Estonian Electoral
Commission (2015) and Kitsing (2014).
One way how the Center Party has tried to minimize their lower share was by setting
up special internet voting booths in Tallinn, a capital city of Estonia whose municipal
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The IRL was two separate parties in 2005. Isamaliit (IL) got 18 percent of votes and Res Publica (RP) 10
percent of votes. In the next elections both parties had jooned forces and were running as one party - Isamaa ja
Res Publica Liit (IRL).
41

Independent candidate Indrek Tarand received 32 percent of all internet votes. More than any political party
in these elections.
42
Independent candidate Indrek Tarand received 16 percent of all internet votes.
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government they control. Even though such actions were not technically violation of electoral
law as long as it was not done directly by political party but by city government or other
organizations, such booths do raise the question of privacy and introduce additional political
biases into the voting system. Ironically, it turns the whole idea of internet voting on its head
as the process reminds more of traditional voting. Instead voting in their home or office,
people will go to special internet voting booth to cast their vote. Nevertheless, such internet
voting booths may be good at promoting civic engagement and offering an opportunity for
people without home computer to cast their ballot online.
The previous discussion showed that the electorate of center-right parties used more
internet voting than center-left parties. However, the crucial question is whether these gains
came by increasing turnout or simply substituting internet voting for ballot-box. Alvarez et al
(2009) argue on the basis of data from the 2007 parliamentary elections that online voting
mobilized “more casual voters” (Alvarez et al, 502). They found that 11 per cent of online
voters probably would not have or for sure would not have voted without this option (Alvarez
et al 2009, 502). Similarly, Vassil (2007) found that 14 percent of internet voters would not
have voted in the 2007 parliamentary elections by other ways than internet (Vassil 2007, 41).
Both of these studies relied on survey data, which is of limited nature and cannot properly
estimate substitution effects. In a methodologically more sophisticated approach, Bochsler
(2010) estimated the magnitude of substitution effect and found that the internet voting in
2007 elections did not lead to increased turnout, but attracted the same social groups who
usually vote (Bochsler 2010, 18). This is also consistent with more qualitative preliminary
conclusion drawn from the early experiments in the 2005 municipal elections is that it did not
increase participation in the election but was used as an alternative method to cast one’s vote
(Drechsler 2006).
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The internet voting does not necessarily increase participation in the elections. In
democracies, adult citizens can vote but large minorities or even majorities choose not to
exercise this right even if the transaction costs are low. Similarly, internet voting may
decrease transaction costs but does not necessarily increase participation. In many cases, it
may simply serve as a substitute for citizens already actively engaged in political
participation. Nevertheless, the last results of municipal elections were correlated with
increased participation. The turnout is unusually high for a municipal election, which seems to
suggest that internet voting might have contributed for the increased participation. However,
online voters made up almost 15 percent of voters also in the European Parliament elections,
where the turnout was close to 44 percent in 2009 and overall turnout was 37 percent in 2014 .
Of course, there are other factors at play such as economic issues and dissatisfaction with
particular municipal governments in explaining the high turnout. Most importantly, the
elections results are overdetermined and correlations do not imply causation.
My results of analysis of internet voting across several elections in Estonia indicates
that political parties misunderstand the nature of internet voting by thinking it creates winners
and losers. Center Party has been actively campaigning against internet voting but this is
based on misunderstanding. Internet voting does not reduce their total share of votes as it does
not increase turnout. In 2014, the city government of Tallinn, a capital of Estonia,
commissioned a study by American and European internet security experts, who argued that
internet voting is not secure and Estonia should abandon this practice (Springall et al 2014).
Since the city government of Tallinn is controlled by the Center Party, then by the supporters
of internet voting it is seen as a political attempt to delegitimize the internet voting. It can be
argued that the Center Party engages in rational behavior with the objective to abolish internet
voting. The Center Party perceives that internet voting benefits other parties at the expense of
its potential electorate. But their rationality is bounded by asymmetric information. This has
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led them to learn wrong lessons andbelieve something which is not necessarily the case.
However, it can be seen as entrepreneurial discovery process where agents are bounded by
institutional complexity. The Center Party aims at eliminating internet voting because they see
it as threatening their interest and they believe that they lose votes as a result.

5.4.3 Internet Voting and Path-Dependency
Constantly increasing number of Estonians has used opportunities to vote online in the
last ten elections. This follows the logic of diffusion of innovations. Early adopters showed
the way and more and more people follow their lead. The data shows that older people and
more women are using online voting option, which reveals that this method of voting is
becoming more widespread and ordinary voters may simply use it as a substitute for offline
options. This is in line with the data that shows that internet has become a more widely used
among different segments of Estonian society. Internet voting has not been the main cause for
the wider use of internet but it has certainly given at least one additional reason, if not
symbolic reason, for getting online.
The discussion of internet voting has indicated the role played by online identification
methods in encouraging the widespread use of internet and sophisticated online services.
Section 2.6 emphasized that internet is a network good where its use depends on applications
connected to the network. Once Estonian started to use ID card in online banking transactions,
it also made easier for them to use it for internet voting. ID card and internet voting are both
applications which broaden the options for internet users. The internet voting would not have
been possible without the adoption of government issued ID cards by increasingly greater
segments of Estonian society. As the ID card can be used in multiple offline and online
environment, its widespread use in using both online services provided by public and private
sectors has contributed to the internet voting turnout. Internet voting is primarily used by
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residents of Estonia, not by expats and institutional changes to increase voting period from
three to seven days have encouraged adoption of internet voting.
Furthermore, section 2.6 emphasized the importance of path-dependency in
technology diffusion. Network goods are often characterized by path-dependency because of
increasing returns associated with their diffusion. It was not certain in 2002 when ID cards
were introduced that they will be a success. As it was highlighted above there was rivalry
among different players. Similarly it was not certain that internet voting will be a success in
2005 when it was introduced. Similarly, it is not certain whether these technological solutions
are superior to alternative options. However, choices were made within the constraints. As a
result the spread of internet voting is a path-dependent process, where early adoption of online
identification methods for internet banking has contributed to the use of ID cards, which in
turn have made internet voting more widely spread. Obviously, the path-dependence may also
imply that individuals accustomed to traditional methods of voting may be reluctant to adopt
new innovative methods of voting – even if these methods will save their time. Hence, it
seems unrealistic to assume that majority of voters will start voting online soon. Particularly,
as it has been pointed out above that significant segments of society still do not use ID card
online, not to mention Mobile ID. Internet voting is not possible without the use of ID card or
Mobile ID (Mobile ID use requires the existence of ID card).
Nevertheless, path-dependence may also imply that heavy users of sophisticated
online services may find it less costly to use internet voting than offline alternative. Their
previous choices in using internet and online identification methods have given them
experience and trust in such methods, which can be transferred to internet voting. The reasons
for internet voting cannot come from a calculative singular approach, where we assume
perfect rationality and utility maximization. Voters have many different identities and they
have multitude of preferences. Some voters may be encouraged to vote simply because
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remote electronic voting is available. This does not imply that they will vote next time. For
many others the availability of internet voting is not even necessary (not to mention
sufficient) condition for submitting their vote. Hence, we should assume “bounded
rationality” instead of perfect rationality, when approaching theoretically and analyzing
empirically the role of internet voting. Internet voting might be a good substitute for offline
alternatives for some people but certainly not for everybody. It is difficult to see how the
internet voting contributes to increased turnout on the basis of Estonian experience and
inadequate evidence. Hence, the instrumentalist case that making voting convenient will
contribute to increased turnout does not hold on the grounds of instrumentalist logic. As it
was demonstrated above descriptive data does not allow inferring that turnout has increased
because of internet voting. Share of internet voting of total votes has increased but turnout has
fluctuated between 34.5 and 64.2 percent depending on election in the last 10 years.

5.5 Conclusion
Radical change in the rules of the game led to the entrepreneurial discovery process
and emergence of many new agents, such as banks, who became heavy internet users and
promoters of their own interests in Estonia. The positive externalities of private sector internet
use spilled over to other parts of life, including civic engagement. Indeed, the story of internet
banking development suggests that the incentive structures of public and private sector agents
were consistent with each other, and thus led to the use of internet banking technology in
interactive transactions with government as well (such as filing taxes). This mutual reenforcement made it possible to exploit the positive network externalities of the internet yet
further by both private and public sector agents. Users benefited from increasing returns as
more users joined the network. This weakened the position of substitutes (e.g., walking to the
local bank branch office or submitting income tax returns by regular mail) by replacing them
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with the demand for Internet. Most importantly, it was rational for the banks to cooperate
with government because it allows reaping benefits from the Internet as a network good.
Essentially, banks such as Hansapank (it was renamed Swedbank in 2008) became hubs in the
network. Clients are able to access services of government agencies as well as other services
provided by private sector with a few mouse clicks while being logged onto the online
banking environment. Citizens accessing government agencies are directed to the websites of
banks if it was necessary to identify his or her identity. It was rational for government
agencies to rely on this solution and cooperation because it was efficient, secure, simple and
kept costs minimal. It has been rational for the banks to cooperate with government because it
allows reaping benefits from the Internet as a network good.
Even though, the government ID card initiated a change from privately driven online
identification methods to publicly driven methods, it was essential for banks to be part of ID
card project and allow its use instead of creating their own identification system. In this sense,
the behavior of Estonian banks is completely different from many other banks in the world,
who are usually eager to create their own identification systems. The use of game theory can
help to illustrate these fundamental differences. Essentially, Estonian banks play the
coordination game such as the battle of sexes with the government while alternative option is
to play prisoner’s dilemma. In the game of battle of sexes both players are better off
coordinating their activities with each other. Multiple equilibrium are possible – (3, 4) or (4,
3) (Figure 5.6). The outcome depends on the relative bargaining position of different parties.
At the particular juncture from 1996 to 2005, the outcome is closer to the preferred position of
banks rather than that of government (4,3). However, it is still beneficial for them to
cooperate rather than not to cooperate. Banks benefit from the network externalities and
government from the platform to provide services to the citizens. The lack of coordination
and creating incompatible public and private platforms would result much worse outcome for
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both parties (1, 2) or (2, 1) (Figure 5.6). However, the ID card project increases the
bargaining position of government and new equilibria emerges (3,4). Banks gradually start
shifting from their old identification methods to new one.

Private: internet bank
based identification
Public: ID card based
identification

Private: internet
bank based
identification
4, 3

Public: ID card
based
identification
2, 1

1, 2

3,4

Payoffs: (Banks, Government)
Note: 4 is the highest payoff. 1 is the lowest payoff.
Figure 5.6: Coordination game between Estonian government and banks .

It is still beneficial for them to cooperate with government because alternative option
of setting up own identification methods which are incompatible would lead to worse payoffs.
Hence, the strategies of government and banks have been incentive-compatible in the time
period of 1996-2013. In the terms of game theory, government and banks could have played
the cooperation game of prisoner’s dilemma during the throughout the same time period. In
ideal world, they could reach optimal outcome in terms of equilibrium (3,3) but instead they
play repeated game of one-shot prisoner’s dilemma with suboptimal Nash equilibrium (2,2)
(Figure 5.7).
Cooperate
Cooperate
Defect

Defect

3, 3

4, 1

1, 4

2,2

Payoffs: (Banks, Government)
Figure 5.7: Cooperation game: prisoner’s dilemma between government and banks.
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Win-lose payoffs in the scale of (1,4) or (4,1) are not characteristic to this game
(Figure 5.7) because rational decision based on assumption that other side acts rationally as
well. Banks would see cooperation on government driven solution as a loss and government
would see cooperation on bank driven solution as a loss.
Of course, this is a stylized narrative based on analogies of two games. It is also based
on perception of players as identified through interviews rather than the calculations of actual
payoffs. In this sense, it serves illustrative purposes in order to highlight key points. Reality is
certainly much more complex and interests of all banks and government agencies are not
perfectly aligned as the chapter on Estonia and previously Kitsing (2011) has highlighted that
different government agencies have used the possibilities of online identification platforms by
banks in a diverse way.
The empirical analysis in Chapter Four followed the discussion of perspectives in
section 2.1 which emphasized the importance of formal institutions, particularly changes in
telecom policy as well as income and skills. From the comparative analysis it emerged that
competition and openness in telecom sector reduces supply side constraints for internet
diffusion. This section brought in additional factors emphasizing the process of
entrepreneurial discovery in banking and in certain agencies of Estonian public sector, which
has been crucial for encouraging the use of internet for a variety of purposes.
My analysis of the development of internet banking in Estonia demonstrates that
changes in the formal rules provided incentives for self-interested agents to find innovative
solutions through the process of entrepreneurial discovery. Leading banks started to offer
online banking in 2000 and cooperate with government and telecom companies to launch ID
card project in 2002. This made internet voting possible in 2005. These new innovations of
online identification and internet voting encouraged internet use in Estonia. The government’s
contribution to Internet diffusion was primarily in the form of rule-making and policy
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entrepreneurship. Government enabled entrepreneurs in private and public sector to take
initiative. Most outstanding example of this policy entrepreneurship is internet voting, which
has been unique not only in the European context but also in the world because it is used in
local, national and European elections and it relies on the use of ID card. The emergence of
internet voting, for instance, is reaction to increasing use of internet in society rather than
factor that led to increased use. Hence, changing the specific rules governing electoral process
can be seen more in terms of political propaganda to show the enthusiasm of Estonian
government about internet. Since people have voted in the elections eight times between 2005
and 2015, it can hardly count as a reason to get internet access. Nevertheless, it does
contribute to sophistication of internet use. Open and liberal institutional framework which
has encouraged the entrepreneurial discovery process has allowed both private and public
sector to offer more sophisticated services to the public. This has contributed to heavier use of
internet on micro level and to the internet diffusion macro level.
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CHAPTER 6
INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY AND POLICY HETEORGENEITY

6.1 Introduction
The Chapter Five discussed experimentation in Estonia from 1991 to present with
different ICT services in both private and public sectors. It emphasized the importance of
entrepreneurial discovery process in both public and private sectors and path-dependency in
delivering positive results. As all of these different projects such as internet banking, ID card
and Skype were surrounded by uncertainty in their early stages of development, when nobody
knew whether they will be widely adopted. However, in order to offer more balanced
assessment this chapter aims to offer heterogeneous cases in addition to positive cases in the
Chapter Five. In doing so it employs concepts of institutional complexity and policy
heterogeneity. The section 2.2 draw attention to the institutional complexity, which by
creating uncertainty may constrain entrepreneurial discovery process. If the Estonian Tax
Authority would have faced complex legal requirements in both national and European level
in 2000, then introduction of online tax services would have been difficult if not impossible.
Also, if they would have faced hostile public opinion primarily focusing on security concerns
of online tax declaration, then this project would not have been as successful as it is seen now.
Let me re-call that institutional complexity refers to the interactions of formal such as
government regulations and informal institutions such as habits and attitudes of people as well
as interactions of formal institutions on different levels of government regulations such as
local, national and European levels. This implies that broad rules governing macroeconomic
environment may conflict with regulations on micro level. There is considerable literature on
institutional complexity and one way to define it is “incompatible prescriptions from multiple
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institutional logics” (Greenwood, Raynard et al. 2011, 317). Different institutions, their
interactions, conflicts and institutional logics create institutional complexity.
Policy heterogeneity is closely linked with institutional complexity because
institutional complexity reduces certainty and means ambiguity in rules governing our daily
interactions. Policy making depends on both formal and informal rules. Broadly policy
heterogeneity can be seen that public policies often have heterogeneous context and design.
Starting with formal aspects, Knoepfel et al (2011) argue that if implementation of public
policy falls under several ministries, or several departments within one ministry, then policy
context is heterogeneous. If policy is implemented by one unit at the same ministry, then it is
homogeneous. They give defense policy as an example of homogeneous administrative
context while policies dealing with natural disasters are heterogeneous (Knoepfel et al 2011,
186-187). For instance, introduction of online tax services was a project of one agency in
Estonia. There was relatively little interaction with other agencies and the Tax Authority was
able to rely on already on existing solution provided by internet banking as documented in
Chapter 5. At the same time, the introduction of ID cards was considerably more
heterogeneous policy-making case involving legislative, executive branches of government,
several ministries within executive branch as well as private sector agents such as leading
retail banks and telecom companies (Martens 2010).
Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine completely homogeneous policy context.
Hence, it is a question of degree of heterogeneity and homogeneity. Most importantly, ICT
policies have high degree of heterogeneity by administrative context as well as design. ICT is
by nature horizontal dependent on physical infrastructure as well as humans skills in different
administrative units and in society as well. For instance, the successful implementation of
online tax declaration depends on existing infrastructure, available identification methods and
many other factors, which are not directly under control of Tax Authority. Knoepfel et al
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(2011) approach seems also narrow considering nature of public policy implementation in
general and ICT policies in particular. Even if policy context and design is homogeneous,
then the impact of public policies can be heterogeneous. This may stem from unintended
consequences, interactions of government regulations with informal rules as discussed under
institutional complexity. In international economics policy heterogeneity is used to highlight
regulatory differences between countries (Kox and Lejour 2005). However, there might be
also regulatory differences within countries or among the group of countries such as EU as
discussed in section 2.8, which formally have adopted same telecom regulations. It is a fact of
life that regulations may conflict with each other and may be implemented differently by
policymakers. True nature of policy heterogeneity is captured by Room (2011) who combines
theories on complex adaptive systems, institutional analysis and policy analysis in his book
“Complexity, Institutions and Public Policy”. He writes:
“The real world of policy-making may be so turbulent that there are few familiar
patterns by reference to the regularities of the past, even fewer plausible ‘mental
models’ or conjectures for the future. Public policy-makers may be able to reduce this
uncertainty by actively shaping the future, rather than just attempting to predict it;
however, even they are limited in the capacity and knowledge of which they dispose.”
(Room 2011, 244).
Room’s emphasis on limits of knowledge of policy-makers echoes Hayek’s
understanding of limits of knowledge in centralized decision-making as it is discussed in the
Section 2.8 of Chapter Two. According to Hayek (1945) considerable amount of useful
knowledge is decentralized and tacit which implies it that it is difficult to centralize it without
collected knowledge becoming useless. Room (2011) is somewhat more optimistic than
Hayek about policy-makers abilities to shape the future and reduce some uncertainties but,
nevertheless, their limits must be recognized. The concept of policy heterogeneity can be also
seen in the context of smart specialization literature as discussed in the Section 2.4, which
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argued that countries follow different development trajectories. This means that same or
similar policies in different context may yield heterogeneous policy outcomes.
This chapter will discuss the following cases to illustrate institutional complexity and
policy heterogeneity. First, the ICT-specific policy making will be discussed in general.
Second, it will be followed by analysis on EU-wide network neutrality legislation and
Estonian policy contributions. As Chapter Four identified rule-making concerning telecom
liberalization as a crucial factor in Estonia, then it will be important to see how Estonian
public policy makers have been able to tackle more complex policy challenges. Third,
government intervention in venture capital market with the aim of supporting ICT companies
will be discussed. All of these cases are used to demonstrate policy heterogeneity and explore
how institutional complexity may lead to heterogeneous outcomes. These cases are offered in
order to balance the understanding that the Estonian government has pursued homogeneous
and centralized public policy to promote ICTs and their use in all segments of society.

6.2 Innovation, ICT and Policy-Making in Estonia
Let me start this section by recalling a quote from Paul Pierson’s book: “Every step
and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed enlightened ages, are made
with equal blindness to the future ; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are,
indeed, the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design.” (Pierson
2004, 102). Chapters Four and Five argued that Estonia is quite different – at least in
comparison with Slovenia and some other countries in the Central Eastern Europe. However,
it is not different because Estonian policy-makers had particularly good vision and did not
stumble upon establishments. Here as everywhere out there outcomes are result of human
action but not human design. As argued in Chapter Two, the galvanizing changes are often
spontaneous.
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However, a posteriori rational reasoning that the good outcomes in internet diffusion
and related technologies were result of some grand master plan is quite widespread in policy
circles. If politicians do it, it is understandable because it is their job often to turn complexity
into simplicity, research into soundbites, uncertainty into certainty and nonlinearity into
linearity. Similarly, civil servants may have incentives to overemphasize their contributions
and impact of public policies. Furthermore, simplified accounts of ICT developments and
policies may simply be used as marketing tool in targeting international audiences with
limited attention span. For instance, Estonian government’s marketing website www.eestonia.com states bluntly at the front page: “”e-Estonia” is a term that is commonly used to
describe Estonia’s emergence as one of the most advanced e-societies in the world – an
incredible success story that grew out of a partnership between a forward-thinking
government, a proactive ICT sector and switched on, tech savvy population” (e-Estonia
2015).active I
The website goes further and claims that “interaction among government agencies,
and between the government and citizens, has been completely transformed in e-Estonia,
quickly making bureaucracy a thing of the past and making the running of all levels of
government more efficient than ever before” (e-Estonia 2015). Even if this is understandably
a marketing text, these are bold claims about complete transformation of citizen-government
interaction, disappearance of bureaucracy and efficiency. The Chapter Two emphasized that
transformational role of technology does not come without any costs and government ICT
projects do fail. The discussion of institutional complexity and policy heterogeneity in the
beginning of this Chapter should also remind us the trade-offs. As Room (2011) reminds us
“the challenge of ensuring both security and transparent governance for these new
institutional forms” is one key area of focus for scholarship in this field. In this context, these
claims are particularly bold. Estonia claimed to have solved the challenges with gusto, while
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leading experts and academics still spend sleepless nights thinking about them. Even if seen
as a pure marketing text, it should avoid overselling and overpromising establishments that
are out of government control.
Academic research tends to be more balanced but even there similar notions can be
found (Ernsdorff and Berbec 2007). They write the following about Estonia:
„…it is setting an example in terms of e-democracy throughout the European Union,
being the first country in the world to enable all its citizens to vote over the Internet in
political elections. But it was not just the EU membership that expanded the use of
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in Estonian society; it was
mainly the strategic thinking within the government to implement e-democracy, good
attention to detail and a positive attitude towards ICT policy, innovative thinking and
the development of a legal framework, and the economic growth and the
macroeconomic stability of the country. The progress made by Estonia in the field of
information technology has led to the development of some of the most dynamic ICT
companies in the world, placing Estonia on the world map with three major
technological innovations: Kazaa (software that allows file sharing), Skype (Internetbased free phone service) and Hotmail (free web-based e-mail) – all three originating
from Estonia.“ (Ernsdorff and Berbec 2007, 171)

Chapter Five already pointed out that the example of Hotmail is a mistake or
simplistic interpretation of some Estonian government marketing text, which sometimes used
Hotmail as an example of company funded by Steve Jurvetson, an American-Estonian venture
capitalist in Silicon Valley. Most importantly, such accounts fail to account for institutional
complexity and policy heterogeneity. If the EU membership is an important variable, then
diverse outcomes in internet diffusion among different EU members cannot be explained.
Ernsdorff and Berbec (2007). It also fails to distinguish between private and public sector
projects. Often the success of Skype is given as an example of successful ICT policy in
Estonia or even a reason to increase government support for ICT sector. But as was discussed
in previous chapter Skype was founded by Swedish and Estonian programmers who were
fugitive from the US justice system for a while because of their previous project Kazaa
allegedly infringed the copyrights of Hollywood music industry. Estonian government did not
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give any support for the project. Once Skype had become a success story politicians started to
exploit its success.
Most importantly, such mischaracterizations tend to rely on the following three
misunderstandings. First, Estonia is particularly innovative country. Second, ICT sector plays
a large role in the Estonian economy and politics. Third, Estonian success in ICT is result of
well-coordinated public policy which in centralized top-down fashion has turned the country
to “e-Estonia”. The latter claim can be found in simplified accounts written by international
experts and scholars (Dutta 2006; Ernsdorff and Berbec 2007). Nevertheless, Estonian own
policy-makers avoid emphasizing centralization and bring attention to the benefits of
decentralization. Even Estonian government’s marketing website states the following:
“The e-Estonia digital society is made possible largely due to its infrastructure. Instead
of developing a single, all-encompassing central system, Estonia created an open,
decentralized system that links together various services and databases. The flexibility
provided by this open set-up has allowed new components of the digital society to be
developed and added through the years. It’s that power to expand that has allowed
Estonia to grow into one of Europe’s success stories of the last decade.” (e-Estonia
2015)

If all or some of these claims were true, then obviously internet would be widely
diffused. Simplified analytical accounts of internet developments are based on understanding
of this stylized Estonian model can somehow be transferred to other countries. Estonian
policy entrepreneurs want outside world to believe that Estonia is a great success story in the
field of ICT, and naturally, they are interested in exporting some of the Estonian IT solutions
such as X-Road and internet voting to other countries. The new example of this marketing
strategy is Estonian e-Residence Program, which aims to make Estonian ID Card and online
services accessible with the card such as company registration and banking available to 10
million international residents (e-Estonia 2015). US President Barack Obama was one of the
first foreign dignitaries to receive Estonian ID card when he visited Estonia in 2014. It cannot
be confirmed whether he has used Estonian ID card or not in online environments. However,
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he was quite convinced of achievements in the Estonian ICT sector and decided to dedicate a
paragraph to it in a speech, which primarily focused on the security situation. Obama said the
following about ICT development in Estonia in a speech in Tallinn on September 3, 2014:
„ Look at the evidence. Here in Estonia, we see the success of free markets,
integration with Europe, taking on tough reforms. You’ve become one of the most
wired countries on Earth, a global leader in e-government and high-tech start-ups. The
entrepreneurial spirit of the Estonian people has been unleashed. And your
innovations, like Skype, are transforming the world.” (Hanrahan 2014)
During the press conference on September 3, 2014, Obama went further and said that “I
should have called the Estonians when we were setting up our healthcare website.” He
pointed out that “With their digital IDs, Estonians can use their smartphones to get just about
anything done online — from their children’s grades to their health records” (Hattem 2014).
This actually is an overstatement and quite ironic because of delivery of Estonian healthcare
records online can be hardly described as a success. The Estonian State Audit Office carried
out analysis of electronic health initiatives in 2014 which concluded that most projects had
failed. Government has spent five times more funds on these health initiatives than initially
budgeted. The result is digital prescription, while all other components of electronic health
services such as digital patient history, digital pictures and other services which would
eliminate repetitive data collection and would make data available for all doctors
electronically have failed (Riigikontroll 2014). Reforming health care does not require only
technological solutions but requires changes in the institutions. Obviously, the process of
entrepreneurial discovery has not been able to deal with institutional complexity of health care
information systems and it has resulted in policy failure. This experience, of course, does not
make Estonia unique as the world is littered with policy failures in this field as health care
information systems have many problems everywhere. The next section will tackle the role of
innovation in Estonia. This is followed by discussion of ICT sector in the Estonian economy
and politics. The third issue concerning (de)centralization of decision-making will be
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discussed last and has been already covered to some extent in Chapter 5 concerning online tax
services and X-Road infrastructure.
6.2.1 Estonia as an Average Innovator
Each year European Union tries to measure innovation among its member states with
the European Innovation Scoreboard. The scoreboard is a result of EU attempts to develop
indicators for measuring “knowledge economy” (Room 2011, 271). EU’s Lisbon agenda
established a new process of “soft” governance, which extends beyond policy areas with a
clear EU mandate. One method for such governance is constant benchmarking. This seems
rather crude and simplistic once institutional complexity and policy heterogeneity but at least
policy-makers in Estonia do pay attention to the European Innovation Scoreboard (personal
observation, Interviews). The scoreboard uses a large number of indicators such as R&D
activity, number of science graduates, patents, weight of high tech industries, innovation by
Small and Medium Size enterprises and others. The detailed methodology is described in the
scoreboard (European Commission 2015, 79-90). As the following Table 6.1 demonstrates
Estonia is slightly above the EU average, Slovenia and other CEE countries in innovation in
2009 but still has a significant room for advancement. It cannot be concluded that Estonia is
particularly innovative in comparison with all other EU countries. However, it was more
innovative than Central and Eastern European member states in 2009. However, if we look at
more recent data in 2015, then Estonia has actually fallen in the ranking below the EU
average and Slovenia is slightly more innovative than Estonia as shown in the Table 6.1
above Estonia is not anymore among innovation followers but classified as a moderate
innovator while Slovenia is still classified as innovation follower. In other words, Estonia’s
performance in innovation has got worse between 2009 and 2015.
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Table 6.1: Position of Estonia and Slovenia in European Innovation Scoreboard.
Indicator/Country
Estonia
Slovenia
Position from highest to
12/Above/Innovation
14/Below/Innovation
lowest/Below or above EU
follower
follower
average /Classification in
200943
Position from highest to
13/Below/ Moderate
12/Below/ Innovation
lowest/Below or above EU
innovator
follower
average/Classification in
2015
Source: Author on the basis of data from European Commission (2009; 2015)
Estonia scores highly on indicators of knowledge-based innovation such as non-R&D
innovation spending by firms. However, it does not score well in knowledge creation as
measured through patents and R&D spending (European Commission 2015). This drop in
ranking happened in spite of the fact that total expenditure and private sector expenditure on
research and development (R&D) had been increasing until 2012. As the following Figure 6.1
demonstrates, total R&D expenditure was around 0.6 percent as a percentage of GDP in 1998
but it increased to more than 2 percent in 2012 but declined to 1.7 percent in 2013. The main
reason for increase is expenditure by private sector on R&D. This implies that public sector
expenditure has not increased in relative terms in this time period. Hence, it challenges the
notion that there has been a coordinated government intervention, which has made Estonia
innovative over time. It also challenges the idea that R&D spending can rely only on private
sector because as the Figure 6.1 shows this implies also volatility in the spending which
makes it difficult to make investments in the long-term and risky projects with potential
positive externalities. Private sector has incentives to underinvest in R&D because they
cannot capture the positive externalities of innovation. However, it must be noted that rapid
increase in private sector R&D in 2011 in comparison is partially caused by investments of
state owned energy company. This creates conceptual challenges in distinguishing between

43

Countries are classified int four categories: 1) Innovation leaders, 2) Innovation followers, 3) Moderate
innovators and 4) Modest innovators
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public and private spending as some private spending as classified by Statistics Estonia is
actually public. Figure 6.1 shows also a drop in total and private sector R&D spending in
2012 as well in 2013 in comparison with 2011 which is partially caused by investment of state
energy company in 2011.

Nevertheless, the key trend remains the same. In 1998 private

sector spent almost nothing on R&D and gradually it has become a bigger spender than the
public sector.

2,6%
2,1%
1,6%
1,1%
0,6%
0,1%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Total R&D, % of GDP

Private sector R&D, % of GDP

Figure 6.1: Research and development expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Estonia from
1998 to 2013 adopted from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (2015) on
the basis of data from Statistics Estonia (2015)

To conclude, Estonia is about average in innovation performance in the EU context. In
recent years, its performance has actually got worse as the R&D spending as a percentage of
GDP has declined and Estonia’s ranking in the EU innovation scoreboard has dropped. This
brief overview at least partially challenged the myth that Estonia is particularly innovative
country. However, it may be that these more general innovation trends are not representative
of Estonia’s innovation in the fields of internet and ICTs. Hence, the next section will study
innovation in ICT sector.
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6.2.2 Innovation in ICT Sector
Obviously, the EU innovation scoreboard and R&D expenditure as a percentage of
GDP are imperfect measures to understand innovation. They provide abstract overview but
lack details. Academic criticism of the innovation scoreboard has pointed out the some data
on innovation performance is based on self-reporting which reduces measurement validity.
Even more importantly, the scoreboard oversimplifies innovation which is “a complex
process involving interactions at the level of enterprise between technological investment,
organizational change, entrepreneurship and workforce development” (Room 2011, 275).
Therefore, the innovation in the Estonian ICT sector may require more detailed attention.

Research and
development
18%

Manufacture of
Manufacture of chemical products
1%
electronical and
electric equipment
Financial
3%
Manufacture of
intermediation
vehicles
8%
1%
Electricity
, water
Domestic trade supply
3%
1%

Information and
communication
29%

Others (incl. oil
production)
36%

Figure 6.2: Intramural R&D expenditures of business sector by economic activity adopted
from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (2015) on the basis of data from
Statistics Estonia (2015).
Private sector R&D spending on ICT as a share of total spending has actually
increased in the recent years. In 2011, ICT sector accounted for almost 18 percent of private
sector R&D spending (including both software development and hardware such as
manufacturing electronics). Figure 6.2 shows that by 2013, the share is at 32 percent where
manufacturing of electronics is 3 percent and information and communication technologies 29
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percent. However, the change in share is partially caused by decrease in R&D on oil
production from shale oil, which also influenced total private sector R&D spending after 2011
as I discussed above.
However, a look at spending on R&D is still too general to understand and compare
ICT sector innovation. Hence, even more detailed analysis is needed. The Eurostat conducts
regular surveys on innovation called Community Innovation Survey (CIS) which serves as
one input to the innovation scoreboard. However, since data collected is not fully utilized in
the scoreboard, it also allows taking a more detailed look into innovation in specific sectors.
Table 6.2 partially relies on CIS but also on data available from Statistics Estonia and
Estonian Business Registry to compare ICT sector and subsectors with other important sectors
in the Estonian economy. It uses NACE two-digit codes to classify these sectors. It looks at
level of innovation as a reflection in the value-added per employee (more innovative firms
can pay higher salaries and have higher profits per employee) and R&D spending by the firm.
It also considers the concentration ratio of firms. Sectors with high concentration ratio have
smaller number of firms and hence the number of innovative firms must be compared among
sectors with similar concentration ratios. The most straightforward sector that falls under ICT
is programming. Value-added in programming 30,000 euros per employee annually is higher
than Estonia average which is slightly over 20,000 euros.
However, logistics with similarly low concentration ratio of firms has value-added per
employee at 44 000 euros and 78 innovative companies while programming has 72. Wood
production with similarly low market concentration ratio had 145 innovative companies.
However, logistics and wood production had non-existent R&D expenditure, but of course, it
does not mean that companies in these sectors do not innovate. Their innovation is practicebased rather than science-based.
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Another ICT subsector, telecommunications, has similar market concentration ratio
with chemical production, transport equipment, vehicles and electrical equipment ranging
between 50-76 percent but the number of innovative firms is in telecom sector is 20 while in
electrical equipment it is 27 and in chemical products it is 20 as well.

Table 6.2: Value-added per employee, number of innovative firms, research and development
expenditure and 4-firm market concentration ratio in selected sectors.
Valueadded per
employee
in
thousands
of euros
(2013)

Number of
innovative
firms in
sector (2012)

Total R&D
expenditure by
firms in sector
in thousands of
euros.

Market
concentration
ratio – share of
4 largest firms
in total sector
turnover (%).

Production of
26,5
27
1,7
90,9
computers and
electronics
Programming
30,3
72
23,4
15,9
Production of
24,4
7
0,0
70,5
transport
equipment
Production of
28,0
27
1,2
63,9
electrical
equipment
Logistics
44,1
78
0,0
14,2
Production of
20,8
145
0,2
22,7
wood products
Production of
29,0
20
1,6
52,4
chemicals and
chemical
products
Telecommu36,2
20
0,0
69,3
nication
Production of
22,8
15
0,8
76,2
motor vehicles
Information
17,9
17
8,5
38,3
services
Sources: Compiled by Author on the basis of Community Innovation Survey (2014), Statistics
Estonia (2015) and Estonian Business Registry (2015).
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Hence, telecom sector does not stand out as particularly innovative – even though its
value-added is considerably higher than sectors mentioned above and higher than the Estonian
average. Telecommunication does not have any R&D expenditure, while this is the case with
chemical products.
If very loose definition of ICT can be applied, then production of computers and
electronics as well as information services do not stand out by a large number of innovative
firms. However, they have somewhat higher R&D expenditures than most other sectors but
not high value-added per employee. In sum, it is not possible to conclude that ICT firms in
Estonia are particularly innovative when compared with other sectors.
The role of ICT firms can also be measured by looking at the share high tech exports
of total exports of Estonia. Figure 6.3 compares high tech exports in Estonia with the Central
and Eastern European countries and with the EU average. Estonian high tech exports account
for 16.3 percent of total exports while the EU average is 15.6 percent in 2014. In other words,
Estonian performance is about the EU average. At the same time Estonia also has higher share
of high tech exports than any other Central and Eastern European country. For instance,
Slovenia’s high tech exports are 5.3 percent of total exports in 2014. Only Hungary and the
Czech Republic come close to Estonia with respective shares of 14.4 and 15.3 percent in
2014. Even more remarkable is the dynamic performance. The share of Estonian high-tech
exports used to be 7.8 percent in 2007 while the EU average was roughly the same and
Hungary’s share exceeded 20 percent. Since 2010 Estonia has been catching up and going
ahead of other countries. However, this outcome is explained by a single decision. Ericsson
decided to open manufacturing plant in Estonia to produce RBS family mobile network
stations. Since electronics is classified as high tech in Eurostat manuals, then this single
decision impacted also macro level data. Ericsson share of total Estonian exports exceeds 10
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percent as the Tallinn factory produces equipment for a half of the world.44 Obviously, if ICT
would be defined very loosely and production of electronics would be included in the ICT,
then the importance of ICT would be quite significant for the Estonian economy. However,
this would be very loose definition.

Figure 6.3: High tech exports as a percentage of total exports in the European Union and
selected Central and Eastern European countries from 2007 to 2014 on the basis of Eurostat
(2015).

If ICT sector is defined more narrowly, the role of ICT sector as such is not as crucial
for the Estonian economy as some accounts suggest. This definition would be more
appropriate because exaggerated claims are not usually made about electronics manufacturing
by large multinationals but about software development and start-up companies. Computer
services account for 1.3 percent of total Estonian exports (including both service and product
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Obviously, Statistics Estonia does not reveal data about single company. The calculation is made by the author
on the basis of Business Registry (2015) data on Ericsson’s revenues and Statistics Estonia (2015) data on the
total value of Estonian exports.
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exports) and for 4.3 percent of Estonian services exports in the first 9 months of 2014
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications 2015).
This section demonstrated that Estonian ICT sector is not particularly innovative when
compared with other key sectors of Estonian economy. Electronics manufacturing plays a
considerable role in the Estonian exports, while software does not. Certainly, there are some
innovative companies in ICT sector but their connection to real economy is not strong.
Indeed, one way to read Figure 6.5 83.7 percent of Estonian exports of total exports are not
high tech.
Actually, some representatives of more traditional ICT companies told in the
interviews that a few start-up companies receive considerable attention in Estonia while
sector-wide problems are left unsolved. For instance, ICT related research at the universities
often has little relevance for industry. Labor market for ICT workers is tight and attraction of
new companies through government sponsored marketing campaigns makes it even tighter.
At the same time, government strict immigration policy does not allow to recruit necessary
number of new workers from outside of the EU (Interviews 30). At the same time, utilization
of ICT in manufacturing sector has been low as well. At the same time, manufacturing sector
is a real engine of Estonian exports and economy. Since innovation in ICT depends on the
skills of workers, then the next section will tackle some of these issues more closely.

6.2.3 Labor Market Constraints and ICT Skills
Chapter Two emphasized that supply-side constraints matter more for internet
diffusion than demand side constraints. This is so because demand for internet and related
technologies is derived demand. There are many substitutes available. Chapter Five discussed
Skype and showed that one important factor that constrained the growth of company in
Estonia is a tight labor market where demand for professionals with good ICT skills exceeds
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supply in Estonia. In other words, labor market and shortage of ICT professionals represents a
serious supply side constraint in Estonia. It does not just affect ICT sector. If manufacturing
sector or public sector would want to higher new ICT professionals, then they have to face the
same issue. As a supply side constraint it limits internet diffusion in macro level as well as in
specific sectors. It is also a case where demands of powerful agents have not been able to
reduce institutional complexity and led to suboptimal policy outcomes. Hence, the mismatch
between supply and demand for ICT professionals in the labor market is tackled in this
chapter as a case to show that Estonian policy has not as homogeneous and innovative as it is
often perceived. This issue was brought up in six interviews with government officials and
representatives of ICT sectors (Interviews 19-21 and 23-24, 30). The discussion below is a
summary of these interviews.
Let me recall that Chapter Four did not show that lack of ICT skills was an issue
among general population when Estonia is compared with Slovenia. At least it is not a
variable that explains a difference between outcomes in the internet diffusion in two
countries. Chapter Five discussed sophisticated services such as internet banking. Since the
internet banking required increasingly sophisticated skills among different population
segments, it also created broader, more enlightened self-interest among private sector agents
and a path through which development of ICT education progressed. Banks together with ICT
companies and government became also active promoter of ICT education and set-up specific
foundations to carry out the projects. Hence, the creation of semi-public goods in the form of
online identification methods led to need to create more semi-public goods in the form of ICT
training and education in Estonia. Obviously, improvement of ICT skills benefited the wider
diffusion of internet among different population segments as these path dependent activities
were deployed.
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However, ICT skills is not just about the skills among general public. General
perception around in Estonia and in the world in crucial places such as Silicon Valley is that
Estonian ICT professionals have excellent skills. Skype was founded by four Estonian
programmers and two entrepreneurs from Nordic countries in Estonia. As Chapter Five
pointed out Skype still has a significant presence in Estonia which implies that skilled ICT
professionals are represented in a broader population than only among Skype six founders.
Nevertheless, interviews with leading Estonian ICT companies clearly reveal there are two
major challenges Estonia is faced with in the context of ICT skills: first, shortage of ICT
specialists and, second, quality of ICT education in universities. Companies point out that
Estonia needs to train thousands more IT specialists which is a significant increase because
broadly the sector employees about 20,000 people in Estonia, including all employees, not
just ICT professionals. Even companies such as Skype employ only 400 people in Estonia
while majority of their employees are located outside. Most of hiring by Skype also takes
place outside of Estonia and company has not expanded its staff in Estonia for years was
articulated in Chapter Five.
Hence, the ICT sector has been actively promoting in the last decade ICT education
and loosening of immigration restrictions on countries outside the European Union (within
the EU there is a free movement of people). One entrepreneur even speaks of a need for
Estonia to become like Singapore which would mean bringing in more ICT professionals
from other countries. Both campaigns have not been very fruitful as the students consider IT
somewhat boring and prefer to focus on social sciences. The attitudes of general population
and population are not hospitable towards loosening the immigration restrictions because of
concerns about the survival of Estonian nation and its culture (Appendix 1, Interviews 23-24,
30).

215

Interviews also reveal that government agencies react differently to the industry
demands. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications pushes for changes in
immigration system while the Ministry of Interior is reluctant because of security
consideration. Government officials are on defensive and through interviews tell that for
popularization of ICT education the following steps have been taken: The number of IT
students both in state-funded and private higher education institutions has been considerably
increased. In addition, to increase the popularity of sciences among the young, the
Association of Estonian IT and Telecommunications Companies (ITL) and the Ministry of
Education and Research have launched a program for the popularization of sciences. They
also mention that to boost interest in technology, general education system needs to be
modernized as well.
Officials also point out that in order to tackle the challenge of both the quality of ICT
education and the limited number of IT specialists, an an international IT Academy was
launched in Estonia. The IT Academy, was launched in cooperation with telecom and ICT
businesses, government and two main and largest public universities University of Tartu and
Tallinn University of Techonology in 2012. In essence, it is a program for the engagement of
best Estonian and foreign lecturers and students in learning process in ICT areas. Thus its not
a new university but a program of collaboration among various public and private institutions
for IT education. Its work will be based primarily on the most competitive existing IT
curricula in Estonian universities. The academy is managed by the Estonian Information
Technology Foundation – a non-profit organisation founded by the Estonian Government,
Tartu University, Tallinn Technical University, Estonian Telecom company and the
Association of Estonian Information Technology and Telecommunications Companies.
Again, this is an example of public-private partnership on how the development of ICT skills
is being tackled. However, it started quite recently as a reaction to the tight supply of skilled
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professionals in the labor market. Clearly, such program is not sufficient for solving labor
market issues.
Government officials also point out that with the inflow of EU structural funds started
in 2004, there are also initiatives aimed at increasing professional ICT skills managed through
Enterprise Estonia, a government agency distributing business support grants. The program
called “Involvement of highly-qualified staff” aims to facilitate the mobility of highly
qualified people, including those in the ICT sector (Interviews 19-21). The program enables to
involve R&D workers, engineers, designers, innovation managers or international marketing
managers to carry out innovation projects helping to create new value for companies. The
involvement of highly qualified competence can be used for product development, preparing
the entering or enlargement to foreign markets, designing new business models. Eligible
costs under the mobility program are the salary costs and costs that are related to using
recruitment agency services. The support rate of these costs is maximum of 50 percent. The
maximum project support period is 3 years (Interviews 19-21).
Government officials also say that within the Enterprise Estonia’s Knowledge and
Skills Development Support scheme companies can apply for a grant to upgrade the
knowledge and skills of their workers on work-related topics and to bring new knowledge into
the enterprise (Interviews 19-21). The grant can be used for trainings, to involve a consultant
outside of the company to come and help to improve the performance of the company, to do
practical training in another company or to pass an qualification exam or to apply for a
qualification standard.
Ironically, availability of EU funds and ICT savvy nature of Estonian public sector did
not reach labor markets services for many years. Earlier research on Estonian E-Government
has indicated that the labor market services do not use the basic potential offered by ICT
(Kitsing 2011). However, more recent interviews revealed that the years 2010-2011 have
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seen rapid developments in the field labor market and unemployment services (Interview 1920). The labor market information system EMPIS of the Estonian Unemployment Insurance
Fund that earlier provided some simpler electronic employment related services, has been
considerably developed and new modules have been added to it. Government officials pointed
out in the interviews that a module for employment mediation allows to automatically match
the existing job offers and the unemployed and sends information on suitable openings to the
unemployed person’s mailbox. A self-service environment has been created for job-seekers.
The self-service area enables job-seekers to browse job offers, create a CV, apply for jobs,
view the applications they have submitted to the Unemployment Insurance Fund and the
corresponding decisions, and notify the Unemployment Insurance Fund of changes in their
personal details or of starting a job (Interviews 19-20).
The interviews with both public sector officials and private sector representatives
confirmed that ICT skills are important factor for further development of innovation capacity
in Estonia. As Estonia does not have large scientific institutions and research and
development by companies is limited, then skills were considering crucial for further
innovation in the area of ICT. The innovation in this area is practice based and traditional
innovation indicators do not capture them well. More innovative products and services
available online will increase the use of internet further. However, as the Estonian population
is ageing and Estonia is not a very attractive destination for international ICT professionals,
then the mismatch between demand and supply of ICT professionals will continue. So far
there is no sign that industry demands will be met by government in significantly relaxing
immigration regulations (Interviews 19-21)..
Obviously, in terms of skills both demand side of internet and supply should be
considered because they are both important that new services and content can be created. This
means that supply and demand interact as more and more it services benefit from user driven
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innovation and it becomes difficult to distinguish between demand and supply as they both
constantly interact. Hence, knowledge and skills that matter for internet diffusion are
decentralized, dispersed and tacit – crucial elements in the process of entrepreneurial
discovery. However, the labor market constraints need to be tackled by multitude of agencies
involved in immigration, education and labor market policies. In addition, formal rule-making
interacts with informal rules such as attitudes of public about inflow of immigrants. This
institutional complexity has led to suboptimal policy outcomes in facilitating the process of
entrepreneurial discovery as potential ICT entrepreneurs and professionals from all over the
world cannot move easily to Estonia.

6.2.4 ICT Policy Making
The chapter Four suggested that government rule-making in the telecom sector was
consistent with overall economic framework in Estonia and institutional changes in the
telecom provided a critical juncture for the supply of high speed and high quality internet.
Chapter Five suggested that internet diffusion was further bolstered by public-private
partnerships in the use of online identification methods. Now it is crucial to look at specific
institutional changes concerning government use of ICT, which have benefited the internet
diffusion in society.
As far as specific changes in the rules concerning the IT are concerned, the local IT
community became crucial in forming government policies on IT spending, procurement, and
use in the early 1990s. In 1993, a strategy paper by government officials, IT specialists, and
scientists was prepared with the sole aim of establishing principles for the management of
modern, well-functioning state information systems (Ott and Siil 2003). The existence of such
a community stemmed from the fact that Estonia had fairly advanced human capital in IT.
Estonia began investing in its Institute of Cybernetics as early as the 1960s (Dyker 1996 915-
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916; Landler 2005). While similar institutes in other Soviet republics focused on math and
engineering, the Estonian institute concentrated on computer programming (Roth 2004; Dutta
2006).
A special state information systems department of the central government was formed
at state chancellery in 1993, and the central government budget included a single category
entitled “Number 37” for all IT expenditures of the various government agencies (Ott and Siil
2003). Government IT procurement was subsequently unified. Nevertheless, according to
interviews, the management of Estonian Government IT system has been relatively decentralized throughout the decades. It has been so technologically as well as institutionally.
Technologically it is based on de-centralized X-Road system which was discussed in Chapter
Five allowing different, old and new systems in various government agencies and private
sector to communicate with each other. Institutionally, the State Information System
Department acts as a coordinator. It was initially under the State Chancellery but moved to the
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications in 2000. Only in 2012 a national IT
coordinator was appointed to the State Chancellery. For many years, position of
undersecretary for state information systems at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Communications remained unfilled. In 2013, Taavi Kotka, an IT entrepreneur and former
CEO of Estonian IT company Webmedia was appointed as undersecretary for state
information systems (which is effectively government Chief Information Officer).
Throughout interviews a number of ICT initiatives by Estonian government were
brought out which may have encouraged the use of the internet (Interviews 19-21). Similarly,
scholarship and articles in popular media have focused on these initiatives. However, even if
there are currently many different initiatives which one way or another target ICT sector and
services and intervene in the market, it must be kept in mind that they are relatively recent
phenomena. In the 1990s Estonia did not have an industrial policy, nor did it engage in
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policies that would target the ICT sector or companies directly (Kilvits 1999, 263-265).
Estonian did not have sufficient resources to make large-scale ICT investments. As the
Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar from 1992 to 1994 and from 1999 to 2002 put it: “Most
disadvantageous was that we did not have large enough resources to build up e-government,
and this was very good because then we had to build public-private partnerships.” (Dutta
2006, 86). The key public-private initiative was ID card which was launched by Laar’s
government and was already discussed in Chapter Five.
The late president Lennart Meri started a national discussion on the necessity of
creating an “Estonian Nokia” in the 1990s but it did not translate into any concrete policy
action. General government spending on research and development in the 1990s was below
0.5 percent of the GDP, and there were no crucial technology or innovation policies to speak
of (Kilvits 1999, 268-277). Even the spending on information and communication
technologies (ICT) remained modest from 1995 to 2003 in comparison with other countries.
Estonian government budget has allocated about one percent for the ICT expenditure
throughout this period, while many other countries spend 2.5-4 percent of the budget (Krull
2003, 52-53). In spite of availability of unique and pioneering online identification methods
provided by banks, Estonia’s government services remained inconsistent and it took a while
for them to develop. While the Estonian government made international headlines with its
paperless “e-government” sessions and most citizens filed their taxes online, the simple task
of applying for a driver’s license still required physical visit(s) to the Department of Motor
Vehicles (Kitsing 2011). Estonia does not have a e-government strategy, nor did it create a
special office or ministry for information society, as was the case in Slovenia, for instance.
The 1998 Principles of Information Policy was very general strategy document and all the
following acts have been quite specific (Krull 2003, 49).

221

If we look at legislative changes in Estonia and compare them with a selected Central and
Eastern European countries in Table 6.3, the we see that the Estonian e-government specific
legislation was not passed significantly earlier than it was the case of other countries in the
CEE. Certainly, the mere time of adoption does not indicate the true impact of legislation.
Indeed, the quality of Estonian legislation may be better than in the case of the other CEE
countries.
Table 6.3: The time of adoption of e-government specific legislation in Estonia, Latvia,
Slovakia and Slovenia.
Act/Document
Strategy for egovernment
E-signature and
E-document
Strategy for
information
society
Data protection
Access to
public
information

Estonia
NA

Latvia
2002

Slovakia
2004

Slovenia
2001

2000

2002

2002

2000

1998

1999

2001

2003

1996
2001

2000
1998

2002
2000

1999
2003

Source: adopted from Kitsing (2008) and compiled by the author on the basis of
information retrieved from IDABC (2005).
Formal law-making in IT, as in many other areas of public sector, has been quite
minimal in Estonia. My analysis suggests that Estonian approach has seen implementation as
the key, and no need for writing excessive documents and creating additional layers of
bureaucracy. Indeed, the standard critique of the local e-experts was in the early years that
Estonian government does not have a clear vision and a work plan and there is a lack of
cooperation among different government agencies and between private and public sector
(Krull 2003, 49). Nevertheless, in these early years the ground was prepared for diffusion of
internet in Estonian government and private sector.
The implementation of ICT policies has been successful in the CEE context without
such documents and formalized cooperation, while many other countries which at least
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formally have adopted such documents and formalized cooperation do not score that well on
the e-government rankings. This is so because the institutional setting as encouraged
entrepreneurial discovery - at least in some key initiatives which have been crucial for internet
diffusion.
One of the key initiatives that has lowered both transaction costs in the market as well
as in public sector has been the use of digital signatures and electronic authentication, which
are widely used both in the public and private sectors (as was discussed in previous chapter in
the context of ID card). In 2000, Estonia adopted digital signature law, which made it
mandatory for public sector institutions to accept digitally signed documents in 2001
(Republic of Estonia 2000). Obviously, the development of digital signatures does not affect
only Estonia , but it is possible to establish a company in Estonia over the internet with the
use of Portugal, Finnish, Lithuanian and Belgian electronic signatures. The public sector has
led the way in the use of digital signing, as accepting digitally signed documents and it has
been made mandatory through legislation. Since 2014 through the e-Residence program
citizens of other countries can receive Estonian ID card and use it for signing documents and
transact digitally online.
Nevertheless, the efforts to harmonize ICT policies within different government
ministries and departments did not go smoothly. Actually, it offers the most straightforward
case for illustrating the constrained nature of agency, policy heterogeneity and diversity of
outcomes in practice. In other words, government’s practice was often quite different from
stylized narratives about e-government in Estonia. The electronic exchange of official
government documents was still limited in 2007 because different departments purchased
different software solutions, which are not compatible with each other (Riismaa 2007). Even
if they purchased same software packages, then often the same software was configured
differently which lead to incompatibilities within government for handling data. For instance,
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interviews revealed that the Ministry of Environment was eager adopter of open source
software while others are not. As a result, the ministry has to deal on daily basis with the
challenges of converting different documents to the usable formats as interviews with officials
revealed. These incompatibilities imply that data may have to be re-entered manually. Since
the Estonian government departments tend to rely on proprietary solutions, then vendor lockin is widespread. This lock-in may not only mean always dependence on a company but on a
particular person.
However, government officials I interviewed argued that despite of shortcomings and
setbacks, it can be argued that the public sector is leading the way in electronic document
exchange in general (Appendix 1, Interviews 19-20). Most of the invoices sent and received
by public sector bodies are electronic. One government official I interviewed pointed out that
in 2011, a study was conducted with an aim to analyze electronic records management in the
entire public sector of Estonia. “According to the results of the survey, approximately 90
percent of public agencies use electronic document and records management systems.
Electronic invoices are widely used with 64 percent of public sector organizations sending
and 86 percent receiving electronic invoices,” was pointed out by the same government
official (Interview 20). Nevertheless, only 25 percent of electronic invoices are in the
machine-readable format such as EDI and XML which make fully automated processing
possible.
To sum up, this section demonstrated that Estonian ICT policy has not been as
homogeneous and unified as sometimes it has been characterized. By looking at development
over two decades, it is clear that policy-making in the area of ICT has been decentralized and
heterogeneous. There have been some successful initiatives where the impact of local IT
community has been strong. In addition to some islands of excellence, there areas such as
harmonization of ICT policies within different government agencies where progress has been
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slower. Many of these changes have been taken place gradually, their role in the internet
diffusion in the early years cannot be considerable. Rather, they have contributed to the
opportunities for using the internet in recent years. Since the discussion of policy-making in
this section was relatively general, then the next sections will look at specific cases to show
institutional complexity has constrained the process of entrepreneurial discovery and led to
diverse policy outcomes. The next part will look at institutional complexity and policy
heterogeneity on the basis of the case of network neutrality.

6.3. Institutional Complexity and Network Neutrality45
Since Estonia became a member of the European Union and was quick liberalizer of
its telecom market, it is crucial to discuss the Estonian government position in the institutional
changes implemented by the new telecom package of the EU, which was adopted in 2009.
This discussion allows understanding the ability of policy-makers to deal with institutional
complexity and reveals the nature of policy-making concerning an important ICT issue. I will
discuss network neutrality only in the context of the 2009 telecom package. This limitation
stems from the following reasons. First, the 2009 telecom package is a fundamental legislative
attempt to shape the EU telecom market. There has not been any comparable reforms in this
scale after that. From the point of view of a relatively new member country such as Estonia,
the telecom package represents an important reform, which is comparable for taking over all
EU telecom related legislative acts in 2004 as it was discussed in Chapter Four. Second, the
EU telecom package mobilized key actors in the preceding years. This was when actors
revealed their preferences concerning institutional changes in the EU. It is difficult to discuss
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This case has been also presented at the conferenses at the Oxford University, UK, in 2010 and at the
ICEGOV 2011 in Tallinn, Estonia, and made electronically available in the respective conference papers
(Kitsing 2010; Kitsing 2011). As the Kitsing 2011 is the latest paper published by the ACM conference
proceedings, I will refer to these conference papers on the basis of Kitsing (2011) below.

225

the role of entrepreneurial discovery and institutional changes in the process on the basis of
secondary sources. I had unique access to some key actors and I was able to interview them in
2008 and 2009 (Interviews 14-17). Hence, the data limitations also mean that the focus will be
on the 2009 telecom package and not on the developments that took part later.

6.3.1 Network Neutrality in the European Union
Before I start discussing the position of Estonian government, it is important to
highlight the broader context of how network neutrality has been understood in Europe. This
is particularly important because as I have emphasized in the Chapter Two technology and its
use is epistemological and therefore concepts associated with the technology use may also
carry different meanings in different context. In other words, there is a danger of “conceptual
stretching”, a term used by Sartiori (1971) here applied in the network neutrality debate.
Furthermore, the institutional framework of the EU telecom markets and its members is quite
different from that of the United States.
The EU’s legislative attempts in the different drafts of 2009 telecom package defined
network neutrality quite narrowly. The EU Commission’s understanding of the network
neutrality is not as comprehensive as scholars approach it (Cave and Crocioni 2007, 270; Hart
2006; Sidak 2006) and as in the case of US administration (Kitsing 2011). EU Commission’s
Communication as a step towards the 2009 telecom package published in September 2008
discussed network neutrality solely in the context of network management:
“It is against this background that concerns have been raised about
preserving "net neutrality" as the internet evolves. New network
management techniques allow traffic prioritization. Operators may
use these tools to optimise traffic flows and to guarantee good quality
of service in a period of exploding demand and rising network congestion
at peak times. However, traffic management could be used for anticompetitive practices such as unfairly prioritising some traffic or slowing
it down and, in extreme cases, blocking it. “
(Commission of the European Communities 2008, 7)
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This concern over traffic prioritization found its way into so-called telecom package,
which in its first versions set forth narrow but straightforward net neutrality provisions. The
European Parliament included in the first draft of its regulations a prohibition against
“hindering or slowing of traffic” (European Parliament 2008). However, this was excluded in
the final version versions of the telecom package. The Council of Ministers and European
Parliament reached a compromise and approved the telecom package in November 2009
(European Commission 2010). The EU Commission summed up the net neutrality provisions
found in the package in the following way:

“…Under the new EU rules, national telecoms authorities will have the
powers to set minimum quality levels for network transmission services
so as to promote "net neutrality" and "net freedoms" for European citizens.
In addition, thanks to new transparency requirements, consumers must be
informed – before signing a contract – about the nature of the service to which
they are subscribing, including traffic management techniques and their impact
on service quality, as well as any other limitations (such as bandwidth caps or
available connection speed).” (European Commission 2010)

The approved version of the package gives authority to national telecom regulators to
ensure minimum quality of service requirements. It also asks service providers to provide
information to consumers about the quality of service. In other words, already narrow network
neutrality provisions as initially envisioned by the EU Commission were further narrowed
down and almost non-existent in the package (Kitsing 2011).
However, the package includes some other provision, which relate to a broader
concept of network neutrality such as backward vertical integration. EU Commission points
out that “National telecoms regulators will gain the additional tool of being able to oblige
telecoms operators to separate communication networks from their service branches, as a lastresort remedy” (2010). Nevertheless, these are additional measures. The functional separation
has been already legislated through previous measures as will be discussed below. The
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implementation of these measures differ in the different member states. At best, the EU
gained a new formal measure to implement functional separation – success of which may
depend more on national authorities than the EU Commission. In other words, the telecom
package did not reduce institutional complexity and policy design and outcomes can still be
quite heterogeneous because of potential differences in interpretation and implementation of
rules by national regulators.
Social science research on information technology about the network neutrality has
sometimes accepted the normative claim that network neutrality legislation is in the public
interests (Kitsing 2011). It has been argued that large corporations block network neutrality
regulations, because it damages their business interests (Hart 2006). What is forgotten in this
characterization, of course, is the fact that many companies that support network neutrality are
content providers. Network neutrality may or may not be good for public welfare depending
on what is exactly meant by its proponents (Kitsing 2011). However, it is certain that content
providers are convinced that supporting network neutrality legislation is beneficial to their
business agenda. Hence, the basic political economy of network neutrality is simple: interests
of content providers clash with those of network providers. It is an attempt by content
providers to change existing equilibrium in the cyberspace and increase their power vis-à-vis
network providers by using government regulation. This is how the leading European
regulatory experts characterize the push for the network neutrality regulations:
“Net neutrality being an attempt by content and application providers –
the likes of Amazon, eBay, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo! and Intel to constrain the behaviour of broadband Internet access providers –
such as AT&T, Verizon, Comcast and Sprint - through political pressure.“
(Cave and Crocioni 2007)

In other words, it is a classic case of political rent seeking where a group of companies
tries to advance their business interests by government intervention (Kitsing 2011). Usually, it
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is assumed in the public choice literature that political rent seeking serves vested interests but not the general interest of wider public (Krueger 1974). However, there are exceptions to
this rule if certain conditions are met. For instance, lobbying for opening a protected market
can simultaneously serve interests of the lobbyist, other companies planning to enter the
market and general public because it will increase competition, which potentially may lower
prices. Certainly this is the way in which content providers characterize their position by
emphasizing the importance of openness of and freedom to use the internet that the network
neutrality legislation should secure. Even the term “network neutrality” puts content-providers
support for new regulations in a more favorable light than network operators who have to be
against “neutrality” (Kitsing 2011). Hence, it is to a great degree to activism of contentproviders that “mundane conflict of business interest - content versus the network industry
and its vendors – has risen to such a high position on the business agenda” (Thorngren, 2006).
Of course, network operators see the network neutrality legislation as purely
benefiting content providers at the expense of other business and consumers. As the network
neutrality regulation would reduce flexibility in management of the networks, then network
providers argue that the network neutrality regulations will contribute to the internet traffic
jams. This is so because of Web 2.0 type applications are creating a crushing new burden of
data on the networks. As companies push more content onto the internet, the networks at
some point will reach capacity. Network neutrality regulations will accelerate these problems
because flow of some data such as emails cannot be delayed in order to make space for
priority data such as video. Heavy regulation may also create disincentives to invest in
networks as these investments cannot be recouped (Kitsing 2011). A view of network
operators along the similar lines was expressed in the Financial Times about the delay of the
telecom package adoption in May 2009: “Telecom companies declined to comment publicly,
but privately welcomed the delay to regulations that they have lobbied against for years. We
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never like uncertainty in the regulation, but doubt is better than some of the stuff that was in
the package,” one executive said. He added: “I still think most of it will go through, but we
may have bought ourselves a year “(Pignal 2009). This is also consistent with my interview
with a lobbyist for a large US multinational company in the EU (Interviews 17).
As the interests of content- and network providers seem diametrically opposed to each
other, it is surprising that both of these groups ended up in supporting the prevailing
minimalist provisions on network neutrality in the EU telecom package. European Telecom
Network Operators’ Association (ETNO), an organization representing interests of leading
European telecom companies, expressed its public support to the final version of the package
(Kiviniemi 2009). ETNO Director Michael Barthomelew told to the Wall Street Journal that
telecom package’s “new provisions to boost investment in superfast broadband networks
should be quickly put into practice” (Kiviniemi 2009). This was echoed by BT Group PLC’s
president of public and government affairs Larry Stone who told to the Wall Street Journal
that “his company strongly supports the EU's regulatory push for a more consistent European
telecom market “allowing for more competition, innovation and consumer choice in the
telecoms sector"” (Kiviniemi 2009). After two years of extensive lobbying and pushing their
narrow agenda, it seems that this narrow self-interest became enlightened self-interest. Or it
may be a realization that more favorable package is not feasible as expressed by a telecom
executive in the Financial Times (cited above). It raises the question whether ETNO
expressing revealed preferences of network providers or their real preferences.
Nevertheless, the simplistic characterization of the interests ignores the fact that
network operators and content providers operate in the environment of mutual
interdependence. Let me recall the Chapter Two which pointed out that internet and related
services are network goods. Use of one good such as internet connection increases the use of
other goods such as google search. In other words, content providers and network operators
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are selling complementary goods. An increase in demand for one good increases the demand
for another good. Operators need content because this will increase demand for their network
services and allow recouping investments in increasing the network capacity. Contentproviders need increased capacity of networks because this allows them to create and sell
even more data-intensive content. In the European context sellers of both of these goods have
to be functionally separated which makes even more sense in characterizing the interaction
mutual interdependence.

6.3.2 Estonian Government and Network Neutrality
The Estonian government view on network neutrality can be placed in this European
context. The main office of Skype, peer-to-peer online phone service provider, was based in
Estonia and Skype employed over 300 people in the years prior to the 2009 telecom package
as was shown in Chapter Four. Estonia has set up a NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense
Centre of Excellence in 2008 in response the 2007 cyber attacks that brought country’s
electronic communication networks to standstill. All of these factors make Estonia a critical
case in understanding how ideas about network neutrality, institutional complexity of dealing
with the EU level legislation and interests of powerful companies such as Skype interacted in
the network neutrality debate and in the legislative efforts. Both Skype and Cyber Security
Center are relatively small operations. The data about Skype is given in Chapter Five. The
Center has 48 staff members from 16 countries- not all NATO members have joined the
center and contribute to its efforts. However, both organizations carry much more significant
symbolic meaning in the world of Estonian policy-making.
Starting with the interests, then the position of Skype is dominant in Estonian policymaking. The company is basically seen as a national treasure and its interests are considered
at least in political rhetoric to be in sync with the interests of Estonia. Skype’s country
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manager Sten Tamkivi was also an adviser to Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves on
ICT issues during the network neutrality debate. In other words, Skype can be seen also as an
institutional entrepreneur trying to shape the rules of the game in Estonia in addition to its
business activities in the peer-to-peer telephony.
Estonian government’s position to see the interests of Skype and Estonia in sync
ignored the fact that until September 2009 that the main shareholder of Skype was E-Bay,
which had purchased the company from Danish-Estonian-Swedish founders in 2005 for 2.6
billion US dollars. E-Bay’s and Skype interests in the network neutrality debate are consistent
with the interests of other content providers such as Google. Interviews reveal that Skype
supported tougher network neutrality regulations through its lobbying efforts both in Estonia
and Brussels (Interviews 14-17).
Hence, it is not surprising that a short speech given by the Estonian Minister of
Transport and Communication Juhan Parts at the EU Council of Ministers’ meeting in
November 2008 echoed rhetoric of content-providers such as eBay, Google and Skype
according to an interview with a person with access to meeting transcripts (Interviews 17)
After it became clear that the EU Council of Ministers and Parliament were not able to reach a
compromise on the telecom package in May 2009 because of the copyright issue, the minister
even expressed opinion that Estonia should support reopening the negotiations on other issues
in the package (Interview 16)
Most interestingly, this view was never debated publicly and did not receive any
public attention in Estonia. The public debate – or to be more precise - the lack of public
debate on the net neutrality in Estonia and the EU in general created much less favorable
environment for the legislation than in the US. While in the US the net neutrality has received
a considerable attention in the media such as National Public Radio and even in Daily Show
of Comedy Central, it is perceived as highly technical issue in Estonia and the EU. It would
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be fair to say on the basis of interviews that many experts working and investors in the field
of telecommunications are not just familiar with the debate but had during the time of
interviews in 2008 and 2009 never heard of the term “net neutrality”. Some of the ideas
assembled under this concept may be, of course, familiar to them. In the US the debate has
taken concrete political leanings where Democrats usually tend to support network neutrality
regulations and most Republicans oppose it (Hart 2006). This is, of course, simplification as
some Republicans have taken and still take a different position.
Nothing of that sort has emerged in Estonia and in Europe where most politicians have
no position on the net neutrality. Hence, the issue seems to concern primarily lobbyists for
particular interests and experts who have studied the issue. It was politically relatively
unimportant issue – perhaps even a non-issue (Interviews 15 and 16). There are no important
political actors who are willing to invest their political capital for focusing on this issue. The
expression of supportive views for Skype position by the Estonian minister can be seen as a
default position - an acceptance that Skype knows the issue and politicians don’t. Thus why
not trust Skype. Therefore, it is also relatively easy to facilitate compromises as many
political actors have not taken firm position on the issue. All of this is not helped by the fact
that main supporters of the network neutrality legislation are American companies such as
Google, E-Bay and Skype - even though the latter has significantly more employees in the EU
than in the US. Nevertheless, it was still owned by E-Bay until September 2009 when its
founders together with London and Silicon Valley-based venture capital firms purchased a
majority stake in the company. In 2012 the company was sold to Microsoft. At the same time,
network providers are usually European companies.
The partisan nature of the debate is also completely different. In comparison with the
US supporters of network neutrality, Juhan Parts is from a center-right conservative party of
Isamaa and Res Publica Liit (IRL), which was chaired by famous Estonian economic reformer
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Mart Laar. He was one of the most important ministers in a center-right coalition government
made up of market liberal Reform Party and above-mentioned conservative party during the
adoption of new EU telecom package. This is further indicator that ideological lines in the
network neutrality debate are not as clear-cut in the European countries as they are in the
United States.
The low profile debate is a logical outcome in a way because the institutional
framework in Estonia and European Union is different. As the leading EU regulatory experts
Cave and Corcioni (2007) point out:

“The net neutrality debate originated in the U.S. and is at least partly
conditioned by the U.S. specific regulatory and market features.
It is most importantly the retail ISPs, operating at the IP layer of the
network, making prioritization decisions. In the U.S. it is much more
likely that the ISP is affiliated to the network access provider than in
Europe. This is because the degree of access regulation for Internet
broadband in the U.S. is currently considerably lower than in Europe
where often because of access obligations, the retail ISP is not the
wholesale network provider. Effectively there have been opposite
regulatory trends to access to broadband networks in the U.S. and
Europe. U.S. access obligations have been largely removed, while
since 1998 European National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and
the European Commission have increasingly extended access
obligations to broadband networks at different levels.”
(Cave and Corcioni 2007).

In other words, some important goals that are expected to be achieved by the specific
network neutrality regulations in the US have already been implemented in the EU by other
means. Hence, Estonian position expressed in favor of network neutrality legislation can be
seen as political rhetoric.
The EU telecom package was discussed for several years and deadlines for adoption
were postponed. In the end, it was supposed to be approved by the Council of Ministers and
European Parliament by May 2009. However, the Council and Parliament were able to reach
compromises on most issues – including the network neutrality provisions discussed above –
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except the one concerning copyright. Council proposed tough provisions denying access to
the internet to those who have violated copyrights online three times (so-called three-strikes
rule), while Parliament saw the access to the internet as a basic human right as Estonia, which
cannot be taken away without due judicial process. Elections to European Parliament took
place in the summer of 2009 and new EU Commission was appointed and confirmed in the
beginning of 2010 (Kitsing 2011). All of these developments increased uncertainty. The
ETNO director Michael Barthomelew expresses the importance of reducing uncertainty. He
told to the Wall Street Journal that the compromise reached on the telecom package “marks
the end of a long period of uncertainty for the telecoms sector" (Kiviniemi 2009). The current
minimalist network neutrality regulations were seen by Estonia and others as a better outcome
than no new telecom package in the near term and potentially even worse telecom package in
the longer term (Interview 16) . Hence, actors did not push for re-negotiations of any clauses
in the telecom package after the elections. The main focus was on reaching the compromise
on the copyright issue which was achieved with the new EU parliament and the package was
adopted in the fall of 2009.
Furthermore, interview with a government official indicate that giving full-fledged and
vocal support by the government for Skype’s position was complicated because of the cyber
security agenda (Interview 16). Tougher network neutrality regulations imply that
management of electronic communication networks becomes less flexible. At the same time,
great degree of flexibility is needed to respond effectively to cyber attacks. Some traffic must
be blocked, delayed and so on. Hence, official Estonian position was thorn between these two
sides. Therefore it is not surprising that Estonian government kept a low profile in this debate.
According to the interviews, the network neutrality was not discussed in the government
meetings where the telecom package was on the agenda (Interviews 16). There was almost no
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public debate on the issue.46 Indeed, interviews reveal that even people with experience in the
field of telecommunications were generally unaware of the concept of network neutrality.
The government policy concerning network neutrality demonstrates balancing among
different vested interests. The institutional framework constrained vested interested and the
emergence of minimalist net neutrality regulations in the EU which the end was supported by
Estonia. The dynamics played out in the EU telecom package debate would have suggested
that Estonia either would support its telecom companies if the regulatory capture would have
been the case or supported content providers because of Skype has become an institution on
its own in Estonia. Estonia Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications who is also
responsible for telecom sector regulation sided with the content providers in the beginning. If
we place this outcome in the context of chapter 4, then it is quite different from Slovenia were
the ministry is suspected in acting in the interest of incumbent telecom company.
Nevertheless, if we put Estonian government position and the interests of contentproviders and network operators into the context of ideas and institutions, then it is obvious
that both institutional and ideological environment were more in sync with that of network
operators. Content providers had to argue for network neutrality regulations in an
environment where general public was indifferent for their cause. Institutional nature of the
EU was not supportive either as effective legislation of network neutrality demands much
more uniformity and enforcement capacity of federal state than it is available in the current
EU. In addition, support for their cause means more centralization, which is opposed by many
member states regardless of how noble the cause might be. Nevertheless, the Estonian
minister decided to express its public support for content-providers in the EU meeting.
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interview to the Estonian national TV evening news in 2009.
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However, in the end Estonia supported the implementation of minimum quality
requirements, which fall under responsibility of national telecom regulators rather than the
EU. The main reason for this compromise was Estonia’s cybersecurity agenda rather than the
interests of telecom companies. As the minimum quality requirements are the main way to
implement network neutrality regulations, it is natural to expect a high degree of variance
what network neutrality means in practice in different EU countries, i.e. Estonian and
Slovenian approaches may considerably differ. Even if the language concerning the network
neutrality in the telecom package would have been more explicit and detailed, then
implementation of these seemingly uniform provisions would have been probably fairly
diverse as has been with the previous EU telecom regulations (Section 2.8).
In sum, the Estonian policy making demonstrates the institutional complexity of
network neutrality regulations. In the case of network neutrality, the institutional complexity
constrains actors – limits the entrepreneurial process of discovery in shaping institutions and
policies. Even the presence of dominant content provider and their lobbying for network
neutrality does not lead to uniform position and homogeneous policy outcomes. Furthermore,
the lack of public debate and debate in government supports the broader points made that
Estonia has either explicitly or implicitly tried to balance different interest and engaged in
making general rules and regulations instead of trying to impose narrow sector-specific
legislation in the telecom sector which would benefit particular interests. This case shows that
government does not promote the use of ICT at any cost and policy entrepreneurship has
serious constraints as a result of institutional complexity. The next section will tackle
institutional complexity and policy heterogeneity in the context of government ventur capital
scheme.
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6.4 Government Venture Capital Investments in the ICT sector47
Chapter 4 and section 6.2 demonstrated that Estonian government has focused
primarily on rule-making and not intervening directly in the ICT sector to encourage diffusion
of internet. However, there is a perception, which was discussed in the beginning of this
chapter and also in developments of concerning Skype that Estonian government has had a
particularly smart policy for encouraging the birth of new innovative companies. Chapter Five
argued that birth of Skype and internet banking had to do more with government
nonintervention than intervention. However, there has been a fundamental policy shift from
2004 onwards. Estonian government actually tries to encourage directly emergence of new
innovative companies. This has happened because the membership of the European Union
means that EU structural funds are available for encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship
in Estonia. Most of these funds have been spent in the form of grants. The impact of these
grants has been characterized as “picking big winners and small losers” in a study by Vicente
and Kitsing (2015) using propensity score matching. Most importantly, there has been a shift
in thinking and policy-makers seem to believe that they can replicate success of Skype
through direct policy measures. This is ironic because as it was pointed out in Chapter Five
the emergence of Skype was accidental and spontaneous. It cannot be attributed to the direct
policy measures.
This section will tackle equity injection by government in start-up companies. It will
leave the question of grants aside as I have addressed it in other papers. The government
venture capital scheme is a supply side measure to reduce constraints in availability of capital
for new innovative ventures. Since these new venture will bring new technologies to the
market, they can have positive externalities for some sectors or for the entire population as
new reasons for using internet will emerge. It must be clarified, however, that the Estonian
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government tries to encourage the development of ICT sector implicitly by government
venture capital scheme. The targeting of ICT sector is implicit because the Estonian
Development Fund (EDF), a government venture capital fund set up in 2006, does not have to
invest exclusively in the ICT sector. However, it has invested primarily in ICT companies
because companies from other sectors do not often meet its criteria.
The EDF was founded by the Estonian Parliament in 2006 with the purpose investing
public funds in and offering management support for early stage research and development
intensive companies. Differently from other government agencies, the EDF does not operate
under the executive branch, i.e. it is not an agency under some ministry, but reports directly to
the legislative branch – the Riigikogu. Nevertheless, in its ever day business the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Communications has some supervisory duties concerning the EDF.
Both Ministers of Finance and Economic Affairs and Communications are members of the
Supervisory Board of the fund. Other members include parliamentarians and independent
experts. The EDF mandate is to take minority stakes ranging between 10-49 per cent in
companies on the equal terms with its private sector co-investors. The time horizon for
investments is 3-5 years. It is also important to point out that the EDF invests funds of
Estonian taxpayers, not EU structural funds. The EDF model was created as a result of
extensive study of Sitra, a similar organization in Finland. The space does not allow to discuss
it here whether Sitra has been a success or not. However, it is crucial to point out in the
context of smart specialization literature in Chapter 2 that Finland and Estonia have had
different development trajectories. Hence, the notion that you can transfer one model of
organizing government venture capital to another country is an example of simplistic policymaking. There is also variance in time which is crucial for understanding how institutions
constrain agency (Pierson 2004). Sitra was founded in 1967 while the EDF in 2006. The
1960s in Finland are different from the 2000s in Estonia. The following discussion is based on
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data obtained from the Estonian Business Registry on the EDF investments, network analysis
of digital ecosystem created by the EDF and 9 semi-structured interviews - with 6 portfolio
companies, with a high level EDF officer and two outside investors (Appendix 1, Interviews
22-26, 28 and 32-34).
6.4.1 The EDF Portfolio
Since 2008 the EDF has directly co-invested with private investors in 18 start-ups
either directly as the EDF or since 2012 through its Smartcap fund, an investment vehicle of
the EDF. By July 2013, EDF had made 18 investments in seed and start-up phase totaling 8.7
million euros. Of these investments 10 have been made in ICT companies amounting to more
than 5 million euros. Table 6.4 highlights these ICT investments. Hence, either intentionally
or unintentionally the EDF has been giving public support to the ICT sector in comparison
with other sectors. The following table gives an overview of the EDF portfolio in the area of
ICT.
So far the EDF has only exited from three companies. The first exit was the Modesat
Communications in September 2012, a telecom company, which was acquired by NASDAQ
listed Xilinx (Anderson, 2012). In this company, the EDF investment totaled 750 000 euros
as of May 2012. The terms of the deal have not been publicly disclosed. Hence, the return on
investment is not known. On the basis of indirect sources and interviews, it can be estimated
that the sale price of Modesat share exceeded the initial investment but not significantly and
the exit can be considered successful from the point of view of financial return. The second
exit took place in September 2014 when a US 3D printing company Stratasys acquire
GrabCAD, a collaborative product development software creator which makes it possible for
engineers to share CAD files. The terms of transaction were not disclosed but Forbes reports
that it was worth about 100 million dollars (Chowdhry 2014).
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Table 6.4: The EDF/Smartcap investments in ICT companies by size, year and phase.
Company

Investment size in
euros48

Year of initial
investment

Investment phase

NOW!Innovations

950 000

2011

Start-up

Modesat
Communications

750 000

2010

Start-up

United Dogs and
Cats

479 337

2009

Start-up

Massi Miliano
(fits.me)

960 000

2009

Start-up

Realeyes

320 000

2011

Seed

GrabCAD

127 800

2010

Seed

Inner Circle

88 000

2010

Seed

Sportlyzer

95 800

2010

Seed

Defendec

1 200 000

2012

Start-up

WeatherMe

250 000

2012

Start-up

Source: Created by author with data from Arengufond (2013).

The third exit took place in July 2015 when the leading Japanese e-commerce
company Rakuten purchased fits.me (legal name Massi Miliano in the Table 6.4), a company
that develops virtual fitting rooms meaning that it helps customers to visualize online whether
items they purchase from e-commerce sites will fit them properly or not (Lunden and Lomas
2015). Again, the terms of transaction has not been disclosed. All these exists have been ICT
companies. By considering only exits, the EDF investments have success. Three exits out of
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The investment size is based on publicly available data, which may be inaccurate and not be up to date
because there is a significant time lag between the investments and the time, when this information becomes
publicly available.
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total 18 portfolio companies can be considered quite a good outcome in venture capital.
Certainly, it is not clear how much has the EDF earned from these exists but they have
certainly exceeded the initial investment.
So far it can be also confirmed that three EDF investments have failed. Two of these
were ICT companies. The business models of two social network companies the United Cats
and Dogs and Inner Circle did not materialize. EDF suffered a loss of all initial investment
(Tänavsuu 2010; Poom 2012, Interviews 21, 22 and 25). The total loss of 1.2 million euros is
about 14 percent of the EDF portfolio as of July 2013. Hence, it can be concluded that the exit
from remaining 5 ICT businesses remains uncertain. According to semi-structured interview
results optimistic projection would be that exit should take place in 4-5 years after initial
investment and more realistic projection is 7 years. If this assumption is correct, then it is too
early to expect exits by 2015 as the EDF invested in first two companies in 2008 (one of
which has gone bankrupt) and remaining 16 investments were made in 2009-2012. The EDF
estimates that the value of its portfolio is 11 million euros. Of the remaining 12 investments,
the EDF has revalued 4 investments below the initial investment value. This implies that the
four additional investments are likely to fail including some ICT companies.
However, there is no objective way to confirm the accuracy of the EDF valuation of
its portfolio. The standard valuation techniques of companies do apply in the case of start-ups.
Their values may fluctuate significantly depending on the subjective interpretation of key
stake holders. For instance, CEO of one ICT company pointed out that the valuation of his
company can be 10-12 million euros but it is too early to say and it is highly subjective
depending on what perspective the potential buyer might have. According to another CEO of
ICT company the value of their company is approximately four million euros. Nevertheless, it
is impossible to evaluate the true value of the company as the exit remains uncertain. It should
be pointed out that during the interviews valuation offered by EDF did not match often the
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valuations given by the management teams of portfolio companies. Ultimately, the value of
company will be discovered when the exit takes place and the exits will take place in the case
of most portfolio companies if they are successful in raising funds in next financing rounds.
Even though interviews were conducted in 2012 and 2013, the portfolio companies already
insisted then that the most likely exit strategy is acquisition by large IT company rather than
IPO in the case of Estonian start-ups. One owner and manager of portfolio company said that
“the exit should take place within 5 years from the initial investment as this is the investment
horizon of the investors” (Interviews 23). According to CEO of one company which has
recently been acquired, “there is no certain date when the exit must take place but usually
exits take 5 years”. He was not willing to discuss details when potential exit may take place
and what is the valuation of the company (Interviews 21). However, interviews with
investors, entrepreneurs and experts highlight that the main purpose of government venture
capital is to develop the venture capital ecosystem and generate positive externalities of its
investments. Hence, the main focus of this case will be on the impact of EDF on the
ecosystem.

6.4.2 Market Failures, Externalities and Ecosystem
The main purpose of government venture capital is to develop the venture capital
ecosystem and generate positive externalities of its investments. The literature on venture
capital has emphasized the role of government venture capital can play in minimizing the
impact of market failures. Some scholars have pointed out that private sector may
undersupply venture capital because of asymmetric information. Hence, it is possible to speak
of market failure resulting from the information asymmetry where government funding could
potentially reduce the negative impact (Brander et al 2010). Other scholars have emphasized
market failure stemming from insufficient incentives of private investor to supply funds to
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innovation and research and development-intensive companies. This is caused by the inability
of these companies to capture positive externalities of their investment. If there is a reason to
believe that innovation is underprovided, then government intervention can reduce negative
effects of this market failure (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Hsu, 2006). This section analyzes
the impact of the Estonian Development fund on the basis on these theoretical premises. In
addition, to semi-structured interviews and descriptive statistics it relies on the online network
analysis. The purpose of network analysis was map the digital networks of the EDF, which
offers one way to demonstrate its role in the broader venture capital landscape.
The Estonian venture capital ecosystem is characterized by few, small but proud
funds. In addition, to state-backed Estonian Development Fund only one or two wellstructured private venture capital funds exist. The following figure 6.4 gives an overview of
venture capital and private equity market by highlighting the distribution of investments on
the basis of geography and investment phase of 18 investors and their 120 portfolio
companies.

Seed
11%

Buyout
18%

Start-up
31%
Expansion
31%
Early growth
9%

Figure 6.4: The characteristics of the Estonian private equity and venture capital market in
2012 on the basis of EstVCA (2012).
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One of the most active investor has been Ambient Sound Investment (ASI), which invests
funds of Estonian co-founders of Skype and does not raise money from outside investors. The
bottom-line is that existing funds and investors do a relatively small number of deals and are
not well diversified and scalable (Jostov and Sonts, 2012).
The Figure 6.5 shows a map a broader venture capital online ecosystem in Estonia
through online network analysis as developed by Rogers (2013). 15 urls of full members of
Estonian Venture Capital Association (EstVCA) were entered to the harvester of
issuecrawler.net. 8 members of EstVCA are included in the output map below given in the
figure 6.5. The EDF (arengufond.ee) is certainly in the central position of the network.

Figure 6.5: The Estonian venture capital network with inlinks and outlinks (May 7, 2013).49

49

Data entered by the author, map produced by issucrawler.net.
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However, EstVCA itself as well as private sector investors such as asi.ee and wnb.ee
play focal role in the network as many nodes connect to them. As the network nodes are quite
evenly distributed (many firms connect to each other as well as to the EDF), then this network
can be characterized as moderately centralized. The network includes also 14 portfolio
companies of the EDF. It is surprising that it does not include 7 members of EstVCA.
However, it does include most active co-investors of the EDF such as asi.ee and wnb.ee.
The network analysis revealed that the EDF is an important focal point among its
portfolio companies as well as in a broader venture capital ecosystem in Estonia. This finding
has been confirmed also by interviews (Interview 22-26 and 32-34). The analysis of EstVCA
members revealed that the EDF plays a central role in the broader venture capital networks.
However, its centrality is moderate as many companies in the network are linked directly to
each other. Hence, this network is less centralized than portfolio network, which signals
maturity and tight contacts among the network members. The network analysis does not only
allow to grasp the links in the ecosystem but to assess the potential performance of portfolio.
Following Hochberg et al (2007) the strong network links of the EDF could suggest that the
potential performance of EDF portfolio could be better than the performance of venture
capital firm with weaker ties. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that most coinvestors of the EDF are relatively inexperienced investors as is the EDF itself. Hence, the
portfolio performance may still turn out to be inferior despite strong network ties.
Most importantly, the central role of EDF played in the venture capital ecosystem is
not necessarily a positive outcome. First, it may suggest that the ecosystem is not able to
function without government intervention and is too dependent on government. Second, the
development of a venture capital ecosystem is not an end in itself. Rather it is a means to
contribute to broader economic development. Thus the potential externalities of the EDF are
explored below.
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6.4.2.1 Asymmetric Information
Thus, it is crucial to analyze the externalities of EDF investments and its impact on
negative effects of perceived and real market failures. One theory in Section 6.4.2 suggested
that the government venture capital is necessary for overcoming market failures stemming
from asymmetric information. However, all interviews with co-investors and outside investors
did not confirm this. Rather several investors argued that they are quite familiar with potential
companies in the pipeline and here the EDF does not add value in solving information
asymmetry by matching investors and start-ups. According to one outside investor the EDF
requires non-disclose agreement (NDA) before showing its pipeline to potential investors.
This was viewed by this investor as unnecessary requirement as the companies in the EDF
pipeline approach potential investors independently as well and the NDA requirement creates
just additional complications (Interview 28). At the same time, a co-investor of EDF told that
he has never been asked for the NDA and he is familiar with the companies in the pipeline
anyway (Interview 34). The EDF confirmed that they had treated potential investors
differently but this is not the case anymore (Interview 25).
Some technology companies in the EDF portfolio pointed out that the EDF has
brought important contacts and contributes to finding potential investor. However, majority of
portfolio companies complained about the EDF not helping them in finding new investors and
not being sufficiently connected to potential investors. Most companies interviewed also saw
the EDF as a financial investor rather than hands-on VC, which brings specific knowledge
and expertise to the sector. In addition, most companies did see the EDF as too bureaucratic in
comparison with private sector investors. One founder and former CEO pointed out that the
EDF decision-making took too long and contracts were too lengthy and overly detailed. He
told that negotiations took 4 months and the EDF approach was narrow-minded as they did
not take a longer term perspective (Interview 34). The EDF did not have experience and

247

network that other venture capital firms could provide (he compared the experience with the
EDF with his new venture which by 2012 had raised USD 700 000 in Silicon Valley).
According to another manager, the EDF has primarily provided oversight over
finances. The EDF has accepted management strategies and not intervened in the core
business. However, he pointed out it is impossible to have a good quality investment team in
such small fund such as the EDF. “The minimum requirement would 50-100 million euros
under management for hiring a highly professional investment team,” said one manager
(Interview 23). His assessment is that the EDF’s legal competence is very strong, but
negotiations take too long, fund is not effective in making quick decisions, decision-making
process is too formal and not very clear always. “The mandate of EDF representative is not
always clear. You need to take 2-3 steps to figure it out but only 1-2 steps with private
investors,” he said. The EDF required very detailed final accounts dating several years back
as a part of due diligence, which was difficult for the company as the previous management
had not kept them and it required additional time and substantial work (Interview 23).
Some portfolio companies offered more moderate criticism. According to another
CEO, they had the first contacts with the EDF in the summer of 2010 and made some
presentations, but started serious negotiations in December 2010 and it was completed by the
beginning of 2011. “In the beginning, the requirements of the EDF were too complex and
bureaucratic, but it was possible to simplify them,” he said (Interview 21). One company saw
clear benefits. The CEO of a small company where the EDF has 20 % stake, pointed out that
the EDF provides advice and legal assistance in drafting contracts and so on. The CEO
considered this really important for him as the company is relatively small and cannot afford
such services (Interview 33).
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6.4.2.2 Underinvestment in Innovation
The first part of this Chapter revealed that Estonian government has been a moderate
investor in innovation. Section 6.4.2 suggested that private sector investors may undersupply
capital to innovative new start-ups because they cannot capture positive externalities of
innovation. Government provision of venture capital does not just benefit these companies but
leads to positive externalities of innovation and thus benefits broader economic development
by minimizing negative effects of this market failure.
Most companies pointed out that they did not have any alternative sources of financing
to the EDF. Two companies had alternative options but they considered terms offered by the
EDF better. In the case of one company, alternative options were not even explored.
According to one CEO they needed investment for product development and the investments
have allowed company to grow faster. Alternative options would have been to raise money
from the UK and the USA. These options would have taken longer than raising the capital
from the EDF. “If the EDF would not have injected capital, then the company would have
found other options,” he said According to him, they have talked with 100 investors in order
to find suitable options for fund-raising (Interview 24).
Another CEO and founder argued that the EDF has fulfilled important gap in the
market as in 2006 only one serious private venture capital firm existed in the Estonian market.
According to him, his company did not have any real alternatives to the EDF investment and
mobile parking solutions would seem too utopian for investors outside of Estonia. He argued
that his company needs to raise additional equity capital of 1-2 million euros but there are not
sufficient funds available. Additional capital would be necessary to secure sustainability of
his team, which should be 2-3 times larger. The new equity injection would enable the
company to be competitive in the mobile parking business, which has market size of 50
billion euros in the US and EU.
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According to CEO of company with a recent successful exit, they did not have any
realistic alternatives for the EDF investment. It is difficult for an Estonian company to raise
money, particularly if it is very research intensive. He said that research and development
expenditure is 70 percent of all the funds company has raised so far. He argued that the
company could not have made necessary investments without this equity injection. Patent
applications alone take 4-5 years to handle and this means investors have to take a long time
horizon. However, this execute saw the EDF role as a passive financial investor rather than
active hands-on investor. “There is no need for active involvement in the company as they do
not have experience and there is no necessity for that,” he said (Interview 21).
For instance, CEO and owner of another company said that the EDF has been
instrumental in developing the company from the early days and alternative sources of
financing have not been available to his venture. Only realistic alternative could have been
bootstrapping, which was not very likely as he already had to live off his wife’s maternity
leave money when he founded the company (Interview 33).
However, the lack of funding itself cannot be a market failure. Otherwise, all areas of
life can be seen as full of market failure as there is often lack of funds. The market failure is
underinvestment in innovative companies, which would create economy-wide positive
externalities and enhance economic development. Thus, it should be explored whether the
EDF investment has created these desired externalities.

6.4.2.3 Capturing Positive Externalities
The key to understanding the impact of EDF is question whether Estonia is able to
capture positive externalities of investments. Certainly, some Estonian entrepreneurs will get
richer once their exits from companies will materialize. However, much more is at stake.
Section 2.4 pointed out on the basis of smart specialization literature that the diffusion of ICTs
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has increased differences among core regions and periphery. This is because ICTs are
complements to knowledge-intensive activities which also require face-to-face interactions but
they are substitutes for activities which can be routinized (McCann and Ortega 2013, 4). Hence,
public policies aimed at encouraging internet diffusion can be self-defeating if they do not factor
in local informal institutions, knowledge, skills and geographical specificity and ensure that
positive externalities of diffusion process is internalized by local actors rather than by outsiders.
Whether the EDF investments lead to positive externalities which will benefit
Estonian economy is far from certain. The innovative activities have to materialize in terms of
increased revenue, particularly increased export revenue as the domestic market is very small.
The cumulative export revenue of whole portfolio for the years 2008-2012 amounted to 20
million euros while the entire export revenue of Estonian companies was 48 billion euros
during the same five years. Similarly, 131 employees in the EDF portfolio companies is
miniscule considering that entire workforce is about 600,000 or even that of Skype which
exceeds 400. Obviously, some of the portfolio companies may achieve significantly higher
revenue and create jobs in the future. Hence, it may be too early to assess the externalities on
these grounds. Only three portfolio companies – two of them ICT companies
NOW!Innovation and GrabCAD - were profitable in 2012. All other 15 companies made
losses. The portfolio companies employed 131 people in 2012. The 131 employees implies
that the EDF alone had invested 68,700 euros per each employee in its portfolio company by
2013 (not counting the equal co-investments by private sector venture capitalists). The
average gross salary was 1400 euros in the portfolio companies in 2012. In comparison, the
Estonian average salary was about 900 euros in 2012.
Alternatively, we could assess the likelihood that potential externalities would occur in
Estonia. The current limited evidence seems to suggest that more successful portfolio
companies usually create positive externalities, but they are not captured in Estonia. At the
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same time, less successful portfolio companies generate negative externalities in Estonia. For
instance, one successful exit did not generate positive externalities to the Estonian economy.
Modesat was taken over by US- based company and its business operations are located in the
US now. GrabCAD has moved its headquarters to Boston and has more employees there than
in its office in Tallinn, Estonia. Fits.me has moved its headquarters to London. Other
investments which can be considered relatively successful by the abilities of companies to
raise new funds signal similar trends. RealEyes does not employ anybody in Estonia. Its
operations take place in London, UK, Boston, US, Budapest, Hungary and Minsk,
Byelorussia. NOW!Innovations have significant operations outside of Estonia.
EDF impact in generating externalities cannot also be seen in isolation. Considerable
amount of EDF portfolio companies have also received grants from the Enterprise Estonia, a
government agency for business support, and KredEx50, a government agency for financial
services. At least two companies out of 18 have used services of KredEx, grants from
Enterprise Estonia and equity injections from the EDF. About half of the EDF portfolio
companies have received also grants from the Enterprise Estonia. Thus, it is not possible to
distinguish the exact role that EDF has played in generating positive externalities in
comparison with other agencies. And of course, sometimes these externalities have not been
positive.
For instance, fits.me has attracted total of 1.5 million euros in equity investments and
R&D grants from the Estonian government agencies. The role of EDF is that of passive
financial investor. Certainly, there has been positive externalities of these investments has the
company cooperates closely with two largest universities in Estonia. However, the
performance of the company cannot be assessed on the basis of publicly available data
because they have not consolidated their accounts to Estonia.

50

The clients of KredEx cannot be publicly disclosed because they are protected by bank secrecy.
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6.4.2.4 Portfolio Performance and Public Interest
There is a constant challenge to find a proper balance between portfolio performance
and a broader public interest. The EDF has to invest into Estonia-based companies, which was
seen by many experts as unnecessary restriction as it limits the potential investment targets
and hinders portfolio performance (Interviews 22-26, 28). One venture capitalist argued that
there should not be any geographical restrictions (Interview 26). “What is Estonia?, ” he
asked during interview. “Define Estonia!,” he added. “Let’s take Hardi Meybaum (founder of
GrabCAD) as an example who has headquartered his company in Boston. Is Hardi Meybaum
Estonia?,” he asked. He argued that we should not limit our definition of Estonia to geography
in the 21 Century. He pointed out that Estonians can never make major breakthroughs in the
world and be world-class professionals if their approach is too Estonia-centric. “Hardi
Meybaum with other founders will always seek and keep their roots in Estonia,” he argued.
At the same time, the political masters of the EDF see requirement to invest in
Estonia-based companies as a crucial building block for its operations. Some portfolio
companies and investors agree that the main aim of EDF should be enhancing public benefits.
One CEO pointed out that EDF’s goal is to maximize profits, but it should consider broader
public goals. “In the end, any return on investment would be marginal from the point of view
of Estonian economy. What really matters is creating success stories and fulfill gap in the
venture capital market,” he said. He argued that the EDF should not focus too much
technology-centric companies because they are acquired early by other companies. The EDF
should invest more in sales-oriented companies, where new companies create brands, which
allows have positive impact on the broader image of Estonia (Interview 23).
In reality, the EDF has found ways to reduce the requirement to invest in Estonia to
formality. For instance, RealEyes does not have an office in Estonia and does not have any
employees in Estonia. The Company was founded in UK in 2006. In 2009, company was
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officially registered in Estonia and shares of UK based corporation were sold to the Estonian
entity in order to receive research and development grant of 770 000 euros from the
Enterprise Estonia, a government’s agency that distributes EU structural funds for
encouraging entrepreneurship and innovation. The EDF invested 120,000 euros as a seed
investment in 2011, which was matched by Bellus (now Caplia Invest) owned by Rolf
Relander and Rikard Relander, who are also co-investor in several other EDF portfolio
companies. By June 2012, the EDF has invested additional 200 000 euros which has been
matched by Kaplia Invest, which means total equity injection of 640 000 euros. As of August
2012, the EDF share was 12.5 percent while founders owned 60 percent of the equity.
Similarly, as was pointed out above, several other companies have moved significant parts of
their business operations outside Estonia. For instance, fits.me has offices in Munich,
Germany, Paris, France, New York, USA and Auckland, New Zealand. In order to stay
competitive, it is natural for them to move to well-established ecosystems. Obviously, this is
not just an issue in Estonia and peripheral EU countries. Even well established and wealthy
US regions such as Atlanta have not managed to keep its new promising companies from
moving to Silicon Valley and Boston (Breznitz and Taylor 2011).
Thus, the tension between portfolio performance and public interest is not a temporary
issue, which can be solved by clever design but rather it is a permanent feature of the
government venture capital scheme. Unless, of course, the definition of public interest would
be radically altered – e.g. investments in the companies could be seen as marketing cost with
the aim of promoting Estonia abroad.

6.4.2.5 Private Equity and Transparency
Imperfect data and insufficient transparency make measurement of positive
externalities difficult. A considerable proportion of the EDF portfolio companies have not
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consolidated their financial data and hence the Estonian Business Registry does not provide
accurate overview of their operations. Some companies also like to inflate their revenues and
other financial data. For instance, Fits.me reported to the Estonian media in 2013 that its
annual sales revenue increased to almost 2 million euros in 2012 from 22,869 euros in 2011.
The annual report available in the business registry shows this to be true. However, the
company did not tell to the media that actually over 1.9 million euros was for the services sold
to Fits.me’s UK-based holding company. Hence, it was a transaction between related parties,
which is shown on its annual report as revenue for sales (Estonian Business Registry 2015).
Similarly, it is difficult to assess the EDF performance if the information disclosed to
the public is limited. As was pointed out before, it is difficult to assess the value of its
portfolio, when even detailed information about successful exits cannot be disclosed. These
tensions concerning data availability and broader transparency are not temporary problems
which can be easily solved. Rather, the tensions stem from fundamental contradictions
inherent to the government venture capital scheme. The important element of venture capital
success is its private nature. It is a form of private equity. This allows making quick and
focused decisions with limited public scrutiny. As the representative of EDF said in the
interview “These investment decisions concern private legal persons who are not public
sector institutions and therefore making information public would actually harm them”
(Interview 25) However, the distribution of public money by nature has to be public and come
with certain degree of transparency. Hence, it is natural to scrutinize companies receiving
money from public purse and organizations distributing the public funds. If the success of
venture capital scheme depends on information asymmetry, then public scrutiny may become
an important obstacle. But if government distributes money, then it cannot be free of public
scrutiny.
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6.4.2.6 Entrepreneurial Discovery and Rent-seeking
The discussion above on market failures and externalities pointed out some
fundamental issues relating to the broader political economy of government venture capital.
Government wants to have a cake and eat it at the same time by demanding both stellar
portfolio performance and positive externalities for the benefit of broader economic
development. Public demands strong scrutiny while the beauty of venture capital is in its
private nature. In other words, government wants EDF to be entrepreneurial and through the
process of entrepreneurial discovery to find new ventures. At the same time, these decision
should be made in the public interest. However, there is considerable institutional complexity
involved because government rules interact with formal and informal rules of venture capital.
There is also considerable heterogeneity in policy design and outcomes. If the parliament is
responsible for the EDF, who is really responsible? All 101 members or only members of
governing coalition? How many exits is sufficient to decide that the EDF performance has
been positive? How do we decide that positive externalities created by EDF are sufficient? All
these questions do not have clear answers and hence, they create ambiguity and uncertainty.
In this context entrepreneurial discovery and investment of public funds can become
easily coupled with potential rent-seeking. There is a risk in the venture capital scheme, which
seems to point towards a classic outcome where benefits are privatized and costs socialized. A
straight-forward rent-seeking is difficult to explore on the basis of semi-structured interviews
and descriptive statistics. Some perspectives suggest that government venture capital may
crowd out private investments and government may want to pick successful companies which
do not need its funds instead of companies which struggle in raising funds. Cumming and
MacIntosh (2006) have shown that government venture capital tends to “crowd out” private
investments. This fits well with the reasoning offered by Wallsten (2000) that government
officials may not tackle market failures but select companies, which are likely to be successful
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rather than businesses that actually cannot raise private sector funds and need government
support. There is no evidence that the EDF has crowded out private investments. Interviews
confirm the opposite (Interviews 22-26 and 32-34). Particularly, as the EDF started to invest
in 2008-2009 when the financial crisis reached Estonia. The capital was scarce and terms of
credit were tightened. The Estonian GDP had a cumulative drop of 20 per cent in the years
2008-2009. The EDF has not invested in Transferwise which is valued over one billion dollars
and is the most successful of recent start-ups. This financial technology start-up was founded
in London by two Estonians (one of them first employee of Skype) but has a significat
presence in Estonia. Interview with the EDF officer shows that they regret not investing in
Transferwise.
The EDF portfolio performance suggests that EDF has picked more losers than
winners. There has been three successful exits so far. Three investments have failed and four
investments have been revalued downwards. This would suggest that the current evidence
supports more “traditional” political economy hypotheses that governments do not manage to
pick winners even if they try very hard. Losers simply have stronger incentives to pick
governments than governments’ incentives to pick winners. Nevertheless, on the basis of
evidence it cannot be concluded that the government venture capital scheme is more likely to
pick losers than winners. We have to see venture capital in a broader context. Majority of
investments by private sector venture capitalist fail as well. A large number of failures is
expected among the venture capitalist as long as some investments earn them extraordinary
returns. Uncertainty surrounding venture capital investing suggests that even if governments
may perceive some companies as clear winners and pick them, the companies may turn out to
be losers because investors have to face unknown unknowns in decision-making. For
instance, the EDF picked social networking start-up Inner Circle as its portfolio companies,
which was backed by one of the most well-known Estonian venture capitalist Allan
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Martinson. The decision-making was quick and the Chairman of EDF supervisory board
became co-investor in the venture. However, the venture struggled to find a proper business
model and eventually failed despite of excellent management team and strong financial
backing (Interviews 22-26).
There is limited evidence of other type of potential rent-seeking. Estonian business
newspaper Äripäev has brought attention to the case of Inner Circle, where Chairman of the
EDF supervisory board and other interested parties were shareholders (Tahlfeld 2010). The
Estonian media reported in 2012 that unnecessarily exclusive and excessive office space was
rented by the former management team of the EDF. The EDF paid annually 85,000 euros for
500 square meters in one of the most exclusive office buildings in central Tallinn (Smutov
2012). This is the price of most expensive office space in Tallinn but the EDF could have
rented 30-50 percent cheaper space in a less exclusive office building in central Tallinn.
Considering that the EDF had about 20 employees, there was 25 square meters of office space
per each employee. Obviously, the EDF should have also been more economical with the use
of space, which could have generated additional savings. Furthermore, Tõnis Arro, CEO of
EDF was fired in 2014, for using EDF funds to cover his personal expenses.
However, the rent-seeking may also take place indirectly as agents may not be always
the best guardians of principal’s assets. In the case of one failed investment private coinvestor said that he invested his own money, while the EDF and other co-investor Ambient
Sound Investment are investing other people’s money, which may also impact their
incentives. According to this investor, the board did not execute sufficient control over the
company. The CEO was an excellent sales man and was able convince board members that
everything is going fine even if numbers showed otherwise. This investor argued that the
main reason for the failure of the company was misallocation of resources. “They spent
almost 4000 euros on servers per month,” he said. CEO paid himself and other employees
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high salaries, which is out of line with start-ups. Too many people were hired who were given
dubious and fancy job titles. He concluded that his decision to invest in the company was
clearly a mistake and he must have suffered “a temporary loss of mind”, when he made this
decision (Interview 22).

6.4.3 Entrepreneurial Discovery and Institutional Complexity in the Case of EDF
The main purpose of paper was to assess the broader impact of the EDF on the ICT
ecosystem and how institutional complexity constrained entrepreneurial discovery and created
heterogeneous policy outcomes. Online network analysis and semi-structured interviews
showed the central role of EDF in the venture capital ecosystem of Estonia. This is consistent
with previous qualitative studies based on semi-structured interviews that have suggested a
crucial role of the EDF in getting venture capital networks started in Estonia (Nightingale and
Reid 2010; Jostov and Sonts 2012). The broad venture capital ecosystem network is modestly
centralized where network nodes connect to the EDF as well as to other members of
networks. One of the portfolio companies - accelerator Startup WiseGuys - has become a
focal point in this network in less than a year. Certainly, the analysis of online networks gives
only a partial understanding of the EDF role as the offline world may not match online world.
Nevertheless, it is a crucial factor – especially as many EDF portfolio companies are social
network and ICT companies.
While the EDF has contributed significantly for the creation of the ecosystem, it is not
sufficient for capturing positive externalities. The findings suggest that the 18 EDF portfolio
companies , including 10 ICT companies, are small and insignificant from a broader
perspective of the Estonian economy. By tackling market failures and externalities of
government venture capital scheme, the case highlights policy dilemmas stemming from
institutional complexity. First, the research demonstrates that government’s aim to increase
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the EDF portfolio performance and concurrently create positive externalities for local
economy are in conflict with each in the government venture capital scheme. The portfolio
performance can be increased by removing requirements for investing such as to invest only
in the Estonian companies. But this would enhance already existing trend where successful
companies are eager to leave peripheral economy of Tallinn, Estonia, for the better ecosystem
in Boston, London and other areas. Second, the principles of venture capital investing and
public accountability of government expenditures are also mutually exclusive. By definition
venture capital is a form of private equity, where most benefits stem from its private nature.
At the same time, government expenditure has to be public and transparent. Information
asymmetries concerning the losses and exits of the EDF portfolio companies work against the
principles of accountability and transparency. Third, the case offers evidence of how
entrepreneurial discovery process can become rent-seeking and negative externalities of
government intervention. The EDF comes across as a passive financial investor rather than
hands on venture capital fund and is seen as too bureaucratic and inflexible in comparison
with the private sector funds. However, lengthy formalities and inflexibility may also stem
from the fact that the EDF is an institutional investor while its co-investors are less
institutionalized and not comfortable with high degrees of complexity.

6.5 Conclusion
Even though often Estonian government’s ICT specific initiatives receive a lot of
attention and Estonia government is seen as a unified strategic actor in encouraging the use of
internet throughout society and providing numerous online services, these factor are not
critically important for the diffusion of internet. As the discussion above demonstrated even
semi-successful of these initiatives are at best false positives. Wrong conclusions are drawn
on the basis of these cases. First, even though numerous strategy documents for information
society exist, the implementation mechanisms of ICT policies are relative decentralized.. With
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the decentralization have come benefits as well as costs. On the one hand, Estonian system
has delivered innovation in the form of groundbreaking initiatives (internet voting, ID card
and digital signatures as discussed in Chapter Five) as a result of entrepreneurial discovery in
different government agencies. On the other hand, the system has costs such as
incompatibility of certain solutions and delays in implementation as well as lack of financial
benefits that come with economies of scale and scope in centralized systems. Hence, the
relative successes and failures (or the outcomes) of government initiatives have been quite
heterogeneous by nature rather than homogeneous. As Estonia is often seen as an ICT success
story it is often assumed that policy design and outcomes have been homogeneous.
Second, many initiatives have been launched already after the significant take off of
internet in 2000. Thus, they have actually been a reaction to the availability of internet and
benefited the further use of internet rather than been crucial for the internet diffusion in the
early years. The internet diffusion has been outcome of a path-dependent process in Estonia
where crucial critical juncture took place in 1996 when internet banking was launched. All
following steps have in one way or another built on the success of internet banking. However,
perception of Estonia abroad as an ICT innovator and some successes at home have created
mental models for key policy-makers and other actors where they aim to replicate earlier and
accidental success by deliberate design. Some of these attempts have been fruitful but as this
Chapter tried to demonstrate outcomes have been heterogeneous at best. Let me re-call the
Chapter Two that policy-makers may actually not understand causal mechanisms and draw
wrong policy lessons.
As it was emphasized throughout the description, Estonia does not have sectorspecific approach to ICT. Either explicitly or implicitly ICT is seen as priority by government
institutions and members of society at large. Many government initiatives have been and are
small in its significance for the take-up of internet and they have indirect impact through
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political rhetoric rather than direct impact. The implicit and informal elements of internet
diffusion are more fundamental than formal strategy documents. This also makes it more
challenging to compare and copy directly the Estonian initiatives and solutions in contextually
different. Therefore, it is important to locate specifically the drivers of internet diffusion
beyond reliance on formal strategy documents. The beginning of this Chapter highlighted that
many other countries in the world look to Estonia for guidance on building a path to an
information society. However, the understanding of causal mechanism behind Estonia’s
achievements is often superficial. For this reason, it is important to understand the formal and
informal institutions that actually build internet diffusion. It is crucial to separate the ICT
projects and other activities that are more peripheral to the country’s success. Especially, as
sometimes these projects are false positives. This chapter took also a hard look at the actual
successes of Estonia in the ICT domains and note some significant weaknesses, troubling
long-term trends and project failures. In other words, Estonia offers opportunities to learn
from both its successes and failures but its model must not be automatically copied and
universally transferred to other countries. As it has been emphasized throughout this
dissertation, different countries follow different development trajectories and there is no one
size fits all model for encouraging internet diffusion which is ahistorical and aspatial.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to describe and explain how the internet diffuses in
different institutional contexts. Let me recall that dissertation asked three questions. The first
question was following: How do Estonia and Slovenia differ in the outcomes of internet
diffusion? The second research question of this dissertation was the following: How have the
entrepreneurial discovery processes and internet diffusion intertwined in Estonia? The third
research question of this dissertation was the following: How has institutional complexity
constrained entrepreneurial discovery processes and internet diffusion in Estonia? These
questions corresponded to each individual chapter. In this concluding chapter I will offer
overview of findings which is followed by discussion of methodological limitations and
policy implications.

7.1 Overview of Findings
In order to examine two similar countries and their developmental paths with respect
to internet diffusion, Chapter Four offered a comparative descriptive analysis of Estonia and
Slovenia from 1991 to present. It demonstrated that there is significant variance in the internet
diffusion between Estonia and Slovenia when measured by both eleven variables in the last
year of data availability as well as over time. Most importantly, Estonia has performed better
in internet diffusion outcomes than Slovenia when measured statically in one point of time as
well as dynamically over time. Estonian internet users have been able to use better quality
and higher speed internet for longer time-period than Slovenian users. The more regular use,
better supply of internet and demand for more sophisticated services have interacted more
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favorably in the Estonian case and contributed to both better intensive and extensive diffusion
the internet.
The comparative analysis of Chapter Four also shows clearly that the national wealth
as has been suggested by some scholars cannot explain the variance between internet
diffusion in Estonia and Slovenia. Estonia has been and is considerable poorer than Slovenia
as the data on per capita GDP demonstrated. Furthermore, Estonia is considerably less equal
than Slovenia as the data on the Gini coefficient demonstrated. In spite of lower per capita
GDP and higher inequality, internet has diffused more among Estonian population and among
different population segments by income in Estonia than in Slovenia. Thus, the propositions
based on wealth and/or distribution of wealth as an explanation for the internet diffusion can
be rejected as a crucial factor in the variance between internet diffusion in Estonia and
Slovenia. Furthermore, Chapter 4 also shows that there is no considerable variance in human
capital in the form of ICT skills between Estonia and Slovenia. The dissertation does not aim
to generalize to entire world and hence, it is plausible that national wealth hypothesis and/or
human capital hypothesis fail to be rejected on the basis of different sample of countries. As it
is a descriptive study, then I do not entertain the possibility of causality. However, the wealthbased hypothesis can be rejected by a simple logic on the basis of descriptive statistics in the
case of this comparison.
An examination of institutional developments that investigates formal institutional
arrangements – in other words, the thick description -- shows that most important have been
institutional changes carried out by the Estonian government in the 1990s and the early 2000s.
Interviews showed that both Estonia and Slovenia had vibrant IT communities in the 1990s
but mere existence of an IT community is not sufficient for influencing government decisions
if entrepreneurial discovery processes are seriously hindered by institutional complexity.
Precisely, the interaction between telecom-specific rules of the game and the broader
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institutional framework is fundamental for understanding the reasons for the different
outcomes in the internet diffusion. This is so because it reduces conflicts among different
institutional logic. Estonia had broadly liberal institutional framework for economic
governance after radical reforms in the 1990s. Opening up telecom market for competition
was consistent with these general changes in the rules of the game. All these institutional
changes were also consistent with the EU legislation in both letter and spirit. At the same
time, Slovenia introduced a form of managed capitalism after gradual reforms in the 1990s.
Government was reluctant to open up telecom sector for competition and did so under the EU
pressure. Government is still the main owner of incumbent telecom company and to present
day this issue creates tensions with the EU. Even if Slovenia may follow EU regulation is
letter, it does not do so in spirit as the interviews revealed.
Most importantly, mutual reinforcement of general and sector-specific formal
institutions and timing of institutional change offers an explanation how high quality and high
speed internet has spread widely in the Estonian society and how distribution of internet
among users with different socio-economic backgrounds is more equal in market liberal
Estonia than egalitarian social democratic corporatist Slovenia. The rules created greater
openness in Estonia than in Slovenia. Telecom sector liberalization provided a critical
juncture, which enabled a path that led entrepreneurs to supply high quality fast internet. The
telecom sector liberalization and encouragement of competition is a fundamental difference
between Estonia and Slovenia. It fits nicely with previous empirical works which has
emphasized the importance of telecom liberalization and competition which is discussed in
Chapter Two (Dasgupta et al 2001; Guillen and Suarez 2005; Caselli and Coleman 2001).
However, the telecom sector liberalization and encouragement of competition is not
sufficient on its own for internet diffusion. Chapter Five shows that this supply of telecom
services interacted with other forms entrepreneurship in an ecosystem that produced the
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provision of innovative online services by both public and private sector. The institutional
changes unleashed the process of entrepreneurial discovery and experimentation with
different ICT services as documented in Chapter Five. As an example of this ecosystem,
Chapter Five discussed how innovative peer-to-peer telecom service provider Skype emerged
in Estonia in 2003 and it was sold for 2.6 billion dollars to eBay in 2005.
Most important of these was the online identification method provided by the leading
banks and accepted as a platform by government for building online services. We can
attribute this acceptance of innovation by government as an example of a mental model that
sought out and leveraged innovations for the public good. The banking system with
innovative internet solutions was one of the unintended outcomes of market liberal reforms
carried out by the Estonian governments in the 1990s. It was accidental but it set-forth a pathdependent process where interests of government and banks were incentive compatible. In
the 2000s, both government and banks built on the foundation and gradually started to
substitute the old online identification methods with national ID card. Certainly, this
adoption was possible because of government’s rule-making, which made the ownership of
ID card mandatory and by doing so contributed the emergence of new sophisticated online
services.
Nevertheless, government did not make the use of ID card online mandatory per se
rather certain government services had higher transaction costs when accessed without the ID
card. The emphasis is on the rule-making by the government in contributing to the intensity
of internet diffusion rather than specific initiatives and policies. Certainly, this rule-making
was not rational, top-down process which was able to foresee outcomes. Rather, it was
learning-by-doing, experimental. Some of the experiments worked out well as Chapter Five
documented on the basis of online tax declaration, ID card and internet voting. Other
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government initiatives and policies were by design and outcomes more heterogeneous as
shown in Chapter Six.
Institutional complexity, bounded rationality, uncertainty and policy heterogeneity
documented through various case studies in Chapters Five and Six do suggest that the reason
why Estonia has the higher penetration rate of internet in comparison with Slovenia is not
because of some master plan drawn out to achieve this particular rate adopted by the
government. Although various strategy papers expressing grandiose visions for promoting the
internet did exist, these plans were a reaction to already existing phenomena and an attempt
by politicians as rational agents to capitalize on success; they were not the cause of Estonia’s
rapid internet diffusion. As the thick description on Estonia showed many government
initiatives targeted at the ICT sector and use of internet were not existent in the early years of
internet diffusion. Chapter Six showed that differently from other CEE countries Estonia did
not have a comprehensive ICT strategy before the emergence of internet banking, introduction
of online tax declarations and other crucial initiatives. Chapter Four also discussed that
differently from Slovenia Estonia did not have a special ministry dedicated for ICT. Skype
emerged in 2003 in Estonia but government initiatives for imitating Skype’s success in the
case of other start-ups materialized in 2008 in the form of government venture capital
investment. Once government initiatives such as government venture capital have been
implemented, the allocation of government expenditure to them has not been significant and
these initiatives have not created serious positive externalities for innovation and internet
diffusion as shown in Chapter Six.
The main role of Estonian government as a catalyst for innovation and internet
diffusion has been in the form of general rule-making rather than contributing to the internet
diffusion by specific initiatives and government programs. In the 1990s the Estonian
government followed the advice of its local IT community by unifying the public sector IT
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systems through X-Road and increasing IT use in public sector administration because it fit
well with reforms aimed at making government more efficient and reducing the size of
government in the economy. Most importantly, it was a technologically decentralized and
cost-effective approach which aimed to make different legacy systems to connect to each
other.
The Estonian government did not increase a public sector spending on R&D and did
not engage in industrial policies for IT promotion, however. The government online services
to the general public emerged gradually and were heterogeneous reflecting the different
priorities of different agencies. Overall, the government approach to the ICT use remained
quite decentralized not only technologically but also institutionally as Estonian did not aim to
create any new ministry responsible for the ICT as Slovenia did in the early 2000s.
Hence, analysis of the impact of institutions has to go beyond the consideration of
formal institutions. This is challenging to do because formal institutional changes are
documented and informal institutional changes have to be interpreted indirectly. Nevertheless,
the interaction between formal and informal institutions is fundamental for understanding
effective institutional changes. Chapter Five discussed the case of Skype, which cannot be
understood solely on the basis of formal institutions. The existence of bohemian-libertarian
ecosystem in Estonia enabled various entrepreneurial discovery processed to take place and
allowed experimentation with various forms of ICT ventures. Indeed, the Skype founders’
early venture called Kazaa made them the fugitives of US justice system because their peerto-peer technology was primarily used for illegal file sharing. However, Estonian government
stayed aside and did not intervene.
Entrepreneurial discovery process can take many different forms and exist in both
public and private sectors. Chapter Five showed how on the basis of private sector initiatives
in internet banking public sector online services can be offered. This is a positive case of
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entrepreneurial discovery benefiting public good. However, Chapter Six offered some insights
on basis of interviews how entrepreneurial discovery process can become affiliated with rentseeking on the basis of government venture capital, where risks are socialized and benefits
privatized. Institutional complexity stemming from different institutional logic of venture
capital and public sector governance creates perverse incentives for agents. Thus benefits for
public good are unclear.
By emphasizing the institutional framework and how it conditions entrepreneurial
discovery, the dissertation has demonstrated that the institutional context matters and there are
many tacit elements in understanding the process of internet diffusion. This highlights the fact
that practices on the ground are not captured by nominal variables. In a large N-study based of
limited variables the differences between the telecom sector regulation as well as the role
played by the entrepreneurial discovery in creating online identification methods would be not
understood. Their role of critical junctures of for the extensive and intensive diffusion of
internet in Estonia would be ignored. The path-dependent nature of these developments would
not be captured. Internet is tacit as it is used differently in different political, social and
economic context. Many factors explaining differences in Internet use are also tacit as they
are not easily measurable.

7.2 Limitations of the Study
Certainly, this study comes with several limitations stemming from its descriptive
nature, small population and sample (population equals sample), limited comparisons and
imperfect data. The limitations of data and self-selection biases inherent in using semistructured interviews reveal several obstacles for analysis. This is a fundamental issue that
cannot be solved by more publicly available data and more interviews with actors whose
interests are at stake. Only time may allow overcoming these barriers because only over time
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agents involved in decision-making may become more open about the past decisions. Even
more importantly, the institutional changes are challenging to address because of pathdependency on previous decisions and lack of proper counterfactuals. Second, measurement
difficulties are empirical.
As the number of experts, high level officials, ministries and other very important
persons is small in Estonia and Slovenia, then significant portion of information cannot be
aggregated and published without revealing sensitive information, which people do not want
to reveal in public. The interviews were coded in order to encourage more openness in
interviews but this may not be always useful and people are reluctant to discuss important
issues even on the unpublished record. In addition, public information sources such as
business registries do not always have comparable data on different countries.
However, the future research can be certainly improved by incorporating more
theoretical insights on process-tracing, policy entrepreneurship and institutionalism as well as
improved methodological approaches in the form of network analysis and collection of more
data.
7.3 Policy Implications
The cases come with specific characteristics and these characteristic mean that
findings may not be relevant for all countries but it may be relevant for small countries or
countries. Obviously, this is not just a methodological issue but creates substantial issues for
policy-makers as they try to learn as they go and would like to learn from the Estonian “best
practices”. Hence, this particularist version of history of internet diffusion in Estonia is
limited in its lessons that policy-makers can draw. The purpose of dissertation was to
understand the processes rather than give simplistic “take-aways” as lessons. The particularist
emphasis itself signals that there is no take away. Governments cannot create unintended
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path-dependencies by design which would benefit them. The rationale for policy intervention
is crucially different from the emphasis on institutional complexity in the dissertation. Policymakers assume institutional complexity away and use simplistic deterministic mental models
for making their case. Often policymakers aim is to make long-term commitment of public
funds with limited accountability, transparency and ability to track the performance of
programs aimed at bridging digital divide and justify the public investments in the broader
public discourse.
Even if government schemes are able to establish incentive structure that would make
decision-making processes incentive compatible and establish the best possible public
investment model, the performance of government initiatives are difficult to measure. First,
partially these measurement difficulties are conceptual. The government interventions are
surrounded by uncertainty in fast-changing technological environment. Politicians and
government officials may want certainty and short-term result, which may lead to the
adoption of superficial projects - some of which may be successful and others not - as the
Estonian experience demonstrates. Success is relative and its measurement overdetermined,
which means in the end it is not known whether an initiative materialized accidentally or
because of deliberate actions.
However, one of the key lessons from the dissertation is that the process of
entrepreneurial discovery should be encouraged also in the public sector. Usually, government
officials are not seen as entrepreneurial and entrepreneurs and government bureaucrats are
seen mutually exclusive. However, the Estonian experience suggests that it does not have to
be so. It certainly comes with caveats. Entrepreneurial discover process should not become
rent-seeking. There is a fundamental difference between the two. Former is about creating
new value, new products and services. The latter is about redistributing existing resources.
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Another important message from the Estonian experience is that reduction of
institutional complexity has to be a priority for government because it reduces constraints on
entrepreneurial discovery in both private and public sectors. The key to reduction is
understanding of different institutional logic and how creation of new formal rules of the
game may interact with existing formal and informal rules. This requires more institutional
analysis, which have incorporate insights from political science scholars.
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APPENDIX A
KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

This appendix defines key terms and concepts used in the dissertation in alphabetical
order.
Entrepreneurial discovery – this dissertation relies on broad definition of
entrepreneurial discovery. It is Schumpeterian approach where entrepreneurs are risk-takers
and innovators who find ways to break old routines and establish new ones. Entrepreneur is
not an ordinary business person or employee in a corporation. The latter tends to follow
routines and is not motivated to break the routines. Entrepreneurs engage in constant process
innovation as well as improve existing products and bring new products to the market place.
This approach to entrepreneurial discovery also includes what in smart specialization
literature McCann and Ortega-Argiles (2013a) call an entrepreneurial process of discovery.
This process means involvement of entrepreneurs in policy-making process and consideration
of their insight in early stages of policy design, which allows identification of new domains
for technological development as well as re-designing public policies through constant
feedback mechanism between entrepreneurs and policy-makers. The involvement of
entrepreneurs in policy-making concerning ICTs and other technologies is crucial because
successful innovation policy has to be aware of developments in real economy. The degree of
embeddedness and relatedness of domain increases the impact of innovation developments
across different activities and sectors. It has to be pointed out that smart specialization
literature defines entrepreneurs very broadly: public universities and research institutes can be
entrepreneurial and part of the process. It is not impossible that policy makers can be
entrepreneurial. Hence, the entrepreneurial discovery is not only limited to private sector, but
can also take place in public sector as well as in the non-governmental sector.
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Epistemological nature of technology means that diffusion an use of technology
takes place within the social frameworks of knowledge. Our previous knowledge and beliefs
affect how we use technology. At the same time, technological change affects how we think
and our thinking about thinking. It is circular process but technological change does not have
unifirm impact. We perceive technology differently depending who we are. Braman (2012)
see information policy as epistemology policy. She argues that epistemology affects
perceptual entity, i.e. how we perceive technology, it affects how material and social world
are experienced, translation of experiences into facts and which facts are are discussed in
social groups and lead to consensually understood truth (Braman 2012, 137)
Institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (Pierson 2004, 27). Institutions consist both
formal and informal institutions. The former is understood as laws, regulations, constitutions
and other rules made by government and/or international governmental organizations. The
latter is defined as social norms, culture and other nonformalized rules of the game shaping
the behavior of agents. It also includes social networks and social capital.
Institutional complexity – refers to the interactions of formal and informal
institutions as well as interactions of formal institutions on different levels of government
regulations. This implies that broad rules governing macroeconomic environment may
conflict with regulations on micro level. There is considerable literature on institutional
complexity and one way to define it is “incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional
logics” (Greenwood, Raynard et al. 2011, 317). Different institutions, their interactions,
conflicts and institutional logics (see it defined below) creates institutional complexity.
Usually, it can be assumed that greater institutional complexity implies greater constraints on
agency. However, it does not have to be so. Some entrepreneurs and policy entrepreneurs may
be well equipped for navigating in institutional complexity and achieving desired outcomes.
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They may benefit from complexity and it may create absolute or comparative advantages for
them.
Institutional logic - may stem from laws and regulations imposed by government in
the case of formal institutions as well as socially constructed historical patterns of behavior,
mental models of agents, habits, assumptions, expectations, values, culture and other rules,
which may constrain or enable individuals and groups of individuals in their behavior and
define social reality for them. Institutional logic may operate on community level as long as
community members share the same beliefs. On a macro level, community may be a nation.
Different nationalities may share the same beliefs about themselves and other nations. On a
micro level, such abstract community as a nation may consist many different communities,
which may follow different institutional logic. These communities may have different
understanding of the same issue depending on their beliefs, knowledge and other factors
(Smets, Morris et al., 2012; Thornton, Ocacio et al. 2012). For instance, nation as a
community may be proud of IT developments in their country. They may experience the
differences in quality and availability of services when spending time abroad or read about it
in the newspapers. Within a nation IT community may also share the view about overall
progress but may be more critical of recent developments finding that the government is not
investing enough in IT development. Within IT community open source community may have
a different view finding that government has overinvested in proprietary software solution and
should rely on open source solutions instead.
Internet diffusion - There is no uniform definition of internet diffusion in the
literature. Often scholars use the terms internet diffusion, penetration, adoption,
connecitivity, access, use and digital divide interexchangably to describe the same
phenomena. For example, the Internet Encyclopedia offers the following definition:
“diffusion of an innovation is a macro process concerned with the spread of the innovation
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from its source to the public” (Dholakia et al 2004). The adoption is defined as “… a micro
process that focuses on the stages through which an individual passes when deciding to accept
or reject the innovation” (Dholakia et al 2004). However, individual decisions to adopt or not
to adopt the Internet have clearly consequences on macro level. And diffusion on macro level
impacts individual decisions on micro level to adopt the internet. In practice, it is not possible
to draw clear lines between adoption and diffusion as these processes are mutually
interdependent. Micro and macro processes interact. Often macro outcomes are simply
aggregates of multiple micro processes. Adoption of internet by groups of individuals such as
students or businesses in manufacturing sector, for instance, increases diffusion of internet on
per capita basis on macro level. Indeed, the same encyclopedia talks about “adoption and
diffusion patterns of internet” without clearly distinguishing between the two (Dholakia et al
2004). Essentially, adoption, use, penetration and diffusion of Internet describe the same
phenomena.
Path-dependence – this dissertation uses following definition: “At every step along
the way there were choices political and economic - that provided real alternatives. Path
dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision making through
time” (Pierson 2004, 52). It is not a story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the
future. Rather than assuming causal independence through time, it assumes that events are
normally "path dependent," that is, that what has happened at an earlier point in time will
affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time (Pierson
2004, 20).
Policy heterogeneity – implies that public policies often have heterogeneous context
and design. Knoepfel et al (2011) argue that if implementation of public policy falls under
several ministries, or several departments within one ministry, then policy context is
heterogeneous. If policy is implemented by one unit at the same ministry, then it is
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homogeneous. They give defense policy as an example of homogeneous administrative
context while policies dealing with natural disasters are heterogeneous (Knoepfel et al 2011,
186-187). Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine completely homogeneous policy context –
even in the case of defense policy different ministries are involved as stakeholders. For
instance, the implementation of defense policy depends on taxation which means trade-offs
have to be made among ministries and in society. Hence, it is a question of degree of
heterogeneity and homogeneity. Most importantly, ICT policies have high degree of
heterogeneity by administrative context as well as design. ICT is by nature horizontal
dependent on physical infrastructure as well as humans skills in different administrative units
and in society as well. Knoepfel et al (2011) approach seems also narrow considering nature
of public policy implementation in general and ICT policies in particular. Even if policy
context and design is homogeneous, then the impact of public policies can be heterogeneous.
This may stem from unintended consequences, interactions of government regulations with
informal rules as discussed under institutional complexity. It is similar to competitive
heterogeneity affiliated by scholars such as Harold Demzets (1973) and Michael Porter (1980)
in strategic management and industrial economics, which examines why industries do not
converge on one single model of operations. In international economics policy heterogeneity
is used to highlight regulatory differences between countries (Kox and Lejour 2005).
However, there might be also regulatory differences within countries or among the group of
countries such as EU, which formally have adopted same regulations. It is a fact of life that
regulations may conflict with each other and may be implemented differently by
policymakers.
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APPENDIX B
OVERVIEW OF ESTONIA AND SLOVENIA
Estonia
Estonia per capita GDP was almost 20 000 in current US dollars in 2014 which is
below the EU average of 36 000 dollars (World Bank 2015). In 1995 Estonian per capita GDP
was 3000 in current US dollars. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonia
experienced rapid decline in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in combination with high
levels of inflation. GDP in 1992 decreased by 14.2 percent and the annual rate of inflation
was 1.076 percent. However, Estonia’s economic misfortune turned around relatively quickly.
By 1995 rapid GDP growth became characteristic to this economy. For instance, Estonia
reached 11.7 percent growth in 1997. Since 1998, the inflation rate has been limited to single
digits. Within a few years Estonia had oriented its economy to the Western markets to such a
degree that even the 1998 financial crisis in Russia had relatively small consequences in
Estonia – GDP dropped 0.3 percent in 1999 and the growth was restored to positive figures by
2000 (International Monetary Fund 2009). In retrospect, the Russian crisis and collapse of
markets in the East helped to cool down an overheating economy and strengthen economic
integration with Western markets. Most importantly, Estonia experienced some of the most
spectacular GDP growth rates in Europe in the second half of the 1990s and early years of the
decade. The rate of growth was more than seven percent for each year between 2000 and
2007, and indeed, reached 11.4 percent in 2007.
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Estonia’s total GDP was 26 billion in current US dollars in 2014 while it was slightly
over 4 billion US dollars in 1995 (World Bank 2015). Estonian labor productivity based on
hours worked was slighlty over 60 percent of the EU average in 2013 (Eurostat 2015).
However, it was only 41 percent of the EU average in 2000 which signals significant progress
over the decade. Estonian population is 1.3 million people of whom 32 percent lives in rural
areas (World Bank 2015). Estonia is one of the most attractive destinations for inward FDI in
Europe as well as in the Central and Eastern Europe. Inward FDI to GDP ratio was 84.5
percent in 2012 (Eurostat 2015). Only Bulgaria with almost 94 percent had better outcome in
the CEE.
Estonian general government debt to GDP ratio was 10.6 percent in 2014 while it was
3.7 percent in 2007. The increase was modest considering that Estonian GDP decreased
cumulatively by almost 20 percent in 2008 and 2009 which made it the third-deepest
recession in the EU (International Monetary Fund 2009). Estonian government pursued
conservative fiscal policy throughout crisis and aimed to keep budget balanced. the
government implemented contractionary economic policies in response to the current crisis.
Throughout the economic depression, Estonia has remained a beacon of fiscal prudence,
keeping the public sector debt at the lowest level in Europe and one of the lowest levels in the
world. Estonia has not issued and does not issue government bonds, thereby essentially
making this country the “Anti-Greece,” to use a term recently coined in a Financial Times
editorial (Financial Times 2010). As Estonia is a small open economy and rapid credit
expansion had boosted domestic consumption after entrance to the European Union (EU) in
2004, then it is not surprising that the country was hit hard by the recent financial crisis.
Significant export markets disappeared and the domestic housing bubble deflated
The overall government budget surplus was 0.6 in 2014 while it was 1.8 percent in
2003 (Eurostat 2015). Even during severe recession in 2008 and 2009 government deficits did
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not reach 3 percent of GDP which is maximum allowed by the EU Maastricht criteria.
Throughout the so-called boom years the government ran constant budget surpluses and built
up emergency reserves, moves that also helped to respond to the crisis without any external
assistance. Instead of external devaluation by changing the exchange rate of the Estonian
kroon to the euro, the government kept the peg and opted for internal devaluation, resulting in
wage cuts averaging twenty percent.

Estonia joined the eurozone in 2011, when many

experts started to question the viability of euro as a currency in the long run.
Slovenia
Slovenia became independent from Yugoslavia in 1991 and was the wealthiest of
Central and Eastern European countries which joined the European Union in 2004. Slovenia’s
population is about 2 million and Slovenian make up roughly 80 percent of this population.
Other ethnic groups include Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and many others. 50 percent of
population lives in rural areas. Population density is 101 inhabitants per square kilometer.
Total area of country is 20,273 square kilometers. Slovenia per capita GDP was 24 000 in
current US dollars in 2014 which is below the EU average of 36 000 dollars. In 1995,
Slovenia’s per capita GDP was almost 11 000 in current US dollars (World Bank 2015). This
signals that Slovenia’s transition from market socialism to market economy has been
relatively gradual over the past decades without significant ups and downs.
Slovenia’s total GDP was 49 billion in current US dollars in 2014 while it was 21
billion in 1995. Slovenia’s labor productivity was 86 percent of the EU average in 2013 and it
was 76 percent in 2000 (Eurostat 2015). Slovenia’s general government debt to GDP ratio
was 81 percent in 2014 while before the economic and financial crisis at 23 percent in 2007.
In 2003 Slovenia’s debt to GDP ratio was close 27 percent which indicates that government
debt had been gradually reduced. This clearly indicates that Slovenia has suffered in the crisis
and followed relatively loose fiscal policies by trying to stimulate economy by public sector
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spending. Furthermore, Slovenia’s current debt level exceeds 60 percent allowed by the
Maastricht Treaty. Slovenia joined the eurozone in 2007 and made a commitment to follow
Maastricht criteria concerning government debt level and deficits.
However, Slovenian government has run excessive deficits since 2009 which have
been significantly higher than 3 percent to GDP ratio allowed by Maastricht treaty. In 2014
Slovenia’s public sector deficit was 5 percent and in 2013 15 percent. However, before the
country joined the euro, the annual deficits stayed within 1-2 percent and never exceeded 3
percent (Eurostat 2015). Because of excessive macroeconomic imbalances, Slovenian
economy has been under close scrutiny of the European Commission. In Spring 2015 EU
Council warned that Slovenia’s government macroeconomic policies do not meet the criteria
of EU Stability and Growth Pact. It also sätted that Slovenia’s business environment is
constrained by excessive regulations which do not facilitate the growht and government has
been slow in privitizing state assets such as state owned banks.
Constraints in the business environment of Slovenia are well demonstrated by looking
at FDI statistics. Slovenia was one of the most attractive destinations for FDI in Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) in the late 1980s throughout the mid-1990s. However, according to the
current FDI to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio, Slovenia lags behind other countries in
the region. Inward FDI to GDP ratio was 33.2 percent which is the worst outcome among the
CEE countries who joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (Eurostat 2015). One key difference with
other CEE countries is that FDI in Slovenian telecom sector is nonexistent. Throughout the
years, Slovenia has engaged in selective protection against certain types of FDI. Most inward
FDI is directed into the manufacturing sector, including industrial output such as paper, paper
products, machinery and equipment, rubber and plastic products, chemicals and chemical
products, and motor vehicles (OECD 2002, 10). Most of these products play an important role
in Slovenia’s export structure. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
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Development (OECD), foreign investors were attracted to Slovenia because of individual
companies rather than specific industries (OECD 2002, 10). In addition, FDI is concentrated
on a small number of large multinational companies (MNEs) of European origin. This
characteristic indicates that Slovenia has been well integrated with the economic clusters in
Europe (Biegelbauer et al 2001).
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APPENDIX C
LIST OF SEMISTRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

No
1
2

Position
Minister
high official

Company
government
government

Date
Jan 6, 2003
Jan 7, 2003

Place
Ljubljana
Ljubljana

Method
in person
In person

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

owner
official
researcher
activist
expert
regulator
researcher
executive
professor
expert
owner
executive
journalist
official
lobbyist

IT company
parliament
University
social movement
ICT company
government
university
telecom
university
university
IT company
ICT company
TV
government
telecom

Ljubljana
Ljubljana
Ljubljana
Ljubljana
Ljubljana
Ljubljana
Ljubljana
Ljubljana
Maribor
Ljubljana
Ljubljana
Tallinn
Tallinn
Tallinn
DC

In person
In person
In person
In person
In person
In person
In person
In person
In person
In person
In person
In person
In person
In person
In person

18

former banker

bank

Tallinn

In person

19
20
21

official
high official
CEO/owner

government
government
ICT company

Tallinn
Tallinn
Tallinn

In person
In person
In person

22
22

regulator
Investor/owner

government
social network

Tallinn
Tallinn

In person
In person

23

CEO/owner

ICT company

Tallinn

In person

24

CEO/owner

ICT company

Tallinn

In person

25

executive

government

Tallinn

In person

26

investor

ICT

Tallinn

In person

27

expert

university

Tallinn

In person

28

former banker

banking

Tallinn

In person

29

official

government

Tallinn

In person

30

former CEO

large ICT company

Jan 7, 2003
Jan 8, 2003
Jan 8, 2003
Jan 9, 2003
Jan 9, 2003
Jun 7, 2012
Jun 7, 2012
Jun 7, 2012
Jun 8, 2012
Jun 6, 2012
Jun 6, 2012
Dec 3, 2008
May 5, 2009
May 7, 2009
March 4,
2009
Sept 25,
2011
Dec 3, 2011
Dec 5, 2011
September
4, 2012
Sept 5, 2012
September
7, 2012
September
3, 2012
Aug 23,
2012
Sept 20,
2013
August 13,
2013
August 8,
2013
August 21,
2013
August 13,
2013
August 23
2013

Tallinn

In person
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33
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34
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2013
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2013
August 17,
2012
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2012
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In person

Tartu
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In person
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APPENDIX E
NETWORK ANALYSIS
Network analysis of EstVCA full members on May 7, 2013, with following 15 urls:
http://www.arengufond.ee
http://www.asi.ee
http://www.baltcap.ee
http://www.cresco.ee
http://www.danskecapital.ee
http://www.essentiacapital.com
http://www.estban.ee
http://www.estvca.ee
http://www.masainvest.com
http://www.mtvp.ee
http://www.pioneer.ee
http://www.redgatecapital.eu
http://www.smartcap.ee
http://www.swedbank.ee/private/investor/funds/funds/hai
http://www.unitedpartners.ee
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